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Seré todos o nadie. Seré el otro
Que sin saberlo soy, el que ha mirado
Ese otro sueño, mi vigilia. La juzga,
Resignado y sonriente.
—Jorge Luis Borges
—“El sueño”
[I shall be all or no one. I shall be the other
I am without knowing it, he who has looked on
that other dream, my waking state. He weighs it up,
resigned and smiling.]

Personalmente, yo no me creo dotada de poderes especiales, sino más bien de una
capacidad para ver rápidamente las relaciones de causa a efecto, y ello fuera de los
límites ordinaries de la lógica corriente.
—Remedios Varo
—Cartas
[Personally, I do not think I am endowed with special powers, but rather an ability to
quickly see the relationship between cause and effect beyond the current limits of
ordinary logic.]
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ABSTRACT
Bob Kalivac Carroll
The Numinous Gate: A Philosophico-Phenomenological Study
of Wonder and Image Consciousness in the Fabulist Art of Varo and Borges

This study investigates the roles of wonder and a sensibility to “the numinous” in the
work of Spanish-Mexican painter Remedios Varo and Argentine writer and poet
Jorge Luis Borges, each of whom created fabulist narratives, visual and literary
respectively. An investigation of wonder as a distinctly “disruptive” universal
phenomenon and its accompanying “not-knowing” and “self-forgetting” qualities
serve as an entryway for engaging, contemplating and depicting the infinitely shifting
terrain that marks the invisibility of the numinous. Eastern approaches to
understanding the variations and fluctuations of aesthetic consciousness might
describe this theme as a “gateless gate.” Thus European and Asian thought are
combined to support the argument that Varo and Borges’s irrealistic narratives
challenge any immutable account of truth and reality in art. The proposal herein is
that truth and reality are ultimately indefinable aspects of art. Grounding this study in
a philosophico-phenomenological orientation by combining a methodology rooted in
Edmund Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology with aesthetically oriented
philosophical commentary by other thinkers allows the seemingly amorphous and
paradoxical roles of subjectivity and spiritual consciousness in modern art and
aesthetics to be more directly examined and understood. That the dynamic of the
artist-philosopher fuels an impulse to make visible through art the invisibility of what
vi

Rudolf Otto called “the numinous” reflects how, as Remedios Varo asserted, art is
made “as a way of communicating the incommunicable,” thus bringing meaning to
what Borges describes as “the overwhelming disorder of the real world.” The seminal
roles of subjectivity—the decentering of the subject, Husserlian transcendental
subjectivity and intersubjectivity, and intertexual philosophical assessments of
subjectivity— are all used to explore Borges’s literary and Varo’s visual storytelling
and their respective searches for truth and reality.
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The Numinous Gate: A Philosophico-Phenomenological Study
of Wonder and Image Consciousness in the Fabulist Art of Varo and Borges
Introduction—Communicating the Incommunicable
This study investigates the interwoven roles of the numinous, wonder, and
image consciousness in the work of Spanish-Mexican painter Remedios Varo and
Argentine writer and poet Jorge Luis Borges, both of whom created narratives—
visual and literary respectfully—of what is described here as irreal fabulism.1
Explicating Varo and Borges’s irreal fabulist storytelling magnifies the broader
thematic focus of the study. Similarly, considering the art of Varo and Borges as
being rooted in wonder opens an investigative window for viewing how a sensibility
to what Rudolf Otto termed “the numinous” lends itself to an aesthetically inspired
nonlinear search of mystery.2 Grounding this investigation in a philosophicophenomenological3 orientation allows the seemingly amorphous and paradoxical role
of spiritual consciousness in art and aesthetics to be more directly examined and
understood.
However, a necessary interjection here is that because the word “spiritual” is
so replete with multiple connotative meanings, the broader definition inherent in “the
numinous” is utilized because it enfolds spirituality as well as other topics that are
seemingly less spiritual but nonetheless related to mystery or the unknown. These
additional meanings of the numinous will be examined ahead.
Similarly, employing a methodology inspired by Edmund Husserl’s
transcendental phenomenology, and especially his theories of epochē, image

consciousness (Bildbewußtein, also translated as “depicting consciousness”), fantasy
or imagination, and memory, yields a more logical and conceptual rendering of the
ineffable nature of the proposed theme. Essentially, this study argues that art4 is
rooted in an impulse to disclose or make visible the invisibility of numinous presence,
or as Remedios Varo put it, art can serve as “a way of communicating the
incommunicable” (Elizondo 216), thus bringing meaning to what Borges describes as
“the overwhelming disorder of the real world” (Selected Non-Fictions 81).5 Related
topics include intertexualities (both conceptually driven discursive and perceptually
fueled visual versions), and a consideration of how the root source of wonder in the
specific cases of Varo and Borges serves the dynamic of the artist-philosopher.
Examining the creative processes of Remedios Varo and Jorge Luis Borges
allows the multifarious and interwoven topics of irreal fabulist storytelling, wonder,
the numinous, and image consciousness to be elucidated and presented via a
consolidated examination, while a philosophico-phenomenological orientation allows
plurality to be partnered with congruity. In other words, the manifold topics and
subtopics that surface here can be illustrated in the literary art of Borges and the
visual art of Varo, even though this is neither an exhaustive study nor a survey of
their work. While both of these artists respond aesthetically to a sensibility to the
numinous in his or her distinctive fashion, Borges’ philosophically and intertextually
oriented work is clearly different from Varo’s representational magical and mystical
paintings. Varo and Borges also emphasize autobiographical elements in different
ways, as will be seen. Nonetheless, their common orientation to creativity involves an

2

amalgamation of wonder and an impulse to seek, elucidate, and somehow represent
the numinous via irreal fabulist art.
What is more challenging is to explicate the evidence of sensibility in these
two artists and the other artists referenced herein—from Kandinsky to Duchamp and
beyond—to a common numinous presence, one that exists prior to any subjective
filtering. While subjectivity is central here, it is not a conventional or psychological
study of individual subjectivity per se. Instead, Husserlian transcendental subjectivity
and intersubjectivity concepts, as well as other theories about subjectivity and
creativity, are referenced. For example, the writings of Russian theorist Mikhail
Bakhtin, French novelist and philosopher Georges Bataille, and German philosopher
Arthur Schopenhauer, among others, are referenced in regards to aesthetically
oriented metaphysical concepts and issues, and to address the paradoxes and
conundrums inherent in subjectivity.
The Chapters
Specific topics and issues are explored to explicate the multi-thematic territory
described above, beginning with Chapter One—Phenomenological: A Husserlian
Methodology, which establishes the methodological means used to elucidate relevant
thematic territories. While that chapter aims primarily at establishing the
methodological means inherent in Husserlian phenomenological concepts such as
epochē,6 intersubjectivity, image consciousness, and other tools used for explicating
more clearly topics related to mystery, there are additional non-Husserlian concepts
that are relevant and very useful as well.

3

Chapter Two—Wonder as Disruption: Subjectivity and Not-knowing, besides
investigating the phenomenon of wonder itself, argues that wonder undermines
various presumptions about subjectivity and conceptual thinking, as well as specific
presuppositions about life and the world—presumptions rooted in scientific
materialism and conventionally linear ways of knowing. Wonder is closely related to
the topic in Chapter Three—The Numinous, which addresses a topic that—at least in
phenomenological and philosophical terms, and to some extent in contemporary
sociopolitical thought—is taboo. There are various reasons for this unspoken
prohibition against studying the numinous in contemporary aesthetics and philosophy,
the most salient of those reasons being the question of how can one possibly address
(beyond religious belief and New Age notions) what is by its very nature seemingly
not addressable. Because the numinous is invisible and a highly subjective, seemingly
enigmatic experience, one naturally is puzzled as to how it might be examined and
understood objectively as a universal element of life and reality. Yet this is also a
primary reason why this kind of investigation can be valuable—the numinous is
rarely examined in the conceptual and discursive worlds of contemporary philosophy.
There remains a tendency to either ignore topics like wonder, the numinous, and
ecstasy, or to reassign them to other fields such as religious studies or psychology. In
fact, it is not unusual for contemporary thinkers to categorize wonder and the
numinous as banal topics in the sense that they are unsuited for objective
philosophical studies and consequently are irrelevant in contemporary thought and art
theory.

4

That attitude is not the case here. In regards to mystery and the invisible, part
of this study’s purpose is to argue against contemporary presumptions that such
ineffable topics are automatically invalid ideas impenetrable to scholarly
investigation. This inquiry proposes and argues that such an understanding is indeed
possible even if these topics ultimately appear to be apodictic, and that such an
explication is a valid philosophical project. This last point is asserted with a caveat—
merely presuming the numinous is apodictic is not enough. While part of the answer
to this conundrum is explicated in the chapter on wonder, what is required is more
than a neatly packaged answer rooted in conjecture and opinion. Just as significant as
eschewing any pat answer in regards to challenging the unspoken prohibition
described above is to formulate the right questions without philosophical, theoretical,
theological or personal presuppositions. A failure to bracket out presuppositions of
any kind places this investigation (and in fact any philosophical investigation) in
jeopardy of becoming something less than what it is or what it intends to be. To
burden something as critical and far-reaching as philosophical investigation with
presuppositional and thus possibly invalid understanding, which is to say possible
misunderstanding, is to place philosophy itself in the precarious position of becoming
yet another belief system. The unconscious motive to undermine philosophical
discourse by converting it to a belief system must not be ignored; it must be bracketed
out. Open-mindedness is understood to be more than a cultural or religious
automaticity since what is required is an immaculately constituted examination and
exegesis. Thus the approach here is to utilize scholarly work for a philosophical
examination of what has frequently been avoided, ignored or dismissed.
5

Chapter Four—Seeking the Numinous in Modern Art may at first seem
superfluous, given that numerous artists besides Varo and Borges are referenced. Yet
this chapter is essential in that it establishes a broad grounding of evidence that many
modern artist-philosophers confronted and attempted to communicate through
aesthetic motifs, artistic styles, and leitmotifs7 such as wonder, a sensibility to the
numinous, and ecstatic expression, a search for a numinous gateway. The purpose of
this chapter, then, is to establish with clarity and via historical evidence that an artistic
attraction to wonder and the numinous, while not universal, is nonetheless much
broader than the work of the two artists emphasized in this particular thesis. And that
is possible. Art commentaries of numerous modern artists and writers besides Varo
and Borges have explored various expressions of this issue. Those art commentaries
and the artworks viewed in this chapter add substance to the overall thematic purport
of this study. In other words, Chapter Four helps to provide evidence within an
investigational framework that can be described as a specific thematic geography, one
that takes into account the impulse to seek the numinous in artistic creativity, thus
accentuating how such themes were acceptable prior to unconscious contemporary
(and in some cases emphatically and calculatedly conscious) prohibitions. It is
essential to show that an artistic sensibility to and a seeking for the numinous has not
been restricted to only a few seemingly eccentric artists, but was, especially before
postmodernist thought and aesthetics, widespread. Evidence is also presented in this
chapter that some postmodernist and contemporary artists have continued to
demonstrate this sensibility to and search for the numinous.
Chapter Five—Philosophico: An Intertextual Orientation to Aesthetic
6

Thinkers continues to examine the validity of this thematic territory. A major section,
for example, of Arthur Schopenhauer’s masterpiece The World as Will and
Presentation (Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung)—“Third Book: The Platonic Idea:
The Object of Art” explicates an essential subtopic here via his writing and thought.
Schopenhauer was the first major western philosopher to acknowledge and
incorporate in any substantial way non-Eurocentric concepts and forms of
understanding.
Similarly, the concept of carnivalesque presented by Russian thinker Mikhail
Bakhtin, and his advocacy of “art for life’s sake,” is important when applied to
Borges and Varo. These two artists’ uses of irrealist fabulism—terms explicated in
more detail ahead—elucidate and are elucidated by Bakhtin’s theme of the
carnivalesque. The writings of Borges and paintings of Varo both signal a lifepositive orientation to the human being, one that affirms a sensibility of art for life’s
sake. Bakhtin presents the carnivalesque as a merging of the sacred with the
irreligious or profane, inspiring an anti-authoritarian, contrarian celebration of life
and art, a style of presentation relevant to the work of Borges and Varo. A liberating
attitude towards the humor and the grotesque is inherent in the carnivalesque, just as
humor is inherent in the artist-philosopher dynamic fueling the creativity of Varo and
Borges. Both artists immerse, to some extent, their work in popular culture, while
simultaneously challenging, through the carnivalesque and other means, uninspected
categorical presumptions and cultural limitations of what only appears to be a
stabilized society. Thus this chapter utilizes, often in an intertextual context, the work
of Schopenhauer, Plato, Kant, Bakhtin, Bataille and other thinkers whose ideas are
7

specifically relevant to wonder, the numinous, image consciousness, and the various
aspects of subjectivity.
Chapter Six—Art for Life: Varo and Borges as Artist-Philosophers brings the
previous chapters together to bear more directly on the work of these two artists.
Working from the already established historical and aesthetic ground established in
Chapter Four about the search for the numinous in modern art, the unique and what is
described by the title of Rick O’Rawe’s study of The Unorthodox Spiritualities of
Jorge Luis Borges and Remedios Varo are disclosed and elucidated. The relevance of
themes and topics introduced in the first five chapters—Husserlian phenomenology,
wonder as disruption, the numinous, the artistic seeking of the numinous, or mystery,
and multifarious philosophy of art concepts—emerges again in Chapter Six to
illustrate in artistic terms within the artist-philosopher dynamic what was
philosophically and aesthetically explicated earlier.
The Interrelatedness of Not-knowing, Ecstasy, Self-forgetting
Some significant (and to some extent precursory) inquiries underlie the
explication of the primary themes in the chapters described above. While most of
these subtopics will be addressed in the relevant chapters themselves (such as, for
example, the phenomenological Husserlian terms intentionality, givenness, and representation in Chapter One), a few are relevant throughout all the chapters. These
include knowing and not-knowing, ecstasy, self-forgetting, chance, invisibility,
intuitive perception, and performance-assisted subjective process. However, only a
few need to be introduced immediately.
It is necessary, for example, to ask what knowledge is, or exactly how do we
8

know something to be true? This is more complex than one might initially presume.
One of the most direct answers to the question of how can we know something to be
true requires an address of what we do not know, and certainly the “answer” Socrates
offers in Plato’s Theaetetus reveals a description of unknowing or not-knowing that is
relevant here. In his discussion with the young Theaetetus, Socrates notes that a
“strange occurrence” surfaces in an attempt to understand or define knowledge. This
occurrence, Socrates asserts, is that “an interchange of pieces of knowledge should
ever turn out to be a false judgement” (Plato, Theaetetus, 91). When Theaetetus asks
for clarification about this assertion, Socrates goes on to say:
First of all, that someone who has knowledge of something should be
ignorant of that very thing, not through ignorance, but because of his
own knowledge; and second, that he should judge that thing to be
something else, and something else to be that thing—surely it’s very
unreasonable? That, when knowledge has come to be present in it, the
mind should know nothing, and be ignorant of everything? Because
according to that argument, there’s nothing to stop even ignorance
making one know something, or blindness making one see, if even
knowledge can sometimes make one ignorant (91-92).
Besides “blindness making one see” being a profound statement, it is more
importantly a relevant one.8 Recalling the famous statement by Socrates in Plato’s
Apology is also useful:
When I left him, I reasoned thus with myself: I am wiser than this
man, for neither of us appears to know anything great and good; but he
9

fancies he knows something, although he knows nothing; whereas I, as
I do not know anything, so I do not fancy I do. In this trifling
particular, then, I appear to be wiser than he, because I do not fancy I
know what I do not know (Plato, Six Great Dialogues, 4-5).9
Although wonder and not-knowing are fully explicated in Chapter Two, this
seeking to understand the nature and validity of knowledge demands some
explanation of how an association between wonder and not-knowing surfaces. The
sense of wonder is acknowledged in the philosophies of both Plato and Aristotle,
though in distinct ways. As Aristotle wrote in the Metaphysics, “For it is owing to
their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize” (Vasalou,
“Wonder” 51). In her essay “Wonder and the Beginning of Philosophy in Plato,”
Sylvana Chrysakopoulou writes, “No wonder that Socrates in the Theaetetus begins
the genealogy of philosophy with “wonder”— a highly ecstatic yet profoundly
disorienting state of consciousness arising when experiencing the unfamiliar as
strangely familiar and vice versa, or when unexpected attraction for the unknown
triggers memories of a life never lived” (89). Later, Chrysakopoulou examines the
extended implications of Greek wonder and the beginnings of philosophy: “To
Socrates, wonder is a ‘passion,’ a state to which the soul is subjected—in accordance
with the meaning of pathos in ancient Greek. Although thauma [wonder] is described
as a malady, a kind of malaise that captures the soul all of a sudden, wonder is not
only welcome, but also necessary to begin philosophizing” (94).
Chrysakopoulou goes on to propose that understanding begins with ignorance,
not with knowledge, and that this may well include a sense of disorientation. At the
10

same time, thauma also leads to intellectual illumination, as when the first messenger
of the Greek gods, Iris, appears “like an iridescent vision through the dark mists of
the soul’s ignorance” (95), a beginning principle in seeking wisdom, as in a rainbow
or archê “bridging over philosophy” (95). It is Plato’s emphasis on wonder as “the
beginning of philosophizing as a divine phenomenon, a sort of epiphany, related to
the sight of divine beauty” (95) that sets off the Platonic version of wonder from
Aristotle’s more scientific observation of wonder as a starting point.
The moment of unfamiliarity, of mystery or not-knowing occurs—as
contemporary phenomenological scholar Jennifer Anna Gossetti-Ferencei argues in
The Ecstatic Quotidian: Phenomenological Sightings in Modern Art and Literature—
against the background of daily life experience:
The “quotidian” is the sense of life built up in daily experience by
everyday habits, by the sedimentation of ordinary expectation of the
world, but also by the tensions between the regularity of the familiar
and necessary innovation. The quotidian is that background in contrast
to which new discoveries emerge and we are surprised; and more
pointedly, it is a necessary condition for surprise, the regularity in
contrast to which something new and unexpected occurs.
Unfamiliarity, wonder, and mysteriousness are both embedded in and
turnings-away from familiarity and predictability. These turningsaway, our stepping outside of the ordinary, do not leave it behind, but
draw energy and vivacity from this deviation (Gosetti-Ferencei 1).
While the experience of wonder may perhaps be less likely to arise
11

spontaneously with adults, who are burdened, in a sense, with a plethora of
presuppositional knowledge, it is nonetheless available over and against a contextual
disruption of the quotidian.
The primary point is that wonder is an essential factor in life, in philosophy, in
art and in the philosophy of art, and that wonder includes an experience of notknowing. As will be seen, wonder and not-knowing are also connected to art for life’s
sake. In fact, prior to art and scholarship (although related to both) is the role of
wonder in humankind’s collective experience of knowing and not-knowing. The
phenomenon of wonder reflects a philosophical and aesthetic significance greater
than any presumption of fairytale “make believe” entertainment. While Varo and
Borges were chosen specifically because they do not dismiss mystery and the
invisible as impenetrable, but acknowledge and attempt to excavate the phenomenon
through their art, Gossetti-Ferencei’s point above about “unfamiliarity, wonder, and
mysteriousness” (1) signals, among other issues, that the proposal here of wonder and
not-knowing is not restricted to the oeuvres of Borges and Varo. Bataille, for
example, not only discusses “nonknowledge” and ecstasy in art; he discusses the
connection between nonknowledge and topics like torture, pain, pornography, and
death. To Bataille, nonknowledge opens doorways:
On entering into nonknowledge, I know I erase the figures from the
blackboard. But the obscurity that falls in this way isn’t that of
annihilation, it is not even the “night when all cows are black.” It is the
enjoyment [jouissance] of the night. It is only slow death, death that it
is possible to enjoy. And I am learning, slowly, that the death at work
12

in me wasn’t missing only from my knowledge, but also from the
depths of my joy. I learn this only in order to die. I know that without
this annihilation already within my thought, my thought would be
servile babble, and I will not know my ultimate thought as it is the
death of thought (Unfinished System of Nonknowledge 204).
That Bataille’s approach is that of the artist-philosopher and not simply the
thinker becomes evident throughout his writings, as when he states, “The death of
thought is the voluptuous orgy that prepares death, the festival held in the house of
the dead” (204). Bataille’s great value is that he passionately enters the darkness of
mystery, and even provides for himself an intimate examination of evil, in order to
access ecstatic joy and a kind of freedom that engenders artistic integrity that extends
his art and his life beyond the limitations of linear discursive thought. Nor is the
festival he speaks of above so distant or different from the Bakhtinian carnivalesque,
with its feast animated within the contrarian trope.
That said, ample evidence exists that both Borges and Varo are well aware of
the implications and value of mystery, or the numinous, and of not-knowing. Among
the writings of Borges is an excerpt from his 1928 “The Language of the Argentines”
(“El idioma de los argetinos”)10 in which he describes an experience that occurred as
he arrived at a certain street corner in the Barracas district, a barrio of Buenos Aires.
Before reaching that corner in his anecdote, Borges reflects on his feelings and state
of consciousness during his evening walk that led up to this incident.
I did not wish to have a set destination, I followed a random course, as
much as possible; I accepted, with no conscious prejudice other than
13

avoiding the avenues or wide streets, the most obscure invitations of
chance. But a kind of familiar gravitation drew me toward certain
sections I shall always remember, for they arouse in me a kind of
reverence, I am not speaking of the precise environment of my
childhood, my own neighborhood, but of the still mysterious fringe
area beyond it, which I have possessed completely in words and but
little in reality, an area that is familiar and mythological at the same
time. The opposite of the known—its wrong side, so to speak—are
those streets to me, almost as completely hidden as the buried
foundation of our house or our invisible skeleton (Kodama xiv).11
Some of the language in Borges’ anecdote accentuates and confirms the
primary purpose of this study, which is to investigate what is invisible and thus
normally hidden from consciousness but nonetheless existing on the “mysterious
fringe area beyond it” (Kodama xiv). Mystery can be vaguely threatening yet still
attractive partly because it is not known, as reflected in Borges’s description of the
Buenos Aires streets.
Acknowledging and exploring the parameters of mystery in art also becomes
evident in the paintings of Remedios Varo. While describing one of the thematic
sections of the exhibition The Magic of Remedios Varo, the first retrospective show in
2000 of Remedios Varo’s art in the United States,12 exhibition curator Luis-Martin
Lozano referenced the painting Exploración de las Fuentes del rio Orinoco (fig. 1):
The second thematic nucleus, entitled “In Search of other
Dimensions: The Conjunction of Magic Forces,” examines one of the
14

conceptual constants Varo developed throughout her career: the
permanent search for new metaphysical dimensions within the twodimensional space of painting. Her characters assume a Platonic
attitude of meditation and explore inwardly, searching for the balance
between yin and yang; or they travel in a continuous and frantic
exploration of the analogous mountains or the dark waters of the
afterworld. They are untiring travelers who reach the miasma of the
Orinoco River in search of the primordial origin of all oracles. These
travelers often go into occult dimensions, using fantastic means of
locomotion to traverse winding roads and labyrinthian canals. Always
clandestine, they discover the secret passageways of walls and
cathedrals, searching for answers to the mysteries of the universe
(Lozano 45).

Fig. 1. Remedios Varo. Exploration of the Sources of the Orinoco River (Exploración
de las Fuentes del rio Orinoco), 1959.
Oil on canvas, 44 x 39.5 cm., private collection.
15

However, the approach herein is not to examine the occult per se, although
varieties of occultism, magic, mysticism, and related topics surface from time to time
within the philosophical and aesthetic themes of the study. Wonder, the numinous,
and fabulist storytelling, on the other hand, are essential topics here. Extending the
metaphor of search shown in Varo’s Exploration of the Sources of the Orinoco River,
one might say (at the risk of oversimplifying the labyrinthine aesthetics of the artists
studied here) that Varo and Borges are explorers attempting through their fabulist
storytelling to locate the sources of the river the artists themselves are already
immersed in, the immense flow of existential, aesthetic consciousness. While wonder
itself is a kind of interruption or a temporary experience universally familiar to every
human being, in artists wonder can also fuel a creative dynamic.
For example, this phenomenon of not-knowing is central to an anecdote told
by a pioneer of nonobjective abstraction, Wassily Kandinsky. Among the influences
and experiences fueling Wassily Kandinsky’s artistic journey into non-objective
abstract painting is a 1908 anecdote told by the artist:
Much later, after my arrival in Munich, I was enchanted on one
occasion by an unexpected spectacle that confronted me in my studio.
It was the hour when dusk draws in. I returned home with my painting
box having finished a study, still dreamy and absorbed in the work I
had completed, and suddenly saw an indescribably beautiful picture,
pervaded by an inner glow. At first, I stopped short and then quickly
approached this mysterious picture, on which I could discern only
forms and colors and whose content was incomprehensible. At once, I
16

discovered the key to the puzzle: it was a picture I had painted,
standing on its side against the wall. The next day, I tried to recreate
my impression of the picture from the previous evening by daylight. I
only half succeeded, however; even on its side, I constantly recognized
objects, and the fine bloom of dusk was missing. Now I could see
clearly that objects harmed my pictures (Kandinsky: Complete
Writings, 369-370).13
Kandinsky’s intense interest in the spiritual in art14 and his movement towards
non-objective abstraction,15 when combined with this moment of perceptual notknowing or mystery in consciousness, illustrates an aspect of the phenomenon of
wonder. Not-knowing is, in fact, inherently related to subjectivity, the subject-object
dichotomy, and perception in a particularly phenomenological way, as will be seen in
the chapter on Husserlian transcendental phenomenology.
A more recent example of art-making and the roles of wonder and notknowing are evident in both the content and title of Lawrence Weschler’s book on
contemporary American installation artist Robert Irwin, Seeing is Forgetting the
name of the Thing One Sees: Over Thirty Years of Conversations with Robert Irwin.
The title is related to a line attributed to the French poet-philosopher Paul Valéry, that
“to see is to forget the name of the thing one sees” (Weschler 207). That artists are
acutely sensitive to wonder is echoed in this anecdote about Irwin:
During the early seventies, when Robert Irwin was on the road a lot,
visiting art schools and chatting with students, he was proffered an
honorary doctorate by the San Francisco Art Institute. The school’s
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graduation ceremony that year took place in an outdoor courtyard on a
sunny, breezy afternoon, sparkling clear. Irwin approached the podium
and began, “I wasn’t going to accept this degree, except it occurred to
me that unless I did I wasn’t going to be able to say that.” He paused,
waiting as the mild laughter eddied. “All I want to say,” he continued,
“is that the wonder is still there.” Whereupon, he simply walked away
(Weschler vii).
It should be noted that this anecdote is not presented to support an argument
that scholarship and a philosophical understanding of knowledge are irrelevant to art.
On the contrary, the argument here is that the phenomena of not-knowing and
unknowing inherent in the experience of wonder are, as in the quotidian experience of
ecstasy,16 significantly important elements in any investigation of knowledge.
In fact, Chapter Six—Art as Life: Varo and Borges as Artist-Philosophers
considers how not-knowing or unknowing in Borges and Varo affects the dynamic
that refines and redefines the artist as theorist or philosopher. As the chapters ahead
unfold, it is useful to remember that the thematic orientation here is not to establish a
theological, philosophical, or any other kind of “belief” system characterized by
presuppositional knowledge. Any attempt to establish a presuppositional element
must be rigorously explicated, illustrated, and documented with a body of genuine
evidence that can authenticate such an argument, which is why Edmund Husserl’s
meticulously unfeigned scholarship is, despite some difficulties, such an invaluable
resource for elucidating this topic.
Sylvana Chrysakopoulou’s description above (pages 10-11) of Socrates’s
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wonder as a kind of epiphany and a highly ecstatic state signals another element to be
incorporated into the consideration of the numinous and wonder—ecstasy.
It should also be noted here that “epiphany” does have a relationship to
ecstasy, although epiphany, most frequently defined as divine appearance ("epiphany,
n.2.") and ecstasy, defined as a state of being “beside oneself” in astonishment, fear
or passion ("ecstasy, n. 1") are not synonymous, although other definitions of ecstasy
reflect how ecstasy amalgamates epiphany into itself as “the state of rapture in which
the body was supposed to become incapable of sensation, while the soul was engaged
in the contemplation of divine things” ("ecstasy, n. 3a). Another definition of ecstasy
is as a state of consciousness beyond conceptual thinking as “an exalted state of
feeling which engrosses the mind to the exclusion of thought” ("ecstasy, n. 4a”). This
last definition of ecstasy is one especially relevant to the sense of not-knowing or
unknowing that is significant to the present study, as is the etymology entry in the
Oxford English Dictionary entry of ecstasy:
The classical senses of ἔκστασις [ecstasy] are ‘insanity’ and
‘bewilderment’; but in late Greek the etymological meaning received
another application, viz., ‘withdrawal of the soul from the body,
mystic or prophetic trance’; hence in later medical writers the word is
used for trance, etc., generally. Both the classical and post-classical
senses came into the modern languages, and in the present fig. uses
they seem to be blended (“ecstasy, n.” etymology).
Although the experience of ecstasy, or stepping outside of oneself (what one
conventionally considers to be oneself), appears—at least superficially—to be more
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of a psychological or theological topic than a philosophical one, this dissertation
challenges that presumption along with other philosophical presuppositions. In a
certain sense, a primary use of art is a kind of aesthetic ecstasy in which not-knowing
and self-forgetting occurs, albeit temporarily. While clearly there are other uses of
art,17 in the present context of wonder and seeking the numinous, the experience of
ecstasy is a frequently related aspect.
To that end, Bataille’s work is accentuated, although not as a principle theme.
His passionate references to and elucidations of the roles of mysticism, the sacred,
and ecstasy—albeit in a more uniquely oblique fashion than that utilized by many
philosophers, theologians, and artists—serve to illustrate how an artist-philosopher
may, via a highly emotive intellectual approach, present those topics. Furthermore, if
one considers Bataille's work in an intertextual context, the highly emotive
orientation to his work can be understood to be an expression of the intensely
emotional state of Gefühl, a concept and phenomenon that will be explicated farther
ahead.
The point here is that the multifarious topical territory explicated throughout
this study are not a group of unrelated topics. What is intended is an exploration of a
single fabric, so to speak, a multi-colored, interwoven work, as reflected in the
study’s title. That said, this work necessarily raises the question of principal themes—
or what the study is about chapter by chapter, even if every chapter also examines
numerous interrelated topics.
Along with ecstasy, the subtopic of self-forgetting is used in several chapters,
especially to clarify some of the characteristics of wonder as disruption and some
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Husserlian concepts. It needs to be understood, however, that there is nothing
negative or psychologically debilitating about self-forgetting as used in the present
context; what is being discussed is not the tragic suffering inherent in Alzheimer’s
Disease or various unfortunate psychotic manifestations studied in psychiatry, nor
does the usage here include the admirable altruistic and sometimes religious contexts
of forgetting about oneself and one’s personal welfare in order to serve or help
others. Self-forgetting here is used in an explication of consciousness, including states
of so-called alternative and altered states of consciousness. Various states of
consciousness have long been included in Eastern philosophical studies, but less in
Occidental studies. Part of this study’s purpose is to readjust that imbalance.
Obviously, the experience of self-forgetting has several definitions and
usages, but in the present context this phenomenon is referenced because it
sometimes (not always) accompanies wonder and a sensibility to the numinous, and is
almost always closely related to ecstasy, or the temporary experience of stepping
outside of one’s usual sense of separative self-identification.
How are these themes—primary and secondary—related to the work of
Borges and Varo? The most accurate description of Borges and Varo might be to
simply say that both are—primarily by virtue of his or her art, but also in other ways
in their respective lives—storytellers, or fabulists. This will be explored in more
detail in Chapter Six. Here it is enough to point out that while in the 15th century a
“fabulist” was a title for a professional storyteller, the definition now is simply “one
who relates fables or legends; a composer of apologues” ("fabulist, n."). An apologue
is a synonym for a fable, but usually is understood to be an allegorical story, one
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usually intended to serve a moral purpose ("apologue, n."). While the term fabulist
has often been applied to Borges, Remedios Varo has more often been called a
surrealist. Here, however, both Borges and Varo will be referred to as fabulist
storytellers.
When primary themes along with accompanying secondary themes come
together and congeal as a central thematic unity, what is most apparent is that Borges
and Varo are, as artists, like explorers repeatedly entering an unknown forest to locate
what they can sense but cannot see. In a more literal sense, the forest is consciousness
and Borges and Varo are exploring consciousness via their fabulist art-making. For
Varo, the cliché that every picture tells a story is accurate, and the visual story she
tells is an exploration of this forest of consciousness. For Borges, every story yields a
literary picture, or rather a series of narrative pictures, about the forest and its history,
about the dense tangles of the forest of consciousness, about the explorers who
preceded his own exploration, as well as those who will follow him. How these two
artists enter the forest, what they see, and how they report their sightings via their art
becomes central to this investigation.

22

Chapter One—Husserlian Phenomenological Methodology
Using some selected elements of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology to
explicate the art of Varo and Borges may seem less than pragmatic given the contrast
between Husserl’s style of research and thought over against the work of these two
artists, who were metaphorically described in the introduction as explorers of a forest
of consciousness searching for the numinous. However, there are both practical and
philosophical reasons for using what can be described as a Husserlian methodology
here, even though this study makes no claims to being a detailed exegesis or
exhaustive exploration of Edmund Husserl’s lifetime of work. The inventive and
irrealistic18 literary and visual narratives of these two fabulists demand an
investigative means that can balance and ground those narratives in a clarifying
philosophical language, one that admits conceptual thought about what seems at times
to be beyond the reach of conceptual thinking. In fact, even acknowledging the
challenge to investigating, assimilating, and critiquing the art and aesthetic of Borges
and Varo reflects the relevance of choosing Husserl’s phenomenology as a grounded
methodological means of addressing that challenge.
Given the irreal nature of both Borges and Varo’s art, an orientation rooted in
analytical philosophy is unlikely to provide a philosophical language that can
effectively explore (without undermining, marginalizing, or dismissing) an
investigation of mystery. Although an occasional point may be best considered via a
thinker associated with the analytic tradition, or with the precursors to logical
positivism (Ludwig Wittgenstein and Bertrand Russell come to mind), the avenues
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developed over the history of what is called continental philosophy are more
promising. Specifically, phenomenology offers the strongest possibility of articulating
and explicating the complex aesthetic elements germane to the work of Borges and
Varo. The potential of phenomenological thought for investigating the primary
themes herein eventually leads—via a refined phenomenological root specificity—to
the decades of pioneering work of Edmund Husserl and the transcendental
phenomenology he initiated and developed. In a sense, Husserl’s phenomenology
offers perhaps the most analytical and logical methodology available in the
continental tradition, which also points to why Husserlian approaches are increasingly
utilized by various scientific and other fields, from mathematics to cognitive
science.19
One must remember that Husserl’s earliest work focused on mathematics and
psychology, and that among his earliest seminal work is his 1900-1901 Logical
Investigations.20 That approach to understanding eventually proved inadequate for
Husserl. This study primarily references and utilizes work subsequent to what has
been described as Husserl’s “transcendental turn” after his 1913 Ideas: General
Introduction to Pure Phenomenology.21 A volume frequently referenced here is
Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory (1898-1925), a posthumous collection
of Husserl’s work (a translation of Husserliana XXIII) on representational
consciousness that is important in this study for several reasons, but especially
because it addresses Husserlian explications of fantasy and especially image
consciousness—the awareness in a person looking at a painting or a photograph,
reading a novel or story, or attending a dance, theatre, or musical event and how that
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awareness is related to art and aesthetics. Those writings collected in Phantasy, Image
Consciousness, and Memory (1898-1925) are of direct significance here because
fantasy, image consciousness, memory, time, and related Husserlian topics also
represent elements in the work of Varo and Borges. While Husserl did hope to
publish a single book on systematic presentation of perception, phantasy, and time
consciousness, the book was not published in his lifetime.22 However, Husserl created
courses with notes and wrote sketches addressing the topics (Brough, “Translator’s
Introduction” XXIX-XXX).
Focusing on Husserl’s work uncovers a somewhat peripheral question. If
phenomenology is the selected means for explicating primary themes such as wonder
and the numinous, as well as image consciousness, fantasy, and memory in the
fabulist art of Varo and Borges, why not utilize instead the concepts of some of
Husserl’s more famous and decidedly more art-oriented students or thinkers—
scholars who were influenced by Husserl, such as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre,
Derrida, Levinas or others? To use one of the systems devised by those individuals
seems sensible, especially since most of those thinkers established more detailed
philosophies of art, or what we might describe, in some cases, as aesthetic systems,
than did Husserl.
While the work of some of the thinkers named above will be utilized at times
to address specific points, Husserlian phenomenology is established as the primary
working methodology throughout because it was Husserl who presented a working
methodology first before scholars like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Levinas
developed their own methodologies based on but stretched beyond Husserlian
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transcendental phenomenology. In other words, besides resourcing the book of
Husserlian thought that most directly addresses the topics of this study,23 the rationale
in choosing Husserlian transcendental phenomenology has been that while the
individual philosophers named above were highly creative and in some individual
ways original thinkers, it was Husserl’s decades of original and innovative work that
served as the initial foundation for each of those philosophers. Husserl’s demanding
search for evidence and certitude, his great integrity and willingness to admit his own
errors and shifts in thinking, and his passionate and obstinate drive to establish a
scientifically rigorous means for investigating perception and knowledge, the
phenomenon of this world, subjectivity and other issues, lends to this study a means
of articulating more clearly the investigation of phenomena that are generally
considered to be too ungrounded or too fanciful to yield to philosophical articulation
or analysis.
Husserl, who did not claim to have created an aesthetic or even a
philosophical system per se, did create an immaculately designed method of
investigation:
Although it is true to say that, for Husserl, the subject matter of
philosophy dictates the phenomenological method, it would be a
mistake to see in this an indication that he is advocating a
philosophical system. Husserl was a systematic thinker, but anything
but an advocate of a system. What he called for was a unified method
of approach to each philosophical problem in order to clarify and
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validate significant concepts, but this did not mean the interweaving of
concepts into one systematic whole (Lauer xiv).
Nonetheless, Husserl did interweave many of his concepts in the sense that
one concept or action may be inherently linked to or conjoined with another, not in
order to create a system of thought, but to refine his investigative methodology. For
Husserl, since the method is the message, so to speak, his partial affinity for a
Cartesian approach to investigation is emphasized (Lauer xix).24
Descartes does influence Husserl. In fact, in his Cartesian Meditations,25
Husserl describes how his transcendental phenomenology is both distinct from and
similar to the Cartesian approach. This will be examined more closely ahead.

Fig. 2. Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), circa 1900
Photographer Unknown.
http://dic.academic.ru/pictures/wiki/files/69/EdmundHusserl.jpg
Husserl emphasizes knowing and apodictic certainty over opining and
believing. This becomes more valuable in regards to the narratives of Varo and
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Borges, which do tend to arouse and activate uninspected personalized opinions in
readers and viewers. In this study, the transcendental phenomenological
methodology referenced and used include some of the primary terms and concepts
that have specific meanings in Husserl’s work that can be applied to the circuitous,
labyrinthine aesthetic orientations and work of Varo and Borges.
Although these terms and concepts are interrelated in Husserlian
methodology,26 each requires definition and clarification in this chapter. As these
terms, concepts, and principles are considered individually, one must nevertheless
continually keep in mind that each term does not really exist in isolation but functions
in an interrelated dynamic of investigative thought with various other Husserlian
terms, concepts, and principles. Epochē, for example, works with Husserl’s neutrality
modification, along with his frequently repeated admonition to “return to the things
themselves.” Husserlian givenness functions in conjunction with intentionality and a
specific form of intuition. Presentation and re-presentation, subjectivity and
consciousness, and other terms and concepts work together as reciprocal units.
Meanwhile, the multifarious meanings of the term “transcendental” pervade Husserl’s
entire body of thought.27 These terms and the combined usages of terms require more
elucidation before moving on to the question of a Husserlian approach to the arts.
Husserlian Transcendental Subjectivity and Consciousness
Since “transcendental consciousness” and “transcendental subjectivity” are
sometimes used synonymously, either by Husserl or Husserlian scholars, it is useful
to distill and clarify, as much as possible, the Husserlian use of the word
“transcendental” in general. What does Husserl mean by transcendental subjectivity,
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transcendental consciousness, transcendental ego, or, for that matter, why does he
describe his work as transcendental phenomenology in the first place?
In order to understand transcendental phenomenology one must first consider
Husserl’s orientation to subjectivity. David Carr excerpts a comment from Husserl
about subjectivity: “The paradox of human subjectivity: being a subject for the world
and at the same time being an object in the world” (Carr, Paradox, 3).28 John B.
Brough describes the distinctive uses of Husserlian subjectivity, in which “authentic
philosophical reflection” is inherent in the turn to the subject:
The subject in question is transcendental in Husserl’s sense; it is the
subject that intends or presents the world. The Husserlian turn to the
subject is therefore not a turn away from the object into a solipsistic
self, nor is it a turn to a self which creates its object out of whole cloth;
it is rather a taking up of the object in its relation to the subject, the
‘dative of manifestation,’ as Thomas Prufer so aptly puts it, to which
the object presents itself ” (Brough, “Art and Artworld” 35-36).29
Husserl’s methodology30 necessarily requires a turn towards the subject
himself or herself, which action leads to Husserlian transcendental subjectivity, and
which is not just about a completely separated version of self-identified subjectivity.
For Husserl, “it is clear also that the subjectivity of the transcendental subject is a far
cry from the arbitrariness of individual subjectivity—from ‘subjectivism,’ we might
say” (Lauer xviii), or from some form of solipsism.
The art of Varo and Borges often reflect encounters with memory and the
shifting characteristics of self and subjectivity. Husserl’s understanding of
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subjectivity, on the other hand, is a challenge to the objectivist turn in modern
science, which Husserl felt was a misunderstanding of how subjectivity functions and
accomplishes actions in the world. In fact, this misunderstanding sometimes surfaces
in regards to Husserl’s work itself.
It has frequently been presumed, and rightly so since Husserl made this
statement himself, that Husserl’s approach to consciousness is always consciousness
of an object. While that is correct, at least as a stand alone assertion, it is also in some
contexts a partial view of Husserl’s work because it does not take into account related
aspects such as Husserlian “absolute consciousness” or other essential factors. In one
art history discussion of Sartre’s philosophical position quoted below, for example, it
is noted that Sartre’s argument “begins with the perception, adopted from Edmund
Husserl’s phenomenology, that consciousness is always consciousness of something
other than itself” (Foster 460). What is presumed to be Husserl’s summary
understanding of consciousness is then described in more detail:
It is what Husserl had called “intentional consciousness,” which means
that it comes into being only in the act of perceiving, grasping, direct
itself toward an object. It is thus always a movement beyond itself, a
projection that empties itself out, leaving no “contents” behind.
Consciousness is “nonreflexive”: I do not hear myself speaking any
more than I see myself seeing. Empty and transparent, consciousness
traverses itself without ever finding anything in its path on the way to
its object. And that object is marked by its own transcendence, its
outsideness to consciousness itself (460).
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Yet is Husserl’s “intentional consciousness” actually an adequate summary of
Husserl’s understanding of consciousness? The authors of this art history textbook, a
group of preeminent contemporary art professionals, go on to describe Husserl’s
intentional consciousness as an “exteriorization” process in which the human being is
synthesized in a unity with the world (460).31
Meanwhile, other scholars have brought a more detailed assessment to
Husserl and consciousness, noting that Husserl felt subjectivity’s first person point of
view was “ineliminable from the very concept of knowledge” and that what he called
“functioning subjectivity” is an anonymous pre-egoic form of subjectivity which is
responsible for the givenness of the world and its ‘always already there’ character”
(Moran and Cohen 311-312). Husserl’s mature work with consciousness has been
described as a “framework that recognized all consciousness as part of the mysterious
transcendental life of the subject in an intersubjective community of co-subjects”
(Moran, Husserl: Founder, 173). 32
In his “Husserl and the ‘absolute’,” Dan Zahavi gives his rendering of a
central aspect of Husserl and transcendental idealism:
On my reading, Husserl is committed to the view that reality depends
transcendentally upon consciousness…This view has various
metaphysical implications—it has implications for our fundamental
understanding of what counts as real and it leads to a rejection of
metaphysical realism—but it doesn’t entail that consciousness is the
metaphysical origin or source of reality. Husserl might indeed consider
consciousness a necessary condition for reality. To that extent, Smith33
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is right in saying that for Husserl nothing would exist in the absence of
consciousness (“Husserl and the ‘absolute’ ” 87).
The above statement, which to some degree accentuates the insufficiency and
unfairness of reducing Husserl’s work with consciousness to only being “intentional
consciousness,” also represents the Husserlian track generally followed herein as
well—that consciousness is not separated from reality, that so-called reality “depends
transcendentally upon consciousness” (87). In other words, what is argued in this
study, which uses Husserlian methodology, is that it is not consciousness that is
dependent on the world, but vice versa—that the world appears within consciousness.
Husserl’s work with consciousness has also been described thus:
Around 1907 Husserl came to postulate an “absolute” or “primal
consciousness” (Urbewußtsein) as a temporalizing consciousness that
is not itself temporal but constitutes everything temporal. This absolute
consciousness is the basic level of consciousness; it is “originary
consciousness” (Urbewusstsein). Consciousness as such is absolute
being to which everything has to be related. Absolute consciousness
contains the past, present and future, all included within it (Moran and
Cohen 24).
That stated, as valuable as it is, does not, however, erase the complexities of
Husserlian phenomenology. For example, Anthony J. Steinbock addresses, while
considering the scope of transcendental phenomenology, the multifarious nature of
Husserl’s use of the word “transcendental”:
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Let me note at the outset that the problem with speaking of Husserl’s
notion of the “transcendental” is that Husserl does not have a singular
theory of transcendental philosophy. Or at least this is my contention.
As we shall see later in more detail, what transcendental
phenomenology means depends to a large extent on the ways in which
it is carried out in concrete contexts of phenomenological research
(Home 12).
Steinbock goes on to say that, nonetheless, two traits are identifiable. For
Husserl, a transcendental phenomenology must investigate the constitution of sense
through a constitutive reduction, and it must identify a priori structures through an
eidetic reduction (Home 12).
To consider this more generally for a moment, what is the meaning of
consciousness in the field of phenomenology? Many books have been written about
this theme, but how does one succinctly address the topic of phenomenological
consciousness? In the forward to Maurice Natanson’s The Erotic Bird:
Phenomenology in Literature, Judith Butler addresses questions of consciousness and
subjectivity:
Phenomenology has been dismissed by some as a philosophy of
“consciousness,” where the presumption reigns that “consciousness” is
a speculative and psychologistic notion, unnecessary or a diversion in
relation to literary reading. Such arguments, however, presume that
they know what they mean by consciousness: that it is an interior and
ideal “stream” of perceptions, the property of a subjectivity cut off
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ontologically from a relationship to the world. Such notions, however,
have little to do with the notion of consciousness offered here (Butler,
ix).
In The Erotic Bird, Natanson applies a phenomenological methodology to the
literature of Franz Kafka, Samuel Beckett and Thomas Mann, among others. In the
present context, the goal is to consider how these kinds of phenomenological themes
are specifically related to the work of Borges and Varo, and part of this argument
includes an acknowledgment that absolute consciousness in art surfaces when a
sensibility to the numinous attracts, fuels, or at least in some way affects the artist’s
creative process.
Before addressing the Husserlian uses of a priori and eidetic reduction per se,
some additional points warrant consideration. One is the similar yet distinct
approaches to subjectivity in Descartes and Husserl. In fact, Husserl felt that
Descartes unknowingly did discover transcendental subjectivity but could not
recognize or make use of it. In his Cartesian Meditations Husserl asserts:
At this point, following Descartes, we make the great reversal that, if
made in the right manner, leads to transcendental subjectivity: the turn
to the ego cogito as the ultimate and apodictically certain basis for
judgments, the basis on which any radica-philosophy [sic] must be
grounded” (18).34
Essentially, Husserl is saying that if Descartes had gone about his argument in
“the right manner” (20), he would have recognized and acknowledged transcendental
subjectivity. In other words, Descartes did not go far enough to satisfy Husserl, but
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instead concluded his argument with the syllogism cogito ergo sum, implying by that
proposition an individualistic subjectivity as the final ground of being. Husserl,
however, sees subjectivity as a means, albeit a mandatory and preeminent means,
rather than a terminal designation of being. His “functioning subjectivity” (Moran and
Cohen 312) is pre-egoic and nameless.
A key point that bears repeating is that Husserl’s search for knowledge is
primarily aimed at understanding transcendental consciousness. The Husserlian
meaning of transcendental consciousness is “consciousness as the agent disclosive of
the world and intentionally united with that world, or, more simply, the whole that is
‘consciousness of the world’—is for phenomenology the absolute concretum. There
is nothing that can be meaningfully posited outside this concretum” (Drummond
205). The ultimate “absolute concretum” is in Husserlian terms “absolute
consciousness,” or the most fundamental level of phenomenological analysis
(Drummond 32).
Epochē, Neutrality Modification, and “Back to the Things Themselves”
Epochē is quite possibly the single most important concept of Husserl’s
investigations. Husserl’s uses the epochē as an active method of bracketing out
certain elements from perceptual considerations. At the same time, epochē is directly
related to Husserl’s broader concept of neutrality modification and his term “back to
the things themselves,” and thus is the pivotal means around which Husserl’s
phenomenology turns, rendering it of paramount importance for understanding his
work and to understanding the significance of using his work in this study: “The
Greek term epochē is used by Husserl (sometimes transliterated in German as
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Epoche) to mean a procedure of bracketing, excluding, canceling, putting out of
action certain belief components of our experience” (Moran and Cohen 106), which is
to say that Husserl’s use of epochē acts as a clearing mechanism, one that allows an
investigation to proceed without becoming entangled with preconceptual issues that
are, thematically speaking, of peripheral phenomenological significance.
It is important to remember that Husserlian phenomenology must deal (or
rather not deal) with what Husserl calls the natural attitude. The epochē (or bracketing
out or phenomenological reduction) is a means for accounting for the natural attitude
in a way that allows a phenomenological investigation to explicate not the what of the
appearance of an object, but the how of that appearance. What is this troublesome
natural attitude that must be accounted for and why must it require a bracketing out?
Husserl states:
Our first outlook upon life is that of natural human beings, imaging,
judging, feeling, willing, “from the natural standpoint”. Let us make
clear to ourselves what this means in the form of simple meditations
which we can best carry on in the first person. I am aware of a world,
spread out in space endlessly, and in time becoming and become,
without end. I am aware of it, that means, first of all, I discover it
seen and observed, through the unseen portions of the room behind my
back to the verandah, into the garden, to the children in the summerhouse, and so forth, to all the objects concerning which I precisely
“know” that they are there and yonder in my immediate co-perceived
surroundings— a knowledge which has nothing of conceptual thinking
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in it, and first changes into clear intuiting with the bestowing of
attention, and even then only partially and for the most part very
imperfectly (Ideas 51-52).
In Husserlian transcendental phenomenology, the phenomenological epochē
as evolved by Husserl is closely associated with an admonition or phrase Husserl
often used: Wir wollen auf die ‘Sachen selbst’ zurückgehen (“back to the things
themselves”):
Otherwise put: we can absolutely not rest content with ‘mere words’,
i.e. with a merely symbolic understanding of ‘words’, such as we first
have when we reflect on the sense of laws for ‘concepts’,
‘judgements’, ‘truths’ etc. (together with their manifold specifications)
which are set up in pure logic. Meanings inspired only by remote,
confused, inauthentic intuitions—if by any intuitions at all—are not
enough: we must go back to the ‘things themselves’. We desire to
render self-evident in fully-fledged intuitions that what is here given in
actually performed abstractions is what the word-meanings in our
expression of the law really truly stand for (Husserl, Logical
Investigations v.1 168).
This seemingly simple admonition of “back to the things themselves” is given
an almost mantric principle in Husserlian thought, reflecting how Husserl’s passion to
free up thinking from any abstract presupposition that would disallow genuine
investigation is a foundational principle in his work. It also reveals much about
phenomenology, about Husserl’s integrity and character, and about understanding
37

Husserlian methodology in the present study. Husserl uses epochē as a means for
bringing his seminal principle of “back to things themselves” into the actual
phenomenological dynamic itself rather than simply talking about the principle and
the dynamic:
Husserl’s commitment to knowledge’s integrity involves something
greater than the theory of knowledge that is today defined under the
heading of “epistemology”. Beyond theory and its pretension to know,
Husserl’s philosophical thought, from its initial concern with the
philosophy of arithmetic to its final concern with the crisis of
European humanity, is driven by the following: the felt need to justify
all claims to know, even the seemingly most secure, on the basis of
something more original than the computational consistency of logical
and mathematical formulae and supposed facts supplied by the natural
and social sciences. This “something more” is early on formulated by
him as the “things themselves”, the return to which was to become not
just Husserl’s motto but the watchword of the entire phenomenological
movement spawned by his thought. “We must”, Husserl exhorts us in
all his major works beginning with the Logical Investigations, “return
to the things themselves” (Hopkins 3).
The Husserlian epochē has already been referenced and utilized in other
phenomenological aesthetic studies of modernism (Mildenberg, “Openings” 41-49).
Likewise, contemporary French scholar Natalie Depraz has emphasized the inherent
relationship between epochē and imagination, noting that in the first volume of
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Husserl’s Ideen,“he provides us with an intrinsic link between imagination and the
very method of phenomenology, namely, the epochē” (Depraz 155). Explaining how
imagination (unlike perception) “suspends the actual existence of the object,”
directing toward its “ineffective modality,” Depraz suggests that this clears the way to
a great variety of possibility instead of (as in perception) one unique reality (Depraz
155-156). In this context both epochē and imagination override factual limitations and
allow fresh possibilities, a dynamic that will be examined in more detail later.
Givenness, Intentionality, Intuition
In phenomenological terms a reception of givenness or the appearance of the
object occurs. If appearances are given to consciousness, givenness (Gegebenheit)
becomes relevant, for example, when examining an artist’s creative process, a point
that is relevant ahead. Givenness in Husserlian terms is an experience of something,
the object appearing (being given in appearance) and experienced (received), at which
point the subject (here, the artist, and also the viewer of a work of art) is perceiving
the object that is given in appearance.
Another related central principle of Husserl’s phenomenology is intentionality
(Brough, “Edmund Husserl” 151).35 Intentionality (Intentionalität) in a Husserlian
context indicates the directedness of a conscious state.
Judith Butler, in her introduction to Maurice Natanson’s The Erotic Bird
referenced above (pages 33-34) goes on to discuss Natanson’s use of two Husserlian
elements—Husserl’s theory of intentionality and the givenness of objects of
consciousness. After mentioning the uses of intentionality by William James and
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Butler notes: “Intentionality thus characterizes a certain
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isomorphism between consciousness and its world, one that cannot be spatially
grasped” (x). Butler then addresses subjectivity and consciousness as understood in
phenomenology:
The notion that consciousness belongs solely to the domain of
subjectivity thus misses the phenomenological point that subjectivity
always belongs to the world: consciousness is always consciousness of
its object, it is nothing without its preposition, and its preposition
marks its kinship with the world that it interrogates. Consciousness is,
thus, in its very structure, in an implicit relation to the world it seeks to
know, and seeks to know that world precisely to the extent that it is
“of” it in some way. What this means is that the terms of subjectivity
that we often imagine to be residing in a psychic interiority, such as
consciousness, memory, and imagination are to be found precisely in a
constitutive and binding relation to the world, intentional relations that
posit a world they do not make, that build up a world of objects whose
thereness is disclosed as irrefutable (x).36
That intentionality is closely partnered with intuition in Husserl’s
phenomenology requires one to understand how Husserl uses the term “intuition.”
The most immediate and primary definition of intuition in the Oxford English
Dictionary is that intuition is “immediate apprehension” (“Intuition”). Derived from
the Latin intueri, which is often translated as meaning “to look inside” or “to
contemplate,” intuition when defined as “immediate apprehension” allows for a broad
interpretation of “apprehension,” covering many states such as sensation, knowledge,
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and even mystical rapport. “Immediate” in this context can be used for a variety of
mediation, and also implies a lack or absence of interference, or an absence of
cognitive thought (“intuition”). Intuition in Husserl’s phenomenology is used in
several ways, including as “evidence” and as eidetic intuition, the intuition of an
eidos or essence. Suffice it to say here that intuitions are perceptions or modifications
of perception, and intuition indicates a “location” where an intentional object is
directly present via that intentionality; when an intention is "filled" by the
apprehension of an object, that object is intuited. Varo’s paintings reflect a use of
intentionality in which a direct apprehension of a given object fulfills intentionality as
an intuition of the object, even when that apprehension is rooted in, fueled by, or
transformed into fantasy or memory. Ultimately, intentionality and apprehension
yield an intuition of immediate structure as evidence of life in art.
While some of the subtle distinctions among Husserl’s uses of “intuition” are
explicated and broken down by his student Emmanuel Levinas (Levinas, Theory),
what is important to emphasize is how Levinas’s explication of Husserlian
intentionality recognizes the uncommon significance (beyond the common one of
intending to do something) that Husserl assigns to intentionality:
It expresses the fact, which at first does not seem original, that each act
of consciousness is conscious of something: each perception is the
perception of a perceived object, each desire the desire of desired
object, each judgment the judgment of a “state of affairs”
(Sachverhalt) about which one makes a pronouncement. But we shall
soon realize the philosophical interest of this property of
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consciousness and the profound transformation that it brings to the
very notion of consciousness (Levinas, Theory 40).
Levinas emphasizes that when intentionality becomes (in Husserlian
phenomenology) a bridge between the world and consciousness, what occurs is the
breakdown of the subject-object dichotomy, so that “[intentionality] is not the way in
which a subject tries to make contact with an object that exists beside it. Intentionality
is what makes up the very subjectivity of subject” (Levinas, Theory 41). Levinas
asserts that Husserl, by overcoming the substantialist concept of existence,
demonstrated how “a subject is not something that first exists and then relates to
objects” (41).
To stay for a moment with Husserl’s use of intentionality, it is again
contemporary scholar Dan Zahavi who offers a clear interpretation of that topic:
In his analysis of the structure of experience, Husserl pays particular
attention to a group of experiences that are all characterized by being
conscious of something, that is, which all possess an objectdirectedness. This attribute is also called intentionality. One does not
merely love, fear, see, or judge, one loves a beloved, fears something
fearful, sees an object, and judges a state of affairs. Regardless of
whether we are talking of a perception, thought, judgment, fantasy,
doubt, expectation, or recollection, all of these diverse forms of
consciousness are characterized by intending objects and cannot be
analyzed properly without a look at their objective correlate, that is,
the perceived, doubted, expected object (Husserl’s Phenomenology
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14).
Givenness remains relevant both to Husserlian phenomenological principles
and art-making in artists whose creative processes are connected to a sensibility to the
numinous. Anthony J. Steinbock’s reference to “givenness in mystical experience and
phenomenology” emphasizes that a Husserlian orientation facilitates more than a
theological rendering and categorization: “This is why it is necessary to be open to a
broader field of evidence. Such a task…is philosophico-phenomenological, not
theological” (Steinbock 27).
Image Consciousness (or “Depicting Consciousness”)
The “broader field of evidence” cited above by Steinbock, one that requires a
philosophical-phenomenological orientation, was noted on the first page of this
study’s introduction. The Husserlian concepts and terms used are interwoven and
interact within in a context of reciprocity. In arguing that image consciousness as it
exists in an artist’s creative process of making art is rooted in a sensibility to the
numinous, some points arise about Husserl’s orientation to image consciousness
(Moran and Cohen 158-159). Although perception obviously plays a major role in
making and viewing visual art, perception and image consciousness are not identical
in Husserl’s phenomenology. The specific modality of consciousness that is
Husserlian image consciousness is separate from but combined with perception,
including being combined in the creative process.
To step back momentarily, the key to understanding this lies in Husserlian
givenness (Gegebenheit), the appearance itself. There are multifarious influential
elements, depending on the form of consciousness being experienced, that enter into
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Husserlian givenness. Besides perceiving and imagining, there is Husserlian picture
consciousness or sign consciousness (signitive consciousness).37 Therefore, “as
Husserl writes, even external perception is a constant pretension to accomplish what
it is not in a position to accomplish, namely, the complete givenness of the object; we
are never with a plus ultra.” (Steinbock, Phenomenology and Mysticism, 35).38
Memory, fantasy, and image consciousness are all forms of re-presentation for
Husserl, although image consciousness is related to perception, which is presentation,
“where what is actually intended is not the same as what is sensuously presented”
(Moran and Cohen 158). By this schemata, a photograph of a person first appears, for
example, as a paper object, not as a person, and a painting first appears as paint
applied to canvas rather than as a composition, although I would predict that many
viewers would debate that. A photograph might appear only tangentially as a paper
object rather than “first” appearing that way.
But then again, how is knowing related to perceiving? Artists often scoff at
being asked what some work “means.” Can a sense of unknowing or not-knowing be
allowed or even caused beyond a spontaneous occurrence of not-knowing? I propose
that the epochē does at least provide for such a possibility. Although obviously not a
Husserlian exclusivity, Husserl’s use of epochē, when combined with the
ocularcentric premises in Husserl’s phenomenology, lends itself, at least up to a point,
to an unfettered phenomenological explication of visual art, an explication that also
works with literary art.
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Two other key elements in the overall Husserlian phenomenological
orientation, and especially here in regards to examining art, are the terms presentation
and re-presentation.
Presentation and Re-presentation
Husserl connects perception directly to presentation, while re-presentation is
essential to Husserlian concepts of memory, expectation, phantasy (or imagination),
and image consciousness. Nonetheless, perception is “never far from the center” of
any discussion of re-presentation (Brough, “Translator’s Introduction” XXXIIXXXIII). Brough also notes in his introduction to Phantasy, Image Consciousness,
and Memory (1898-1925) that Husserl worked on understanding the forms of representation for many years:
Despite the ubiquity and obvious importance of presentation and representation in our conscious lives—we are always perceiving in our
waking moments, and very often remembering, phantasizing, and
looking at images—the connections and differences among these
experiences are elusive and obscure. They initially confront the
philosopher as a tangled skein of phenomena, and Husserliana XXIII
may be read as a chronicle of Husserl's attempts to tease them apart.
He returned to this task again and again, his views evolving over the
years and in some cases undergoing dramatic change. What he
achieved by the end of his life was a comprehensive, if not exhaustive,
account of the forms of re-presentation and their relations to one
another to other phenomena (XXXI).
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Another kind of neutralization in consciousness is possible aesthetically
(Moran and Cohen 221). Thus, “a member of a theatre audience, for example, does
not posit an actor’s being assaulted on the stage as a real world event, and this
precludes the audience member from rushing to the stage to intervene on behalf of the
assaulted actor” (Drummond 143). Before going into more detail about a
transcendental phenomenological approach to art, it is necessary to consider the
infrastructure of Husserlian image consciousness.
The Infrastructure of Image Consciousness and “Questioning Back,”
To consider the precise meaning of Husserlian image-consciousness requires a
continuation of examining the meanings of the larger context that includes not only
image-consciousness, but also other Husserlian principles. One might say that
understanding Husserlian image-consciousness requires what Husserl himself
sometimes referred to as “questioning back” (Rückfragen), a regressive inquiry or
dismantling in order to locate the “primary foundation” (Urstiftung) of concepts
(Moran and Cohen 70). Thus, if phenomenology is the study of phenomenon and a
phenomenon appears, then the next question to ask is what this something is
appearing to? Since it can only be appearing in consciousness, Husserl investigates
how appearances are “given” to consciousness, and this is one of the most central and
essential functions of phenomenology—to study how something appears.
“Phenomenology does not attempt to speak about things, but only about the way they
manifest themselves, and hence it tries to describe the nature of appearance as such”
(Lewis and Staehler 1). In a Husserlian phenomenological context, what the
something is that is given, or why the something is given to consciousness, are
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secondary considerations. The most fundamental phenomenological principle driving
an investigation is to return to the thing itself and see how it appears. One can
understand, then, why Husserl insisted that phenomenology was a scientific study
rather than a metaphysical one.
As pointed out by Brough, Husserlian image consciousness “is complex,
involving as many as three objects” (Translator’s Introduction XLV). For Husserl,
one work of art, say a painting, is three objects described as the physical image (e.g.
the physical canvas), the representing or depicting object, and the represented or
depicted object. On the other hand—to momentarily drop into a non-Husserlian
mode—a framed painting could be seen as one object, as an assemblage, representing
more than one form of consciousness simultaneously.39
Since a theme underlying this investigation of how a sensibility to the
numinous influences the role of image consciousness in making and viewing modern
art, it remains essential to reference Husserl’s phenomenological principles alongside
his philosophy of art, at least to the extent that he stated a philosophy of art. If
Husserlian transcendental phenomenology addresses imagination, image
consciousness, phantasy, memory, and time consciousness (Brough, Translator’s
Introduction XXIX-LXVIII ), these principles can be applied aesthetically in order to
expand Husserl’s thinly expressed philosophy of art.
The point here is that any Husserlian philosophy of art or aesthetic is never far
from his phenomenological methodology. For Husserl, what is being perceived, or
given to consciousness, becomes in the present study the art object. To investigate in
Husserlian terms the art object and the creative process that yielded the art object as
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given to consciousness for perceptual receiving, it is necessary to understand a few
more details of Husserlian methodology.
Image Consciousness and the Work of Art
Husserl’s insistence that aesthetic consciousness is directly related to the
consciousness of an object and the manner of that object’s appearing (Phantasy 459)
leads one to ask if his theory of image consciousness is the same as consciousness of
an object. In other words, does Husserl consider aesthetics as being somehow outside
the realm of phenomenological principles, or are they the same principle? Either
answer—yes or no—is a real possibility, given the somewhat contradictory way
Husserl compares phenomenology and the work of art in the Hofmannsthal letter,
considered ahead. However, Husserl does employ his phenomenological principle of
neutrality modification in an artistic context when directly viewing and considering,
or participating in, a work of art. In fact, the Husserlian epochē acts as one kind of
neutrality modification:
According to Husserl, the neutrality modification is universal
in that it can modify not just beliefs but all kinds of position
takings. It is akin to pure entertaining of the content of the
judgement without the making of any explicit judgement or
taking any stance including a sceptical one (Moran and Dermot
221).
Husserl sees neutrality modification as a universal aspect of consciousness:
For Husserl, the neutrality modification is a wholly unique yet
universal structural feature of consciousness and one that it is
48

hugely important in that its presence enables the very
possibility of philosophical reflection on the life of
consciousness. Epochē, idle fantasy, etc., are themselves all
varieties of neutrality modification. The neutrality modification
is a very deep part of consciousness, but, because it makes no
claim on truth or validity, it is, according to Husserl, difficult to
access (Moran and Dermot 222).
When explicating neutrality modification, Husserl is addressing belief, or the
sphere of belief, and how neutrality modification is a general kind of modification of
consciousness that has nothing whatsoever to do with the sphere of belief (Ideas 224225), which is to say that the neutrality modification deals with or neutralizes opinion
and assumption. Husserl states:
We are dealing now with a modification which in a certain sense
completely removes and renders powerless every doxic modality to
which it is related, but in a totally different way from that of negation,
which, in addition, as we saw, shows in the negated a positive effect, a
non-being which is itself once more being. It cancels nothing, it
“performs” nothing, it is the conscious counterpart of all performance:
its neutralization (Ideas 224).
Husserl’s definition of phenomenology as the study or science of the essence
of consciousness, and his assertion that consciousness is always consciousness of
something, means that any attempt to excavate a Husserlian methodology associated
with a philosophy of art must begin with consciousness (Bewußtsein). Narrowing that
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orientation to the thematic context of this dissertation, all the facets and ramifications
of Husserlian image consciousness or “depicting consciousness” (Bildbewußtein, also
translated as “depicting consciousness”) should be defined and understood, although
with image consciousness examples or illustrations are more clarifying than verbal
explanations.
But to reach the implications of image consciousness, subject-object
dichotomy needs to be acknowledged. In applying a Husserlian methodology to artmaking, the problem of subject-object dichotomy sooner or later surfaces. Varo, for
example, had a distinctive approach to the object, an irreal approach. The object is a
fundamental component of Husserlian transcendental phenomenology, whereas Varo
and other artists are, to put it simply, working to move beyond the art object, or (to be
specific in her case) working to move beyond the conventional notion of an object via
creating the transformed irreal art object. How is this distinction reconciled in a
Husserlian aesthetic that addresses Varo’s or Borges’s creative processes? Ultimately,
the answer is different for each artist, but to continue with the case of Varo’s
aesthetic, she is actually motivated, via her irreal fabulism, to challenged the
implications inherent in the conventional belief of the recognizable object, which
thus is not at odds with the Husserlian neutrality modification. Her art-making is an
example of a neutrality modification that is not specifically the epochē, but is unique
to the aesthetics of the creative process, a process related to image consciousness.
Also, Varo and Borges necessarily accentuate the object in art in the sense
that the recognizable object’s irreal appearance remains present as an aspect of the
reality depicted within the work of art. Ultimately, a Husserlian methodology yields
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an infrastructure or network of Husserlian concepts that underlie image consciousness
in a given work of art.
In fact, Husserl’s investigations of subjectivity, consciousness, intentionality,
intersubjectivity, objectivity, and image consciousness are as complex as Borges and
Varo’s entanglements with self and self-identification. The two artists’ uses of
irrealism are related to subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Thus before looking more
closely at Borges and Varo’s work with irrealism40 it is important to understand
beforehand Husserl’s work with fantasy.41
Fantasy
In Husserlian terms, fantasy is imagination. The complex distinctions among
perception, image consciousness, fantasy and related topics have been elucidated:
Husserl was interested in all the central mental acts including
perception, memory, and fantasy. He regards an act of fantasizing or
imagining (as distinct from seeing pictures as pictures: ‘image
consciousness’) as a special modification of perception. Without
perception there could be no fantasy. Fantasy is characterized as a kind
of re-presentation or ‘presentification’ or ‘presentiation’
(Vergegenwärtigung) since it does not have the full ‘fleshly’
(leibhaftig) character of perception. Husserl distinguishes between
image consciousness (Bildbewußtsein) and fantasy (Phantasie). Image
consciousness is rooted in the perception of a present object that, as
image, refers to an other (absent) object (Husserlina XXIIII 82). The
fantasy, by way of contrast, is not based on the perception of a present
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object but is a quasi-perception of a sensuous object. Fantasy differs
from perception in that perception presents the object with the
character of existing in the present whereas the existence of the
fantasized object is irrelevant in acts of fantasy and imagination.
Existence is simply left to one side. What is fantasized is not
necessarily past, present, or future, but is presented ‘as-if’ (Husserl,
Thing and Space, 11-12), and is not an actual perception. This is a
structural feature of fantasy itself: it has the character of ‘depicting’
rather than presenting (Husserl, Phantasy, 16). In fantasy, there is no
positing the object (Moran and Cohen 120).
As is often the case, commentaries on Husserl can be more accessible than
Husserl’s own writings. However, To quote directly from Husserl:
In phantasy, the object does not stand there as in the flesh, actual,
currently present. It indeed does stand before our eyes, but not as
something currently given now; it may be possible to be thought of as
now, or as simultaneous with the current now, but this now is a
thought one, and is not that now which pertains to presence in the
flesh, perceptual presence. The phantasized is merely ‘represented’
(vorgestellt), it merely places before us (stellt vor) or presents (stellt
dar), but it ‘does not give itself’ as itself, actual and now (Husserl,
Thing and Space, 12).
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Husserlian fantasy is a topic that will necessarily be applied to an
understanding of irreal fabulism in Borges and Varo, but a question to explore first is
if Husserl even proposes an aesthetic or a philosophy of art.
Excavating a Husserlian Philosophy of Art
Does Husserl already have a philosophy of art? Whether or not a fully
developed Husserlian philosophy of art is possible has remained debatable. This study
may provide a step towards authenticating that possibility, but it doesn’t claim to fully
explicate that issue. It must be noted here, however, that contemporary scholars such
as John B. Brough and Milan Uzelac have each already suggested a Husserlian
aesthetic, and their commentaries are valued resources for this paper,42 as are the
Husserlian aesthetic themes in the essays of Christian Ferencz-Flatz.
Since the proposal here is to use Husserl’s phenomenology to investigate
art—primarily in this study, the art of Varo and Borges—one is required to
understand any aesthetic or philosophy of art already evolved in Husserl’s work. That
said, any attempt to excavate a Husserlian philosophy of art must begin, as Edmund
Husserl did in all of his investigations, with a return to the thing itself. An artist’s root
impulse to create a physical work of art in a specific manner can be better understood
via a magnified focus on the object, and that magnification occurs naturally when
using the epochē, or phenomenological reduction. If preliminary elements for a
Husserlian philosophy of art are already present, they may surface more directly and
accessibly by examining a work of art via a transcendental phenomenological
methodology in which phenomena—objects, physical and non-physical—are given in
appearance prior to the assigning recognizable attributions or characteristics. Various
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components in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological investigations of appearance can
serve to explicate issues of consciousness when applied to specific art works. One
aspect of using the epochē or Husserlian bracketing is that a kind of unknowing
occurs, and there are many avenues on which this experience of unknowing can
travel, including artistic avenues.
Varo is altering so-called reality via her art, as is Borges. Usually in Husserl’s
epochē the lived experience is bracketed out in order to distill to an essence of what is
being considered; in the case of Varo’s painting, the presumptions and
presuppositions inherent in the lived experience are not nullified but presented as
transformed experiences. In both Varo and Borges, presumptions and presuppositions
inherent in the lived experience are modified via imagination and transformed into an
aesthetic that allows the dream state and other, less common or alternative states of
consciousness. Bracketing out conventional definitions of reality in order to
accentuate via irrealism a kind of spiritual impulse in their art, Varo and Borges each
repeatedly reshapes sans presuppositions their fabulist storytelling to express their
searches for the numinous. As will be seen in more detail in the next chapter, the
experience of wonder and self-forgetting serve to open the perceptual mind beyond
conscious and unconscious notions of philosophical and aesthetic barriers. The fact
that such barriers are partly in place because of unconscious presumptions reflects the
value of irrealism in art as a means of bringing to the visible, narratological (visual or
literary) surface the intense emotional and psychological personal symbolism of lived
experience and a sensibility to the numinous.
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“Bracketing,” however, is more complex than one might presuppose. As noted
earlier, the Husserlian epochē clears the way for a Husserlian methodology. Now if
that bracketing process of epochē sets aside preconceptual belief systems, as Husserl
asserts, are his opinions relative to the purity of art (described shortly) set aside as
well, or do the methodological principles of his transcendental phenomenology
become somehow incorporated by his philosophy of art? In other words, how can a
“return to the things themselves” and Husserl’s use of epochē combine with the
idealistic trope of purity as described in the pages ahead in Husserl’s letter to
Hofmannsthal? That ideal of purity is a rare moment for Husserl in that he is
momentarily more aligned with a metaphysical orientation than the scientific
principles he usually calls forth in his transcendental phenomenology.43
Phenomenology’s fundamental premise consists in stripping away
presuppositions, going back to what is primary, to intentional acts
through which one constitutes one’s experience. Husserl’s call to
return ‘to the things themselves’44 amounts to a bracketing of the real,
to a return to the things as they appear to consciousness, the things as
phenomena, as they are perceived by consciousness. Such a view is
bound up with a principle of doubt directed towards the reality of
things (Bourne-Taylor and Mildenberg 25).
Considering the roles of reduction in Husserl’s work brings up a related and,
in this investigation, very relevant issue about transcendental consciousness—
Husserlian transcendental experience (transzendentale Erfahrung): “Husserl claims
that the epochē opens up a new dimension of experience—transcendental
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experience—and the functioning of transcendental subject that is normally hidden is
brought to light. Husserl speaks of this domain as a domain of experience” (Moran
and Cohen 329).45 This dimension of experience is promising in explicating the
driving forces behind Varo and Borges’s respective aesthetics. Indeed, transcendental
experience is a key to understanding much art.
However, Husserl’s investigative methodology per se does not supplant his
philosophy of art, as limited as it may be. Husserl does present various aesthetic
observations and principles. He did observe, for example, that all art moves between
two extremes, one being image art, mediated through image consciousness, and the
other being “purely a matter of phantasy [fantasy], producing phantasy formations in
the modification of pure neutrality. At least producing no concrete depictive image”
(Husserl, Phantasy 651). The fact that Husserlian transcendental phenomenology
addresses imagination (or what Husserl called phantasy), as well as image
consciousness, memory, and time consciousness (Brough, Translator’s Introduction
XXIX-LXVIII ) allows these principles to be applied aesthetically: “This achievement
of the imagination does not affect the side of sensibility but the side of the expected,
that is, in a certain sense the side of the schema. It is a method of perspectival
correction (Umzeichnung) and positional alteration of the expected objects” (Lamar,
“Husserl’s Type and Kant’s Schemata” 102). These principles in Husserl’s
phenomenological investigations of appearance become accentuated when applied to
visual or literary art. While Husserl did not establish a highly defined or extensive
aesthetic per se, he did create a highly sophisticated investigative means for studying
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anything one wishes to study, and that investigative means can be useful in exploring
the distinctive creative processes utilized by both Varo and Borges.
Their work and their creative processes are also accessible to Husserlian
transcendental phenomenology—especially in their cases—because Husserl
considered how perspectival distortion and the alteration of shape, because of a
change in an object’s position, has to be accounted for via the imagination and image
consciousness. Although Husserl does not restrict “consciousness” to a state of
consciousness, be it conceptual, visionary, fantasy, memory or other, the object
(physical or otherwise) of consciousness remains predominant in transcendental
phenomenology, and visual consciousness is a seminal element in his
phenomenology. Husserl often offers up visual examples to illustrate a point or
theory; in other words, there is a central strand of ocularcentrism in his work.
Husserl’s Ocularcentrism
The point for now is to excavate a Husserlian philosophy of art, a point that is
much enhanced by Husserl’s ocularcentrism. Some scholars have noted ocularcentric
premises in Husserl’s phenomenology (Jay 265-268; Lyotard 40). While his
preference for immediate vision is an aspect of Husserl’s methodology that lends
itself to a phenomenological explication of art, some of those scholars have described
the limitations and contradictions that Husserl’s obsession with vision led to:
Even a cursory reading of Husserl’s writings, surveying his lifetime of
work from the early Logical Investigations of 1901 through the late
lectures and manuscripts of 1936, cannot but be struck by Husserl’s
ocularcentrism: his reliance on a vision-generated, vision-oriented
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rhetoric—and, as Derrida puts it, “the privilege given to vision.”46 And
not only his reliance on the tropes of light and vision, but also, more
extensively, his apparently inescapable dependence on metaphors of
all sorts. But this dependency and reliance would not be the
catastrophe that it is for his philosophical program, were it not for the
fact that the logic of his visualism tempted him to envision an
uncompromisingly total suspension or bracketing of existential
referentiality and an absolutely uncompromised clarity and
determinacy of meaning (Levin 67).
Without challenging the validity of David Michael Levin’s insightful
criticisms of Husserl’s ocularcentrism and preference for immediate vision,47 I would
postulate here that those noted implications of Husserl’s obsession with vision—
bracketing out existential referentiality, desire for uncompromised clarity, and his
ocularcentric obsession in general—are in fact some of the reasons a Husserlian
methodology is so valuable for this study; Husserl’s exacting philosophy and precise
methodology lends itself to a phenomenological explication of visual art. On the other
hand, a Husserlian aesthetic remains an insufficient means, as a sole thematic
resource, for a philosophico-phenomenological understanding of the roles of wonder
and the numinous in artistic image-consciousness. Questions have been raised, for
example, about the validity of Husserl’s “picture consciousness” (Lotz 171-185).
These kinds of legitimate criticisms are necessary and essential; they must at the very
least be acknowledged, and if shown to be valid, the Husserlian theory must give way
to more specifically oriented, unequivocal theories. In fact, these kinds of challenges
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to a Husserlian aesthetic, and there are a number of these,48 represents one of the
ways to determine what additional resources specific to art are required, even if a
Husserlian methodology remains essential.
A Husserlian transcendental phenomenological methodology applied in an
aesthetic context gives rise to a caveat. Given the extensive and multifarious range of
the arts, a Husserlian aesthetic approach requires and thus must allow for a degree of
plasticity. An investigative means rooted in Husserlian principles or concepts may
need to emphasize a given set of principles for one genre of art and a different set for
another genre. While one or more principles might be applied to the visual art of
Varo, for example, exploring some of Borges’s verse via a Husserlian orientation can
require a different set of principles or components. Even contextual themes for one
artist may require a shift of applied principles. Varo’s early more surrealistically
oriented art from her life in Spain and France requires a shift of principles when
considering the more distinctively irrealistic fabulist art and unique style she
developed in Mexico. Thus some Husserlian principles may require of the art being
investigated a thematic shift of emphasis in order to coherently elucidate that work of
art. To investigate some of Borges’s fiction, for example, can require a multiple or
multi-layered orientation and a transcendental phenomenological approach paired
with philosophical intertextuality. This justifies the addition of some of Mikhail
Bakhtin’s ideas and aesthetic theories, especially in Chapter Six.
Husserl does discuss aesthetic consciousness, primarily in Phantasy, Image
Consciousness, and Memory (1898-1925), but elsewhere as well. Even though
Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is emphasized as much if not more for his
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methodology as for his thoughts and opinions about beauty and art per se, his
thoughts and opinions about seeing and receiving art, as well as making art, and his
investigations of perception in general, are relevant to this thesis. The fact that image
consciousness, for example, is thematically inherent in this study magnifies the
importance of extending a Husserlian methodology towards and into aesthetic issues.
Furthermore, while Husserl’s work with perception and image consciousness
become, in the language of Husserlian methodology, presentation and representation, such specialized terminology does not mean that the methodological
language of Husserlian transcendental phenomenology is too abstract or delineated to
be used for an investigation of art and art theory. Thus any proposal for a Husserlian
aesthetic or philosophy of art must take into account Husserl’s investigations of
perception as presentation and the varieties of intuitive re-presentation he defines as
image consciousness, phantasy, and memory, topics he sometimes directly illustrated
via art and aesthetic examples in several of his books.49
While Husserl did not formally propose an aesthetic theory, he did on
occasion address art and aesthetics in some of his lectures and writings, usually in a
context of explicating a broader usage of phenomenological concepts. Neither did
Husserl’s conversations and correspondence contain a philosophy of art per se, but he
did at times consider the significance of art and aesthetics with others, as he did
following a December 1906 visit by a distant relative of his wife, Malvine Husserl
(née Steinschneider). The visiting relative was the poet Hugo von Hofmannsthal, who
was touring Germany to read his paper “The Poet and this Time” at conferences
(Huemer 121).
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The Hofmannsthal Letter
In January 1907 Husserl sent a letter to Hofmannsthal (Husserl “Letter”) that
reveals some of Husserl’s more general ideas and opinions about a philosophy of art.
At that time, Husserl had recently established some of his primary phenomenological
principles, and there are a number of important issues disclosed in this letter. The first
may be that, as Wolfgang Huemer proposes, Hofmannsthal, through his book Kleine
Dramen, which Husserl read, stimulated Husserl’s development of epochē (121-122).
Huemer goes on to explain why he thinks Husserl failed to see “an important analogy
between Husserl’s phenomenological method and Hofmannsthal’s aesthetic theory”
primarily because Husserl did not at the time actually read Hofmannsthal’s most
recent aesthetic writings (128).
However, the fact that Husserl talked about art and aesthetics in a nonscientific context is very useful here. In the Hofmannsthal letter, he affirms some
affinities between a pure phenomenology and purity in art, and considers the role of
intuition in both phenomenology and art, albeit in distinctive ways. For Husserl, a
trope of purity exists in both phenomenology and art. Husserl explains how the
“natural” attitude and all existential attitudes must be suspended both in
phenomenological methodology and in viewing art:
The intuition of a purely aesthetic work of art is enacted under a strict
suspension of all existential attitudes of the intellect and of all attitudes
relating to emotions and the will which presuppose such an existential
attitude. Or more precisely: the work of art places us in (almost forces
us into) a state of aesthetic intuition that excludes these attitudes. The
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more of the existential world that resounds or is brought to attention,
and the more the work of art demands an existential attitude of us out
of itself (for instance a naturalistic sensuous appearance: the natural
truth of photography), the less aesthetically pure the work is. (To this
also belong all kinds of “tendency”.) The natural stance of the mind,
the stance of actual life, is “existential” through and through (Husserl,
“Letter” 133).
One wonders if Husserl thinks of this “bracketing” out of existential
influences as Kantian “disinterestedness,” a topic to be examined ahead. Continuing
with the Hofmannstahl letter, Husserl also writes that he prefers not to say anything
about Hofmannsthal’s poetry because an artist should be indifferent to praise and
scorn. He adds, “And the three golden rules for the artist (in the widest sense), which
at the same time are the public secrets of all true greatness, are surely familiar and
evident to you: 1) He shall have genius—obviously, otherwise he is not an artist. 2)
He shall follow, purely and solely, his daimonion, which, from within, drives him to
an intuiting-blind production. 3) Everyone else knows better, thus he observes them
all—in a purely aesthetic and phenomenological fashion” (136).
In an essay on the Hofmannsthal letter, Sven-Olov Wallenstein points out the
trope of purity in both Husserl’s phenomenological and aesthetic considerations as
well as the Kantian elements reflected or echoed in Husserl’s thoughts about art:
The task of the artist is threefold, Husserl concludes: he must be a
genius (once more a Kantian echo: unlike science, art need not account
for all of its steps and procedures, and it does not attempt to grasp the
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world in concepts); he follows his own demon; and he observes the
world in a “purely aesthetic and phenomenological fashion”. Together,
this demon and this capacity for observation, Husserl suggest, lead to
an “intuiting-blind production” (schauend-blindem Wirken). The idea
of a pure art and a pure phenomenology in this way remain closely tied
together, and the first wave of abstraction that emerged at the same
time Husserl wrote his letter was one way to articulate this connection.
Others would follow, opposing themselves to a certain modernist
“purity” by, often unwittingly, drawing on other aspects of the
phenomenological heritage, most notably temporality and kinesthesia.
The story of these highly complex exchanges remains to be written
(Wallenstein 4).50
Epochē was obviously very much on Husserl’s mind in the Hofmannsthal
letter, but that is not surprising given Husserl’s constant attention on and immersion
in creating his transcendental phenomenology.
However, some problematic issues exist around Husserl’s comparison
between phenomenological principles and neutrality in an aesthetic attitude. Christian
Ferencz-Flatz, referencing the Hofmannsthal letter, argues for a separation “between
the neutrality of image consciousness, on the one hand, and the disinterestedness of
the aesthetic attitude towards reality, on the other hand” (Ferencz-Flatz, Neutrality
477), and Ferencz-Flatz’s argument is detailed and convincing. It is useful to consider
at this point Husserl’s Dürer.
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In Ideas, Husserl considers Dürer’s Knight, Death and the Devil (Ritter, Tod
und Teufel) (fig. 3). While describing perception, Husserl notes that through a mental
process of “phantasizing consciousness” we simultaneously perceive this world and,
via neutrality modification, the phantasized world. He notes, “We can satisfy
ourselves with the help of an illustration that the neutrality modification of normal
perception which posits its object with unmodified certainty is the neutral
consciousness of the picture-object, which we find as a component in our ordinary
observation of a depicted situation perceptively presented” (Ideas 228).
Husserl then discusses Dürer’s engraving as an example, perceiving first the
“engraved print” as a thing, and then considering the figures created with the lines of
the drawing, including the knight on his horse, “death,” and the “devil” not as objects
but as “depictured” realities. The words in emphasis below are Husserl’s:
This depicturing picture-object stands before us neither as being nor
as non-being, nor in any other positional modality; or rather, we are
aware of it having its being, though only as a quasi-being, in the
neutrality modification of Being. But it is just the same with the object
depicted, if we take up a purely aesthetic attitude, and view the same
thing again as “mere picture”, without imparting to it the stamp of
|Being or non-Being, of possible Being or probable Being, and the
like. But as can clearly be seen, that does not mean any privation, but a
modification, that of neutralization. Only we should not represent it as
a transforming operation carried out on a previous position.
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Occasionally indeed it can be this. None the less it need not be it
(Ideas 228-229).

Fig. 3. Albrecht Dürer, Knight, Death and the Devil
(Ritter, Tod und Teufel),1513.Copper engraving 9.6 x 7.5 inches.
Prints in Museum of Modern Art, New York, British Museum, and elsewhere.
Husserl’s phrase, “if we take up a purely aesthetic attitude” (Husserl’s
emphasis) has generated some scholarly debate, including the aforementioned
Ferencz-Flatz’s essay, “The Neutrality of Images and Husserlian Aesthetics.” For
now, consider that an artist’s root impulse to create a physical work of art in a
specific manner can be better understood via a magnified focus on that aesthetic
impulse itself. That magnification occurs naturally when using the epochē, or
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phenomenological reduction. To bring this into a modern context, as artistphilosophers Borges and Varo bring their intellects to bear on the art-making process
while at the same time remaining attuned to intuitive aspects of perception and artmaking. Both philosophy and a search for the numinous have influenced these artists
in their respective theories of art. Schopenhauer was important to Borges’s thought,
for example, so the extent to which a sensibility to the numinous is integrated with the
thinking mind of the artist becomes relevant.
Given the ocularcentric premises in Husserl’s phenomenology, that preference
for immediate vision and how it lends itself to a phenomenological explication of
visual art points to the relevance of Husserl’s “seeing-in” (Hineinschauen) here. As
John Brough has emphasized:
Essential to imaging is what Husserl calls “seeing-in”
(Hineinschauen). Seeing-in operates in two ways. First, I can see
something in the physical support: a human face. In lines drawn in ink
on a sheet of paper, for example, or a runner cast in the bronze of a
sculpture. Seeing-in carries me beyond the perception of ink and paper
or bronze to the consciousness of an image-face or image-body. I can
also see something in the image itself, in the sense that I take it to have
a subject. Thus I see Bismarck in the image-face before me. This is a
case of meaning what is absent—Bismarck himself—in what is
actually present and appearing—the image of Bismarck. It is seeing-in
that distinguishes image-consciousness from symbolic consciousness,
the kind of awareness I have when I recognize an overhead sign in an
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airport as indicating the direction of the airport. Images represent
things internally. I see the restaurant in the painting of the restaurant
and am not carried beyond it. The sign or symbol, on the other hand,
represents its subject externally; it points me toward something else
that is not contained within it (“Edmund Husserl” 152).
Considering Husserl’s “seeing-in,” one immediately thinks of aesthetic
contemplation. This necessarily brings up a need to consider Platonic influences on
Husserl, and the distinctions between Platonic ideal entities and Husserlian essences,
eidos.
Platonic Influence and Husserlian Essence, Eidos, Eidetic Issues
Are Husserl’s essences, his eidos, ultimately a version of the Platonic world of
real forms, perfect essences beyond the world of appearances? Although Husserl
denied the validity of accusations of Platonism in his work, he did “credit Bozano’s
‘truths in themselves’ for the original inspiration [in his Logical Investigations], and
Lotze’s ‘brilliant interpretation of Plato’s doctrine of ideas’ for making it intelligible
to him” (Moran and Cohen 257). Regardless, it is difficult to discount the influence of
Plato on Husserl in regards to his eidetics: “eidetic insight” and “eidetic intuition” or
“essence viewing” or “eidetic seeing” or “essence inspection.” These are all central to
his transcendental phenomenology (91).
By eidos, Husserl means essence (Drummond 65), and his use of “eidetic
reduction” signals one of the ways Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology differs
from the phenomenological concepts of some of Husserl’s students, especially the
“realistic phenomenologists” in the Munich Circle and the Göttingen Philosophical
67

Society (64).51 More pertinent is to consider how the Husserlian version of eidos is
rooted in Husserl’s foundational principle of epochē and his apophthegmatical
maxim, “back to the things themselves.” While Husserl had to take into account
both Platonic concepts and the Kantian revision of Platonic concepts, that is
especially true of the pivotal issue of the thing-in-itself, rooted as it is in the
traditional metaphysical assertion (since Plato) of the thing-in-itself being beyond
appearance. Revising both that Platonic concept and Kant’s revision of the Platonic
concept, Husserl contends that everything that exists appears; i.e., “the thing in itself
appears to us. So there is no distinction between the thing that hides in itself and the
thing that appears to me. There is no secluded noumenon hiding behind the mask of
the phenomenon. Things show themselves to me, they ‘announce’ or ‘express’
themselves” (Lewis and Staehler 4-5).
Remembering Kant’s historically revolutionary interpretation of the
transcendental as “the conditions of possibility for objective knowledge,” or
knowledge of the object by the subject, and how that dynamic requires the subject to
construct the object, since objects are always objects for a transcendental subject to
construct (4-5), helps one to understand Husserl’s revision of both Plato and Kant.
The influences of Plato and Kant on both Husserl and Schopenhauer are examined
later in Chapter Five.
One might ask the role of emotional expression in this. Both of the artists in
this study acknowledged some degree of emotion in art-making. The expressive
element in the artist’s aesthetic is driven by the sensibility to the numinous that is
initiated by the emotional desire to convey that sensibility via his or her artistic work
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in a way that allows image consciousness to become absolute consciousness. If
Husserlian intuitions are perceptions or modifications of perception, and intuition
indicates a “location” where an intentional object is directly present via that
intentionality, when an intention is “filled” by the apprehension of an object, that
object is intuited. While the appearance of the object is “given” and the
phenomenological reception of the given object is a key element in an artist’s creative
dynamic, that artist’s simultaneous intentionality to invoke the numinous via his or
her art represents a form of direct apprehension in which a given object fulfills
intentionality as an intuition of the object, even when that object is unrecognizable or
pre-interpretational. Since the artists being studied here were working to make what is
“invisible” visible, an art object arises, a physical object. The “interwoven” aspect of
a creative process reveals how intentionality and apprehension yield an intuition of
immediate structure as evidence of life in art. I should add that speaking of life in art
draws near to the radical Material Phenomenology of Michel Henry, 52 and art as life
is considered in more detail in Chapter Six.
On the other hand, can the creative process itself reflect objecthood? And is
this an ontological rather than phenomenological issue? Or is it both? Or as Jeff
Malpas states this question: “What is the relation between the objectivity of an art
work, that is, its material being as an object, and its nature as an artwork? The
relation is surely not an irrelevant or contingent one, and yet it is a relationship the
nature of which is not at all self-evident” (54).53
Subject and object considerations are important in any consideration of a
Husserlian aesthetic. In fact, another way of approaching the epochē and a Husserlian
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philosophy of art would be to assert, as Milan Uzelac does, that “the essence of
classical, modern and postmodern art is the same,” the point of difference being “the
way of interpretation of objectification, which is constituted in the creative act” (9).
In relation to this topic, Arvidson notes:
With Husserl’s Logical Investigations, phenomenology established a
new sense of the traditional relation between object and subject in
philosophy. This doctrine of intentionality in phenomenology asserts
that the subject (as consciousness) is already directed toward or
involved with an object, when object is understood in the very general
sense as anything that is presented. The subject and object are part of a
structure of relations in which meaning is revealed between them
(125).
As noted earlier, what is closely associated to a search for knowledge is a kind
of not-knowing. Although it may be surprising when first encountering Husserl’s
work, not-knowing has a role in several ways in Husserlian transcendental
phenomenology. Going hand-in-hand with wonder and not-knowing is self-forgetting,
which is more than an idea; self-forgetting is an actual experience that challenges the
idea of self and its substantiality. The presuppositional notion that subjectivity is a
valid label for the separately self-identified individual being may provide some
logical sense, but the question to ask is whether that presuppositional interpretation of
subjectivity is actually valid or an error that everyone presumes is factual? An error
can be factual in the sense that it is an error, but can philosophy go forward if a
philosophical concept is rooted in a factual error?
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In the next chapter on wonder, we examine in more detail the experience of
self-forgetting, which is to say that within the universal experience of wonder the idea
of self is erased, albeit temporarily. When Husserl wrote in lecture notes that
“aesthetic consciousness [is] essentially connected with the distinction between the
consciousness of an object as such and the object’s manner of appearing” (Husserl,
Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory 459), Husserl could just as well have
been addressing Borges’s unknowing of familiar streets in Buenos Aires, or
Kandinsky’s anecdote of not knowing his own painting.
Husserl’s work is considered again in Chapter Five in relation to
Schopenhauer and other thinkers, and Husserlian transcendental phenomenological
topics and concepts are applied specifically to the work of Varo and Borges in
Chapter Six.
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Chapter Two—Wonder as Disruption: Subjectivity and Not-knowing
Although the importance of wonder and its relevance to philosophy and art
was described in the introduction, this chapter proposes to elucidate in more detail
how the phenomenon or experience of wonder is directly related to a sensibility to the
numinous. Given that the title of this study begins with the phrase The Numinous
Gate, it is imperative to clarify what that phrase means. If one of the characteristics of
the numinous is its invisibility, how could a “gate” appear? At the risk of
oversimplification, it must be noted that the argument here is not that a physical or
even imaginary gate visually appears. While saying the numinous is a gate is
obviously intended metaphorically (although a verbal metaphor can initiate a
visualized rendering), the point is that the numinous becomes accessible via a
seeming rupture in what we presume is consciousness or so-called reality, and this
rupture or disruptive phenomenon is what can be described as wonder.
Investigating the role of wonder in the irreal fabulism of Remedios Varo and
Jorge Luis Borges requires a suspension of presuppositional concepts such as
linearity, conventional appearance, and spatial-temporal presumptions. In other
words, a form of epochē, described in the last chapter, is required. Whether or not a
reader or viewer consciously creates such a bracketing or a suspension of belief is a
secondary point, because that epochē requirement is not essentially manipulative even
if consciously generated; the primary point is the process that occurs subsequently to
a suspension of belief. In a Husserlian sense, wonder is spontaneously “given” to
consciousness along with wonder’s accompanying “not-knowing” and “self72

forgetting” qualities. Wonder ushers in a distinctly disruptive experience that is a
universal yet nonetheless subjectively accentuated phenomenon, and the seemingly
paradoxical condition of subjectivity joined with universality indicates the challenge
of even discussing the nature of wonder and the numinous. That the experience of
wonder can serve or at least influence art-making seems to be only marginally or
peripherally acknowledged in scholarly studies. This is partly because wonder, in
spite of its universality, is difficult to investigate—partly because of its inherent
relationship with subjectivity but also due to its spontaneously abrupt, immediate and
often unrecognizable appearance in the midst of one’s quotidian life.
Experiencing Wonder
Before examining the aesthetic and philosophical significance of wonder, it is
useful to consider the experience of wonder itself. There are many definitions of
wonder in the Oxford English Dictionary. The primary definition of wonder is:
“Something that causes astonishment” ("wonder, n." I). Other definitions relevant to
this study include: “An astonishing occurrence, event, or fact; a surprising incident; a
wonderful thing” ("wonder, n." I,4), and “The emotion excited by the perception of
something novel and unexpected, or inexplicable; astonishment mingled with
perplexity or bewildered curiosity. Also, the state of mind in which this emotion
exists; an instance of this, a fit of wonderment” ("wonder, n." II,7, a). These three
definitions can be combined and used to understand the meaning of wonder as a noun
or what it is in its substantive form. Essentially it is a surprising event or thing that
causes astonishment, and in some cases causes a strong emotional response to the
astonishing event or the thing in itself. Most uses of the noun wonder pivot around the
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experience of wonder as astonishment. Another relevant definition addresses the
verbal use of wonder, essentially as a question or an expression of doubt: “To ask
oneself in wonderment; to feel some doubt or curiosity (how, whether, why, etc.); to
be desirous to know or learn” ("wonder, v." 2). The verb wonder is closest to a
philosophical usage, if someone, for example, wonders about the nature of reality; the
usage of the verb wonder is closest to scientific use if, for example, someone wonders
if a certain container of water is pure H2O. The two approaches are sometimes
intertwined, as when someone sees something inexplicable and is stunned by
astonishment, then starts considering whether this or that factor initiated or caused the
logically inexplicable event. For example, seeing a rainbow for the first time is
usually followed by asking what the phenomenon is or to wonder how it happened;
however, the first and most apropos or pertinent response is the experience of
astonishment.
Even though a primary point of this study is to accentuate and explicate the
power of wonder as an unusual, albeit universal, state of consciousness, wonder must
be elucidated in a philosophico-phenomenological context. While so-called New Age
and occult anecdotes and assertions can be entertaining and even to some extent
useful, keeping wonder in a bubble of magical possibility is one reason wonder has
been to some extent circumvented or ignored by contemporary philosophy. A major
purpose in this dissertation is to philosophically and phenomenologically legitimize
or at least make philosophically accessible topics like wonder and the numinous, and
the artistic impulse to communicate the numinous. Wonder and the numinous are not
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nonsense; they are critically significant topics, albeit the kind of topics that are
difficult to understand because of their inherently ineffable, amorphous qualities.
Encountering a rainbow is only one of the more common examples of an
experience of wonder. Other examples might include meeting an extraterrestrial
being, a distinctively different and unfamiliar life form, or waking up and finding
oneself to be a cockroach instead of a human being—as did Franz Kafka’s literary
protagonist, the salesman Gregor Samsa, who finds himself somehow transformed
overnight into a large and monstrous insect in Kafka’s 1915 novella, Die
Verwandlung, translated as The Metamorphosis or The Transformation. Kafka’s
work, in fact, has also been used as an example of irreal fabulism.
The Universality of Wonder
Prior to art and scholarship—although related to both—is the role of wonder
in humankind’s collective experience. As every parent or kindergarten teacher knows,
for example, young children have no problem allowing or expressing spontaneous
and genuinely amazed wonder many times in one day. If a young child is seeing an
elephant for the first time without any preconception of what an elephant is in
conventional terms, that child is unlikely to suppress a sense of amazement. He or she
may subsequently ask what this creature is or why it has such a long “nose,” but the
initial state of wonder simply occurs spontaneously in a form of not-knowing.
Furthermore, even an adult who presumes to know what an elephant is but lives in a
society where elephants are rarely seen can be astonished when seeing an elephant up
close. That astonishment, even if momentary, is a form of wonder and not-knowing.
In his discussion of wonder and learning, Philip Fisher describes how wonder
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is related to three elements, “by suddenness, by the moment of first seeing, and by the
visual presence of the whole state or object” (21). He goes on to say that within the
arts, only those available as a whole visual experience in an instant, such as a painting
or sculpture, can offer the complete absence of expectation (21).
Whether one agrees or disagrees with Fisher in regards to wonder and art, the
phenomenon of wonder does undermine expectation, whether the expectation is to
understand the phenomenon or to gain knowledge as information. One aspect of the
present argument is to reveal how artists incorporate wonder as an aesthetic means to
create their art. This has been investigated relatively infrequently, at least in a direct
sense, although related topics have been explicated; it is more commonly presumed,
for example, that one function of the artist is to serve human perception, to enable us
to see more directly (Maine 151-163). There are countless examples of this function,
whether in the work of William Blake, Paul Cézanne, Rainer Maria Rilke, Henri
Matisse, Mark Rothko, Wallace Stevens, Agnes Martin, and Wassily Kandinsky, to
use some established examples, or, as are primarily the cases here, in the art of Jorge
Luis Borges and Remedios Varo. While artists as purveyors of perception and wonder
will be examined in more detail in the next chapter about the numinous, as well as in
Chapter Six about Varo and Borges as artist-philosophers, it should be noted here that
some philosophers also discuss this theme:
Wonder, Wittgenstein tells us, gives us the ability to see the world as a
“limited whole,” in other words, sub specie aeternitatis.54 Wittgenstein
writes in his notebooks that such a globalized wonder is usually the
provenance of the artist: “the aesthetic miracle [Wunder] is that the
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world exists.55 In Culture and Value, he suggests that since philosophy
opens with wonder, it can also “capture the world” from a heavenly
perspective: “Thought has such a way—so I believe—it is as though it
flies above the world and leaves it as it is, observing it from above, in
flight”56 (Rubenstein, 124).
Wittgenstein’s approach to wonder and the ineffable is similar to
Schopenhauer’s, and it is interesting, though perhaps not widely known, that
Schopenhauer’s writings influenced Wittgenstein (Cahill 26). Wittgenstein, for
example, is, like Schopenhauer, not intimidated or repulsed by a notion of the
mystical: “There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make
themselves manifest. They are what is mystical” (Cahill 19).57
Wonder as Rupture and Hinge
To return to the fundamental question of how wonder is related to the
numinous, Jerome Miller’s proposal that wonder is a hinge (33-51), a metaphor he
borrows from Derrida (33), also works here. While wonder is a disruption, a kind of
rupture that is best understood phenomenologically, the implications include how the
numinous can sometimes be accessed via art. This may also be a factor behind why so
many western artists have been interested in eastern philosophy and spirituality. It is
not difficult to understand why artists have been attracted to eastern ideas and
practices—engaging, contemplating and depicting the infinitely shifting terrain of
subjectivity and the invisible influence of the numinous in art-making might lend
itself more to an Eastern philosophical approach because in Asian philosophy a
metaphorical rendering of the variations and fluctuations of aesthetic consciousness
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and subjectivity in regards to wonder has been described as a “gateless gate.”58 While
Continental philosophy is referenced and accentuated in this paper, both European
and Asian thought can be referenced to support the argument that Varo and Borges’s
irrealistic narratives challenge any immutable account of truth and reality in art.
Performance-assisted Subjective Process, the Numinous and Wonder
One useful term in a consideration of the role of subjectivity in art is
“performance-assisted subjective process,” a phrase coined by artist and author Adi
Da Samraj to describe audience participation in a work of art, indicating that each
individual goes through his or her own inward (or subjective) course of response to a
performance or artwork presented. The artwork itself, then, is moved beyond being an
objectified thing, becoming instead a means of assisting in a transformation of
consciousness in the participant (Adi Da Samraj 240).
What, then, are the implications of a sensibility to the numinous whether for
the artist or for the viewer or reader? First, related to the performance-assisted
subjective process are the observations by artists as well-known as Marcel Duchamp
that a work of art is not completed until the viewer receives and interacts with the art:
In the creative act, the artist goes from intention to realization through
a chain of totally subjective reactions. His struggle toward the
realization is a series of efforts, pains, satisfaction, refusals, decisions,
which also cannot and must not be fully self-conscious, at least on the
esthetic plane. The result of this struggle is a difference between the
intention and its realization, a difference that the artist is not aware of.
All in all, the creative act is not performed by the artist alone; the
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spectator brings the work in contact with the external world by
deciphering and interpreting its inner qualification and thus adds his
contribution to the creative act (Duchamp 3).
A more phenomenological way of saying this is that until an art object is
given to the viewer in consciousness, it does not exist. If the glamor inherent in the
cultural recognition of an individual artist’s accomplishments are set aside, bracketed
out, who is more important, the artist or the viewer, the writer or the reader? There is
a kind of intersubjectivity at work here that defies or at least challenges the notion of
separative self-identification. That wonder invites a sensibility to the numinous, or
makes visible the invisibility of what is called here the numinous gate, again is a
highly participatory phenomenon.
The aesthetic and philosophical significance of the phenomenon of wonder,
which itself often arises in response to a variety of strange or startling phenomena, or
in response to perplexing or seemingly unanswerable questions, is a factor in some, if
not most, art. That the experience of wonder sometimes overflows into peripheral
areas described as mysticism, occultism, magic or theology signals the complex
challenge of bringing a scholarly orientation to wonder and the numinous, as well as
to examining responses to wonder. The first step in the examination of wonder begun
in the introduction is to accentuate the inverse of not-knowing, unknowing, selfforgetting and doubt—knowing itself, a subject investigated far more frequently in
philosophy. What is knowledge, or knowing, and to what extent can knowledge be
explained? In fact, can knowledge be “explained” at all? Formulating this last
question tacitly acknowledges the array of approaches to knowledge. Thinking about
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knowledge and knowing leads one back into a distinctly human milieu, because
before examining knowledge, one must consider more specifically what subjectivity
is, what the knower knowing actually denotes. What is different here is to consider
how subjectivity is impacted by its encounter with the disruption of wonder, and what
are the ramifications of that encounter? One aspect of responding to that question is
related to the inherent heterogeneity of subjectivity.
Subject and Subjectivity
The modernist/postmodernist divide in art reflects, among other issues,
disparate assessments and theories of subjectivity. The contemporary art world
(which often reflects contemporary thought) sometimes roots itself in a
poststructuralist foundation that defines different uses of the word “subject”:
Most obviously, the word [“subject”] simply implies a “subject”—in
the sense of a “topic”—under discussion or being represented. But
more to the point here, it suggests the idea of a human subjectivity.
“Subject” is preferred to “self” because “self” is likely to be taken to
suggest an essentialist notion of subjectivity that is antithetical to
poststructuralist and other contemporary thinking. The word “subject”
also evokes the idea of being subject to a larger force or forces: a king,
a dictator, or a totalitarian state, perhaps. Of course, in the
poststructuralist world the larger force to which one is subject is not an
individual or human agency, but language itself, which contains all of
us in its prisonhouse, makes subjects of us all. Finally, “subject
suggests the idea of the grammatical “subject” of a sentence. One is
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made a subject when one is represented in language, hailed by
ideology, constructed as a subject, and subjected to the force of
representation” (Gaggi, From Text to Hypertext, xii).
This excerpt is excellent and relevant in that it points to why the thematic
direction of this paper is not rooted in contemporary poststructuralist thought. While
the excerpt above clearly expresses a scholarly tone in which the content is valid in
regards to current aesthetic trends, this paper is rooted in a distinctively different
approach to subjectivity, one that may be considered invalid by some contemporary
thinkers but that is nonetheless aligned with this author’s experiences and subsequent
years of conclusions from studying and explicating those experiences. To say, as
Silvio Gaggi does (xii), that language “contains all of us in its prisonhouse” and
denigrates human subjects or positions humans to be dominated by a larger force, be
it grammatical or sociopolitical, is virtually the opposite assertion of the present
thesis.
This in no way should be interpreted to mean that the work of many modern
scholars who engaged the study of language—Wittgenstein, Derrida, Barthes, and
others—has been invalid or not valuable; their work has been validated and is of
course valuable. In fact, it is also important to note that Jorge Luis Borges and many
other writers, including Derrida and Barthes, have challenged the idea that language
is a subjective enclosure. Borges’s fictional and nonfictional intertextuality and
irrealistic narratives undermine fixed notions of language and reflect an intention to
ignore and circumnavigate immutable concepts of subjectivity. When Borges,
discussing how H.G. Wells insisted that human beings take precedence over ideas
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about human beings, responds “with the nominalist Hume, that very person is
equally plural and consists of a series of perceptions; or with Plutarch, ‘Nobody is
what he was, or will be what he is now’; or with Heraclitus, ‘No one steps into the
same river twice’” (Selected Non-Fictions 212), he circumvents fixed ideas of self,
and reaffirms the reality of fluctuating, pluralistic subjectivities. Is a Borgesian
subjectivity a temporally rooted subjectivity? Perhaps. In a famously beautiful
passage from his essay “A new Refutation of Time,” Borges concludes:
Time is the substance of which I am made. Time is a river that sweeps
me along, but I am the river; it is a tiger that mangles me, but I am the
tiger; it is a fire that consumes me, but I am the fire. The world,
unfortunately, is real; I, unfortunately, am Borges (Selected NonFictions 322).
Likewise with Remedios Varo’s visual representations of subjectivity—she
repeatedly challenges through her fabulist paintings the idea of conventional
subjectivity and considers the self as a means or avenue to transcending not just
conventional ideas of visual representation, but the sometimes uninspected conceptual
exclusivities imprisoning and solidifying the self. Her paintings often reflect
fragmented versions of herself, and especially express her seeking to understand
herself as a journey.
Searches for Knowledge
Is knowledge, then, something that only thought can address, or that can be
experienced only through discursive ideas? This seems unlikely, given the history, for
example, of the varieties of esoteric spirituality and their promulgated experiential
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teachings of alternative states of consciousness. In fact, some of the world’s greatest
Asian scholars and aestheticians have simultaneously been spiritual practitioners. For
example, Abhinavagupta (950-1020 AD) was one of India's greatest philosophers,
mystics and aestheticians, as well as an important musician, poet, dramatist, exegete,
theologian, and logician – a polymath, and a man whose voracious appetite for
knowledge and learning was legendary.59
While any claim to a global approach for art should take into account the
many Eastern philosophies of art and aesthetics—as, to some limited extent, did both
Borges and Varo’s art—this dissertation for the most part remains within the
admittedly Eurocentric context of Continental philosophy. The primary eastern
philosopher referenced here, besides Abhinavagupta, is Adi Shankara, who lived
788–820 AD. There is a relevant reason for referencing Adi Shankara, a scholar and
spiritual teacher who studied and wrote about the Upanishads, a text that deeply
influenced Arthur Schopenhauer. In fact, the Upanishads was reportedly the only text
that Schopenhauer kept continually on his desk.60 Borges, in turn, was greatly
influenced by the writings of Schopenhauer. Adi Shankara, also known as Sankara
Bhagavatpadacarya and Adi Sankaracarya, remains one of the most important Hindu
philosophers; besides his studies and writings about the Upanishads, he synthesized
and rejuvenated the doctrine of Advaita Vedanta, a multi-faceted philosophical and
religious system that argues for a nondualistic orientation to consciousness.
The point here is that knowledge is not a Western exclusivity, and that Eastern
thought can be merged with a study that is primarily rooted in Western philosophy.61
There is no reason for an investigation of knowledge and art to be restricted to
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geography or cultural identification. Questioning is a universal human characteristic.
Considering the fact that Arthur Schopenhauer was the first major European
philosopher to openly reference Asian philosophical and spiritual writings beyond a
cursory mention, and that Borges repeatedly expressed a lifelong admiration for
Schopenhauer’s writings, vindicates an acknowledgement of Schopenhauer’s
philosophy in this study, and in this chapter at least, a mention of Schopenhauer and
wonder.
Schopenhauer and Wonder
David Cartwright’s summary of Schopenhauer’s position regarding religion,
that of a self-described atheist, is clarifying and signals several preeminent points
comprising the Schopenhauerian aesthetic argument as well as the present orientation
here:
Schopenhauer did not subscribe to a religion, and he was an atheist.
Still, he took a lively interest in the religions of the world. That he
would do so is not surprising, since he saw a strong kinship between
philosophy and religion, and also a natural antagonism. He held that
both philosophical and religious systems attempt to address a deep
human need for metaphysics. He attributed this need to a sense of
wonder or astonishment, one that arises from the recognition of the
ubiquity of suffering and death within the world (145).
If Schopenhauer’s work was characterized by a sense of wonder, his aesthetic
also points to the liberating dynamic of contemplating art, a dynamic that generates
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self-forgetting and freedom from the devastating drive of the will. His aesthetic is—
through the contemplation of art—rooted in a sense of wonder.
Wonder, the Night Sky, and the Circle
A particular form of wonder in nature that humankind has long recognized,
and that has been and continues to be a creative force in art, including in modernist
visual art, is space, and especially the night sky. Probably the most famous modern
painting of the night sky is post-impressionist painter Vincent van Gogh’s The Starry
Night (fig. 4).

Fig. 4. Vincent van Gogh, The Starry Night (Dutch: De sterrennacht), 1889.
Oil on canvas, 29 x 39 ¼ in. Museum of Modern Art, New York.
Voluntarily confined in 1889 to a hospital in the town of Saint-Remy
northeast of Arles in southern France (Silverman 393), Van Gogh painted (during the
day from memory) the night view from his sanitarium room window. Although Van
Gogh was suffering intensely at this time, The Starry Night has been described as a
work that “sums up his religious journey in a triumphant vision of the mystical union
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with God” (Erickson 79). In this painting Van Gogh depicts, in visual aesthetic terms
(albeit visual terms fueled by an intense emotional state) a dynamic of the linear
becoming curvilinear with arciform shapes spinning into circles of light to express the
beauty and wonder of the night sky.
The circle in artmaking can be—at least in specific cases—an aesthetic
element that signals a sensibility to the numinous. This line-becoming-circle dynamic
is echoed repeatedly in art, and while such usage does not always claim a spiritual
significance, it sometimes, on the other hand, acknowledges exactly that significance.
With the advent of modernist non-objective abstraction, however, one might expect a
diluting of that sensibility, especially given the absence of the recognizable visual
human root of more representational abstraction. Yet here again the issue of quotidian
context and wonder arises.
While the topic of nonobjective abstraction is covered in Chapter Four:
Seeking the Numinous in Modernist Art, it needs to be emphasized here that
nonobjective abstraction does reflect a different (albeit related) orientation to
expressing a sensibility to the numinous. Whereas Borges and Varo, while working in
an irreal narratology, almost always include the human being via a representational
motif, nonobjective abstraction purports to reveal some version of the absolute, which
need not include any references to the human entity.62 Nonetheless, a sense of wonder
can easily arise when viewing and contemplating a nonobjective abstract work of art.
What is it, then, that one is seeing? What is being expressed or not expressed?
One aspect of this is that nonobjective abstraction is in some sense a more directly
perceived and experienced occasion of wonder because, to put it in the colloquial, the
86

viewer does not know what the picture is, what it is about, or what it has to do with
human identification. If a child inspects a work of nonobjective abstraction, what is
that child going to “see”? Patterns, lines, colors? An adult who is versed in art history
may immediately bring presuppositional information to viewing a piece, or to invert
that thought, an artist may be influenced by a philosopher’s concept, or his or her own
philosophical concept. The point is that a kind of not-knowing can occur with
nonobjective abstraction as well as irreal fabulism, a point that signals how notknowing is germane to wonder in the sense of wonder as amazement or awe.
To extend this in visual and textual intertextual context, it is relevant that
Schopenhauer’s thought does influence Kandinsky (among other artists) in several
ways. “As a thinker, Kandinsky was highly eclectic, and his discussion of color
theory in On the Spiritual in Art is deeply influenced by the optical studies of Goethe
and Schopenhauer” (Lindsay 116).
Not only color, but the use of geometric and other forms may be accentuated
through various ideas. Kandinsky’s uses of the circle are evident especially in, among
other works, two paintings, Several Circles (fig 5) and Composition 8 (fig. 23, p.173)
and, and point to what the contemporary Guggenheim Museum curator Nancy
Spector describes as the significance of Kandinsky’s art and aesthetic while he was
working at Weimar Bauhaus:
Originally premised on a Germanic, expressionistic approach to
artmaking, the Bauhaus aesthetic came to reflect Constructivist
concerns and styles, which by the mid-1920s had become international
in scope. While there, Kandinsky furthered his investigations into the
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correspondence between colors and forms and their psychological and
spiritual effects. In Composition 8 (fig. 23, p.173) the colorful,
interactive geometric forms create a pulsating surface that is
alternately dynamic and calm, aggressive and quiet. The importance of
circles in this painting prefigures the dominant role they would play in
many subsequent works, culminating in his cosmic and harmonious
image Several Circles. “The circle,” claimed Kandinsky, “is the
synthesis of the greatest oppositions. It combines the concentric and
the eccentric in a single form and in equilibrium. Of the three primary
forms, it points most clearly to the fourth dimension” (Spector).

Fig. 5. Wassily Kandinsky. Several Circles (Einige Kreise), 1926. Oil on canvas,
55 1/4 × 55 3/8 inches, Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, New York.
Regardless of Kandinsky’s conscious intention, his Several Circles might be
88

interpreted as a “night sky” or as an expression of astronomical deep space. Spector’s
comments above echo the description of H.H. Arnason, who notes that in Several
Circles “the transparent color circles float serenely across one another above an
indeterminate gray-black ground, like planets orbiting through space. It is hardly
surprising that the artist revered the circle as a ‘link with the cosmos’ and as a form
that ‘points most clearly to the fourth dimension’ ” (Arnason 355). Earlier, Arnason
wrote a more emphatic assessment of how Kandinsky considered the circle to be an
expression of the spiritual:
Kandinsky fervently believed that abstract forms were invested with
great significance and expressive power, and the spiritual basis of his
abstract forms set him apart from Bauhaus teachers like Moholy-Nagy.
“The contact of the acute angle of a triangle with a circle,” he wrote,
“is no less powerful in its effect than that of the finger of God with the
finger of Adam in Michelangelo’s [Creation of Man] painting.” The
circle, in particular, was filled with “inner potentialities” for the artist,
and it took on a prominent role in his work of the twenties (354-355).
To continue with Schopenhauer and wonder, it would be difficult to discuss
Schopenhauer without referencing Kant. While discussing Kant’s two sublimes (the
mathematical sublime and the dynamical sublime) in a context that includes aesthetic
contemplation, Schopenhauer, as Kant did before him in Critique of Practical Reason
(WWP1 252),63 notes with reverence and admiration the overwhelming beauty of the
starry night sky. However, unlike Kant, Schopenhauer acknowledges a more detailed
connection:
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When we lose ourselves in contemplation of the infinite magnitude of the
world in space and time, reflect on the millennia that flowed past and on those
to come—or indeed, when the night sky actually brings countless worlds
before our eyes, and thus impresses the immensity of the world upon our
consciousness—we feel ourselves reduced to nothingness, feel ourselves as
individual, as animate body, as transitory phenomenon of will, vanishing like
a drop in the ocean, dissipating into nothingness (251).
That both Kant and Schopenhauer bring up the immensity of space points
again to humankind’s fascination and wonder with the night sky. All one has to do is
to look upwards to allow wonder to arise in consciousness. Sophia Vasalou argues
that “Schopenhauer’s own analysis of the sublime” combines with “a therapeutic of
wonder at its heart—a therapeutic of the passions that is simultaneously a therapeutic
of the subjectivity that underpins them” (Schopenhauer 5).
Both Borges’ intellectual character and his layered fabulist writings and
poetry are reflected, so to speak, in the complexity and beauty of the night sky, which
one might say reflects the wonder that fuels so much of Borges’ literary vision.
Similarly, numerous Varo paintings also refer to the stars, the sky, and space, often as
background in paintings depicting other subjects, and sometimes obliquely
intertwined with philosophical meaning that influences human lives, as in her Three
Destinies (fig. 6), a work Varo commented on:
Each of these three characters is peacefully doing what he wants to,
oblivious to the others; but there is a complicated machine from which
come pulleys that wind around them and make them move (they think
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they move freely). In turn, the machine is propelled by a pulley
connect to a star in the sky that moves the whole apparatus. The star
represents the destiny of these people, and although they are not aware
of it, their destinies are intertwined: one day their lives will cross
(Ovalle 113).

Fig. 6. Remedios Varo. Three Destinies (Tres destinos), 1956.
Oil on Masonite, 35 3/8 x 42 ½ in. Private collection.
One theme reflected by Varo’s art and art commentary is the human
connection to the cosmos, accentuating how people’s lives are not alienated from the
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night sky, from the unknown, or from wonder itself. As noted elsewhere, Borges and
Varo virtually always reference the human being in the midst of their art. Varo’s Star
Catcher (fig. 7) magnifies this concept.

Fig. 7. Remedios Varo. Star Catcher (Cazadora de astros), 1956.
Mixed media on paper; 18 ¾ x 13 3/8 in. Private Collection.
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Questioning and Explaining Wonder
The history of Western philosophy notes some master questioners among the
great thinkers, from Socrates to Wittgenstein and beyond. Wittgenstein, certainly a
preeminent investigator of knowledge, wrote, “Explanations come to an end
somewhere” [“Die Erklärungen haben irgendwo ein Ende.”] (Philosophical
Investigations 6).
To extend this farther and with more specificity within the present study,
artists, philosophers, and artist-philosophers do use the experience of wonder as an
entryway into expressing through their work a sensibility to the numinous. To shine a
light of scholarly explication onto a seemingly inexplicable or ineffable thematic
territory without automatically accessing logical presuppositional theories of
knowledge is, to say the least, challenging, but the challenge works in both directions
as well. In short, to formulate the questions that will enrich and illuminate the
thematic territory surrounding each question necessarily requires the questioner to
challenge the limitations inherent in the question itself, and in the questioner himself
or herself.
Several factors work to prevent or obstruct the challenging of a question’s
inherent limitations. One is the concept of objectivity, and the second, clearly
daunting factor is the role of science in human culture. If a scholarly approach to a
theme or topic consists of being objective, or not influenced by personal feelings,
then subjectivity is unapproachable. Yet that cannot be—subjectivity is the initial
gateway to all philosophical and spiritual thought, and in fact to any thought
whatsoever. The real question is whether or not scientific orientations alone can lead
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to an excavation of truth.
Scientific Materialism
At this point in contemporary society the belief in the automatic validity of
science is so prevalent that scientific factual knowledge has in some ways become an
almost fundamentalist, unquestionable belief system, one that ushers the individual
into a theatre filled with a passive and in some cases quasi-religious audience. This
orientation amounts to what can be described as scientific materialism. While
scientific proofs, thoughts, and ideas clearly have significantly useful places in the
thinker’s toolbox, or the artist’s paint box, metaphorically speaking, acknowledging
science as an infallible and exclusive revelation of “objective” knowledge creates a
mythological idol of scientifically validated factual objectivity that can become, at its
most distant borders, a close-minded exclusivity. The argument here is that if
scientific objectivity and logic-rooted factual validity are the only tools in one’s
toolbox, the phenomenon and experience of wonder can be easily dismissed and
discarded as invalid or irrelevant to humankind and truth.
Yet wonder cannot be completely dismissed because it is a universal human
experience. Wonder is a key element in both artistic creativity and the philosophical
understanding of aesthetics, as well as in philosophical inquiry in general; this is
neither a new idea nor a radical discovery, even though it “is relatively underrepresented in the scholarship” (Deckard xvii). Among the varieties of wonder,64 the
forms most relevant to this study are those rooted in, first, astonishment and awe, and
secondly, what can be interrupted as perplexity and doubt—both of which are
presented here as forms or modifications of “not-knowing.”
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Related to objectivity is the subject-object dichotomy, which is frequently a
presuppositionally referenced concept, and not necessarily a valid idea. It certainly
appears to be a valid presupposition: there is this “me” and the rest of the world, but
the validity of that idea has long been questioned. One must challenge the validity of
the subject-object dichotomy to even begin to effectively inspect what knowing and a
knower are. Thus the subjective self is a vehicle to a broader landscape. Part of the
argument herein is that when a state of wonder is not suppressed for one reason or
another, it can eventually initiate a search for the numinous. Before that search can
even begin, however, one must necessarily fully allow wonder and its attendant notknowing to manifest instead of instantly explaining wonder away with scientific
materialist facts.
Mary Midgley, using a parable by Jesus that itself uses the example of the
interior motivation of a merchantman seeking and buying pearls, addresses the issue
of expectation and knowledge, proposing that wonder involves more than factual
information:
Of late, scientists have been so anxious to exclude irrelevant, outward
sorts of usefulness from the value of science that they do not easily
notice this point. Yet it must surely be central. Unless the
merchantman merely wants that pearl to sell again, he wants do
something with it. He wants, it seems, to enter into relation with it, to
wonder at it, to contemplate its beauty. But wonder involves love. It is
an essential element in wonder that we recognize what we see as
something we did not make, cannot fully understand, and acknowledge
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as containing something greater than ourselves. This is not only true if
our subject matter is the stars; it is notoriously just as true if it is rocks
or nematode worms (41).
While this example veers into theological thought, which this study, for the
most part, disclaims, the point to make is that the experience of wonder can be more
than an isolated experience in that it may influence one’s orientation to and
assessment of life and the world. Wonder may, in fact, represent one of the most
powerful motivators in science, and it may be wonder not at a single object or
phenomenon, but to the sheer range of direct, non-theoretical experience:
Darwin’s success had a great deal to do with the larger spirit of
empiricism—with a ready acceptance of the richness of experience,
and a refusal to distort it by premature intrusion of theory. What
distinguished Darwin from the innumerable scholars who were
wrangling in his youth about the relations between different lifeforms—and more especially from the Continental scholars—was his
direct, undisputatious, fascinated absorption in the range of facts that
the natural world laid before him. On the voyage of the Beagle, he was
not looking for something that he could use to support a theory. He
was absorbed in the wonder [my emphasis] at the immense range and
variety of the life-forms that he saw (Midgley 201).
Thus the pursuits of science per se are not problematic. The problem is one of
presupposition and application, the presumption and expectation that a purity of
investigation (and this more of an idea about purity rather than the essence of purity
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itself) disallows invisible, non-linear, and only factual elements. While many
scientists would never go so far as using Husserl’s epochē to bracket out specific
presuppositions in their investigations, often a kind over inverted bracketing happens
through theoretical presuppositions, such as the presumption of the invalidity, or at
least the irrelevance of wonder. In the context of this study, that is an error: “If
thinking is our professional concern, then wisdom and wonder are our business;
information-storage, though often useful, is just an incidental convenience” (Midgley
253).
This does not mean that scientific fact has no role or value, or that thinking
should be disallowed. In fact, if there is a primary principle in Husserl’s
transcendental phenomenology, it is that his work and all philosophy should reflect an
immaculate scientific rigor, albeit a Husserlian scientific rigor. Nonetheless, in the
face of spontaneous wonder, initial thoughts sans presuppositional prejudices must be
established. If wonder and not-knowing are allowed and presented to consciousness
without presuming scientifically materialistic or religiously consoling explanations,
an egress from the confines of preconceptual thinking is formed, opening onto a
more directly experiential and penetrating explication of wonder. Experience, in fact,
is another key element in Husserlian thought and intention.
No claim is made as to this study to being a conventional or purely logical
orientation to investigating knowledge. What is claimed and investigated is that
wonder, not-knowing, and a sensibility to the numinous must be considered and
investigated in an open-minded and scholarly approach if the essential value of
acknowledging, exploring and communicating knowledge itself is to be understood
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and communicated. In other words, in regards to mystery and the invisible, it is not
useful to dismiss those elements as automatically invalid ideas impenetrable to
scholarly investigation. Varo and Borges were chosen specifically because their work
does not dismiss mystery and the invisible as impenetrable; they acknowledged,
excavated, and presented the phenomena through their art, albeit in highly
individualistic styles.
This approach to knowledge is described in detail by Ariane Mildenberg
through her examination of Virginia Woolf’s “The Mark on the Wall” (“Openings”
41-69). 65 While doing so, Mildenberg unearths an analogous response to wonder and
not-knowing—doubt. Mildenberg’s referencing of Woolf gives a sense of the
conjunction of art and wonder in regards to doubt and not-knowing.
At the end of the story, the narrator offers a final variation of the mark:
“Ah, the mark on the wall! It was a snail.”66 But having offered
various possibilities as to what the mark could be, the finality of this
last remark cannot but be doubtful.67 In fact, this sense of doubt is
triggered by the short story’s opening sentence—“Perhaps it was in the
middle of January in the present year that I first looked and saw the
mark on the wall”—preventing us from ever reaching a believable
identification of the mark: “as for that mark, I’m not sure about it, I
don’t believe it was made by a nail [sic] after all” (“Openings” 55).
Mildenberg continues, first quoting Husserl, “ ‘The attempt to doubt
everything has its place in the realm of our perfect freedom […] the attempt to doubt
any object of awareness in respect of its being actually there necessarily conditions
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certain suspension [Aufhebung] of the thesis; and it is precisely this that interest us’ ”
(“Openings” 55).68 Mildenberg also points out that Maurice Natanson, in his study of
Husserl (“Openings” 55-56),69 suggests that humans have a taken for granted attitude
to life, a “natural standpoint” that has “suspended our abilities to wonder in the face
of the object” (55). Natanson also argues that Husserl’s reduction (epochē) also leads
the perceiver back to the dimension of “primordial doubt or wonder” (Natanson 54).
The nature and ultimate significance of Husserlian primordial doubt is too
complex to explicate in detail here. Nonetheless, in the present context doubt is
presented as a response to phenomena, whether in the form of philosophical
questioning or as a means of epochē or the suspension of belief rooted in
preconception. Natanson does attempt to clarify the general ramification of
primordial doubt, epochē, and wonder:
The immanent suspension of primordial doubt is the obverse side of
the general thesis of the natural attitude. The suspension assures the
indomitable faith of everyday man in the actuality of his world and
helps to explain his refusal to take seriously the philosopher’s
argument about realism and solipsism. Such discussions are
recognized as clever and entertaining but not as part and parcel of the
truth of daily life. Yet philosophy does arise, there is wonder, and we
do have recourse to the kind of radical reflection which Husserl
proposed. Despite the apparent insularity of common sense to
primordial doubt, daily existence swarms with possibilities, among
them the self-illumination of mundanity (56).
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An objective skepticism or philosophical doubt naturally arises in tandem with
the type of wonder characterized by perplexity, or the question that seeks the true
answer. While the majority of philosophers understand the purposes and value of
doubt as a form of questioning, perhaps fewer thinkers write about the broader
significance of wonder in questioning. Nonetheless, numerous great thinkers
emphasized the critical significance of wonder, including a master of questioning,
Ludwig Wittgenstein, who famously wrote, “Man has to awaken to wonder—and so
perhaps do peoples. Science is a way of sending him to sleep again” (Culture 5e).70
Wonder and Not-knowing
A central theme of wonder, and a preliminary consideration here is to look at
how an association between wonder and not-knowing surfaces.
The salient point is that wonder is an essential factor in life, in philosophy, in
art and in the philosophy of art, and that wonder includes an element, and an
experience, of not-knowing. Prior to art and scholarship (although related to both) is
the role of wonder in humankind’s collective experience of knowing and notknowing. Unless “ knowing” can be put aside at certain junctures, one remains in a
maze of recurring conceptual thought that disallows any inner experience. This is the
real value of the artist-philosopher, whose artistic activity within the larger context of
life (art for life’s sake) challenges seemingly impenetrable labyrinthine qualities of
the conceptual maze. Bracketing out presuppositional knowledge in order to step
directly into “inner experience” requires less of an analytical approach and more of an
oblique, less categorical orientation. That art history remains addicted to categories,
hierarchies, definitions and other fixed divisions is both amusing and oppressive.
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Artist-philosophers such as Borges and Varo challenge not only categories and linear
thought, but perceptual and narratological boundaries as well. Few artist-philosophers
could accomplish this seemingly oblique approach as did Bataille, whose attraction to
mysticism includes a dislike of the word mysticism, and whose passionate resistance
to definitions and the limitations of discursive thought (instances below of italic
emphasis are Bataille’s) remains always evident:
By inner experience, I understand what one usually calls mystical
experience: states of ecstasy, of ravishment, at least of meditated
emotion. But I am thinking less of confessional experience, to which
one has had to hold oneself hitherto, than of a bare experience, free of
ties, of an origin, to any confession whatsoever. This is why I don’t
like the world mystical (Inner Experience 9).
To release inner experience from what Bataille describes above as
“confessional experience” in order to allow “bare experience” also opens the door to
the numerous aspects of subjectivity and perception. Merleau-Ponty, whose work
pivots from and beyond the work of Edmund Husserl, addresses some features of this
territory while writing about the distinctions between perception and thought, as well
as some of their conjunctions and reciprocal exchanges. However, he also makes
clear by the very title of one of his books, The Primacy of Perception, what is, in his
philosophy, fundamental. Accentuating the value of doubt, Merleau-Ponty writes:
At the moment when I am thinking or considering an idea, I am not
divided into instants of my life. But it is also incontestable that this
domination of time, which is the work of thought, is always somewhat
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deceiving. Can I seriously say that I will always hold the ideas I do at
present—and mean it? Do I not know that in six months, in a year,
even if I use more or less the same formulas to express my thoughts,
they will have changed their meaning slightly? Do I not know that is a
life of ideas, as there is a meaning of everything I experience, and that
one of my most convincing thoughts will need additions and then will
be, not destroyed, but at least integrated into a new unity. This is the
only conception for knowledge that is scientific and not mythological
(Moran, Phenomenology 442).71
Merleau-Ponty, besides endorsing philosophical doubt, is echoing Borges’s
Heraclitean approach to subjectivity and time.
Skepticism, Doubt, and Wonder
Doubt is clearly a seminal tool in thinking, including doubt of thinking itself
and doubt in the form of questioning the limitations of a question or an answer.
Discursive thought can create (beyond its function as a necessary and useful tool) an
abstracted belief system that is every bit as misleading as a fundamentalist religious
belief system. Even logic has limitations, although it remains a necessary rudder for
navigating the waters of knowledge. In the years between the publication of his
Tractatus Logico-philosophicus and the posthumously published collection
Philosophische Untersuchungen (Philosophical Investigations), Ludwig
Wittgenstein’s writings about language and logic continued to evolve. As Gordon
C.F. Bearn points out, this period between Tractatus and Investigations was a turn
around for Wittgenstein, threatening the “the very idea of logic itself” (81). While
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Wittgenstein initially proposed, in almost mystical terms via Tractatus, that
understanding the logic of language would calm human unrest, subsequent years of
reflection undermined, at least to some degree, that argument: “Coming face to face
with the dumb fact that some things do and some things do not make sense can incite
the feeling that one is in Wittgenstein’s words: ‘walking on a mountain of wonders’”
(Bearn 81).72 This is not to say that Wittgenstein did always take into account wonder
in the midst of his philosophical examinations, including the “early” Wittgenstein of
Tractatus. In fact, it is Tractatus that is sometimes described as Wittgenstein’s
mystical work (Bearn 126). Writing in 1916 before the publication of Tractatus,
Wittgenstein declares, “Aesthetic wonder [Das künstleriche Wunder] is: that the
world exists. That what exists does exist” (Notebooks 86). And, “a few years later, in
the Tractatus, this wonder is no longer specifically associated with art, and is
renamed the mystical (Bearn 126): ‘Not how the word is, is the mystical, but that it
is’ ” (Tractatus 5.552).73
A summary statement, and an indication of Wittgenstein’s genius, might be
simply to say that Wittgenstein was amazed that the world exists; he felt wonder in
the face of the world’s existence. This is not so different from another acclaimed
modern philosopher, Martin Heidegger, who, in his discussion of Hölderlin and the
underlying meaning of festivals or holidays, speaks of wonder: “On the authentic
holiday, says Heidegger, we ‘step into the …intimation of the wonder (Wunder) that
around us a world worlds at all, that there is something rather than nothing, that there
are things and we ourselves are’ ” (Young, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Art, 86). That a
world “worlds” as a verb, or that existence occurs at all, generates a certain species of
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wonder that occurs perhaps more frequently with philosophers, or with the
philosopher in every man and woman. This is a kind of unknowing in that what one
presumed was known or knowable becomes undone or disassembled.
While doubting or questioning what one perceives or thinks can lead to a kind
of intellectual paralysis, it is also essential to challenge oneself continually, as did
Plato, Kant, Husserl, and Wittgenstein. The first step to challenging presuppositional
bias is to acknowledge the influence of wonder, a phenomenon that paradoxically
allows and in fact demands an initial subjective participatory activity with its
accompanying self-forgetting and not-knowing experience.
Humor and Playfulness
Also analogous to wonder is humor or playfulness, a topic that is more
relevant than one might expect at first glance. Humor and playfulness are
characteristics of a certain kind of wonder associated with delight that frequently
surfaces in art. Varo and Borges both inserted humor into their art, wrapping their
playful fabulist narratives in a setting that allowed a seamless reciprocal
amalgamation of wonder and humor. In the preface to his Order of Things, Michel
Foucault credits a passage from Borges for its expression of humor in the midst of its
simultaneous disruption of “known” parameters and the subsequent presuppositions a
reader may bring to the usual orientation of literature:
This book first arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter
that shattered, as I read the passage, all the familiar landmarks of my
thought—our thought, the thought that bears the stamp of our age and
our geography—breaking up all the ordered surfaces and all the planes
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with which we are accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing
things, and, continuing long afterwards to disturb and threaten with
collapse our age-old distinction between the Same and the Other
(xv).74
Borges’s humor is, as René de Costa emphasizes, “important precisely
because it is embedded in deliberately weighty subjects” (15).75 Nor does one need to
search far to find a conjunction of humor and wonder among Varo’s paintings, as in,

Fig. 8. Remedios Varo. Vegetarian Vampires (Vampiros vegetarianos), 1962.
Oil on canvas, 84 x 60 cm., Coleccion, GMG.
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for example, her 1962 Vegetarian Vampires (fig 8), where her playfulness is instantly
evident.
A sense of strangeness like the one that enriches Varo’s paintings can itself
generate wonder. While wonder in the sense of astonishment or strangeness is only
one element in the creative process, and not an end in itself, strangeness might be
seen as a trace of wonder and mystery expressed in the aesthetic object. Mikel
Dufrenne writes:
Strangeness expresses not so much a lacuna within our knowledge as a
positive attribute of the object, which would be falsified were it to be
eliminated. Nor can the strange be explained by the hidden, since the
aesthetic object hides nothing. The meaning of the work is entirely
present, and any mystery it may contain is fully illuminated” (410).
One could describe some of Remedios Varo’s paintings as simultaneously
strange and illuminated. There is also a revelatory quality in many or her works—
revelatory yet meaningful, as in her Revelation or The Clockmaker (Fig 9).
Commenting on this painting, Varo speaks about time, revelation and astonishment:
This painting is about time. That’s why there is a clockmaker (who, in
a sense, represents our ordinary time), but through the window comes
a “revelation” and all of the sudden the clockmaker comprehends a
whole lot of things. I have tried to make him look both astonished and
enlightened. He is surrounded by a series of timepieces all showing the
same time, but containing a figure from very distinct epochs. I achieve
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the effect through different period costumes. Each clock has a window
with bars, like in a prison (Ovalle 111).76

Fig. 9. Remedios Varo. Revelation or the Clockmaker (Revelación o El relojero),
1955. Oil on Masonite, 27 7/8 x 33 in. Private Collection.
It should be noted here, although it is obvious, that the explication of meaning
in Varo’s metaphorically and symbolically rich paintings can almost always go down
any of several interpretative paths, depending on the elements or features being
accentuated by a given writer. For instance, Tere Arcq interprets Revelation or The
Clockmaker in terms of the writings of P.D. Ouspensky’s writings about fellow
Russian G.I. Gurdjieff’s mystical theories that interested Varo, who kept a large
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library of esoteric writings. In regards to the revelation the clockmaker encounters,
Arcq writes, “This revelation enters in the form of several concentric circles. What
might they symbolize? What is the revelation?” (77-78). Arcq interprets the circles as
actually being one “closed curve” based on a concept of the fourth dimension, and
that this closed curve passes into eternity, which could be described as infinite in
time.
Janet Kaplan, on the other hand, discusses the same painting in more scientific
terms. Noting that Varo, while not completing trusting science, “looked for a science
open to a multiplicity of possibilities, one that would greet with wonder [my
emphasis], and some humility, the potential of the unknown” (174). Kaplan goes on
to say that in Revelation or The Clockmaker, “The vision that has caught the
clockmaker by surprise and sent his spare parts crashing to the floor represents the
Einsteinian revelation that time is relative” (174-175).
Concluding her assessment of the painting, Kaplan writes, “Rather than
deriding the myopia or arrogance or folly of scientific rigidity, Varo here celebrates
science at its best, as a creative discipline open to the Marvelous” (175).
Speaking to how the specific character of “Schopenhauer’s philosophical
wonder forms an illuminating category through which to calibrate the way we read
his philosophy” (Vasalou, Schopenhauer 3), Sophia Vasalou argues that
“Schopenhauer’s own analysis of the sublime” combines with “a therapeutic of
wonder at its heart—a therapeutic of the passions that is simultaneously a therapeutic
of the subjectivity that underpins them” (5).
Scholars have noted that Husserl felt subjectivity’s first person point of view
108

as being “ineliminable from the very concept of knowledge” and that what he called
“functioning subjectivity” is an anonymous pre-egoic form of subjectivity which is
responsible for the givenness of the world and its ‘always already there’ character”
(Moran and Cohen 311-312).
As will be seen in the next chapter on the numinous, there is a strong
connection between wonder and the numinous. One might say that the two are
inseparable in some ways. Wonder is the disruption or rupture in consciousness that
allows an awareness of the numinous, and wonder also becomes the hinge that allows
the gate of the numinous to swing open.
Again, it is Bataille’s writings that so vividly and with great integrity
communicates his subjective experience of wonder and the numinous. Bataille’s
commitment to expressing the layered complexity of such an experience justifies
quoting him at length:
At the moment of nightfall, when silence invades an increasingly pure
sky, I found myself alone, sitting on a narrow white veranda, not
seeing anything of where I was but the roof of a house, the foliage of a
tree and the sky. Before getting up to go to bed, I felt the extent to
which the sweetness of things had penetrated me. I had just had the
desire for a violent movement of the spirit and, in this sense, I
perceived that the felicitous state into which I had fallen did not differ
entirely from “mystical” states. At the very least, as I passed quickly
from inattention to surprise, I felt this state with more intensity than
one normally does and as if an other and not me had experienced it. I
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could not deny that, with the exception of attention, which was lacking
only at first, this banal felicity was an authentic inner experience,
obvious distinct from project, from discourse. I thought that the
“sweetness of the sky” communicated itself to me and I could feel
precisely the state within that responded to it. I felt it to be present
inside my head like a vaporous streaming, subtly graspable, but
participating in the sweetness of the outside, putting me in possession
of it, making me take pleasure in it (Inner Experience 113-114).77
This passage comes from “Ecstasy,” a section of Bataille’s Inner Experience,
and he goes on for some 17 additional pages to write about his subjective rendering of
such experiences. When an artist-philosopher goes to that extreme to question and
excavate the significance of his or her experience of the numinous, the philosophical
component outshines the artistic one. And yet even in a nonfictional essay, the artistphilosopher is very likely to present his or her thoughts in a highly creative rather
than analytical manner. As Bataille emphasizes above, the inner experience, however
seemingly banal, is distinct “from discourse.” He demonstrates how one can write
philosophically about a topic that is seeming impervious to philosophical discourse.
In his introduction to Bataille’s On Nietzsche, contemporary scholar Sylvére
Lotringer vividly describes Bataille’s orientation: “Georges Bataille wasn’t a
“regular” philosopher like Hegel or Sartre. He was diffident of concepts, resilient to
systems and deeply suspicious of language. Bataille never developed ideas that he
didn’t back up with his life” (1).
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This last point is especially relevant to how thinkers often approach
philosophical topics—not as a subjective experience, but as a conceptual theory. An
unusual attribute of the artist-philosopher is that he or she can break free or return to
the discursive mind at will by shifting into or shifting out of artistic expression. Art
does not suffer the same impediments as discursive thought. While discursive thought
admittedly can be a very valuable and finely honed tool capable of cutting through
superficialities and irrelevant peripheral issues, it also can create mental manacles that
inhibit and even disallow intellectual and spiritual freedom.
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Chapter Three—The Numinous
The central topic here is the necessary definition and explication of usages of
the numinous. Again, the governing intention of this investigation is to construct a
philosophico-phenomenological exploration of wonder and image consciousness,
which subsequently leads to a consideration of the numinous in regards to
consciousness and art, particularly in regards to the art of Varo and Borges, but in
modern art in general as well.78
As stated earlier, the primary thematic purpose of this study is not theological.
Nonetheless, since the word numinous arises most often in religious studies, a
temporary excursion into some of the contextual territories of the term’s use becomes
necessary. Inquiring into the definition and usage of the numinous requires especially
a familiarity with the theological-philosophical79 rendering Rudolf Otto applied to the
word numinous, as well as an understanding of how his orientation differs from the
usage here.
Usage and Definition of the Numinous
Why use “numinous” instead of a more familiar word? One reason is that
synonyms or related words such as spiritual, religious, holy, divine, sacred, or
mystical are connotatively overloaded alternatives, although at times it will be
necessary to resource works that use one or more of these more familiar terms.80
Another reason is that Otto’s study of the numinous as well as subsequent usages of
that term by other theologians, philosophers, artists, and writers represent the means
to explicate the topic, one that that can be reconfigured and refined for the purposes
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of the present thesis. Finally, the word numinous works well here in that, more than
some of its synonyms, the numinous readily combines a spiritual and aesthetic
interpretation.81 That combined usage is signaled by the definitions of numinous in
the Oxford English Dictionary, which include: “revealing or indicating the presence
of a divinity; divine, spiritual,” and “in extended use: giving rise to a sense of the
spiritually transcendent; (esp. of things in art [emphasis mine] or the natural world)
evoking a heightened sense of the mystical or sublime; awe-inspiring” (“numinous”).
Numinous has been used to describe the spiritual impulse in contemporary art
(Yoon), as well as, in a more scientifically oriented evolutionary vein, explicated as a
prehistoric developmental topic (Oubre´). Likewise numinous was chosen over other
terms such as immanent or transcendental, although both of these terms may be used
at times in this investigation to explicate specific points. While “immanent” is
sometimes used in a religious or theological context, often a Christian context, to
indicate “Indwelling, inherent; actually present or abiding in; remaining within”
(“immanent”), it is also widely used in philosophical contexts.82 “Transcendental” is a
more complex term in the sense that the word has been used extensively throughout
the histories of both philosophy and religion, from Aristotle, as “transcending or
extending beyond the bounds of any single category” (“transcendental”), to Kant’s
transcendental idealism: what is a priori or “not derived from experience, but
concerned with the presuppositions of experience” (“transcendental”;
“transcendentalism”) to the “religio-philosophical teaching of the New England
school of thought represented by Emerson and others” (“transcendentalism”) to
Transcendental Meditation.83
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As repeatedly stated, Edmund Husserl called his work transcendental
phenomenology, but even his uses of “transcendental” were also varied and
inconsistent, as was noted in Chapter One.
Other words, phrases, and concepts like “epiphany” and “the sublime” and
“ecstasy” are relevant to this study. In particular, “the sublime” has an extensive use
in the history of aesthetics and philosophy, and is integral to some of the thematic
implications in this chapter. Thus the sublime must be addressed in some detail in this
study, especially in relation to Schopenhauer’s aesthetic, but more immediately as it
is contrasted with the numinous. While the meanings of “the sublime” are at times
very close in meaning to “the numinous,” and each term overflows at times into the
other, the two terms are nonetheless distinct, and that distinction should be clarified in
this chapter so that both terms can be correctly and consistently applied. Neither term
is definable in a immaculately lucid way, but a general understanding of distinctions
is possible.84
Rudolf Otto and The Numinous
“Numinous” was first used extensively in Lutheran theologian Rudolf Otto’s
1917 Das Heilige, translated in 1923 into English as The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry
into the Non-Rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the
Rational. In describing why he chooses the word “numinous” to discuss the holy,
Otto writes that he adopted the term from the Latin numen:
Omen has given us 'ominous', and there is no reason why
from numen we should not similarly form a word 'numinous'. I shall
speak, then, of a unique 'numinous' category of value and of a
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definitely 'numinous' state of mind, which is always found wherever
the category is applied. This mental state is perfectly sui generis and
irreducible to any other; and therefore, like every absolutely primary
and elementary datum, while it admits of being discussed, it cannot be
strictly defined (6-7).
The detailed examination of the numinous in Das Heilige serves, up to a
point, the clarification of how the numinous is used in this dissertation. Although
Otto’s perspective is rooted in a specifically German Lutheran theological orientation,
he grew dissatisfied with organized religion’s tendency to remain myopic, provincial
and insular. Part of this dissatisfaction was undoubtedly stimulated by his global
travels. His initial trips to England, France, and Italy were useful, but as noted by
John Harvey:
The long sojourn in the East in 1910-11 must have meant much more
to him. He visited North Africa, Egypt and Palestine, India, China, and
Japan, returning in due time by way of the United States. In this and in
later visits to the Near East and India (1925, 1927-8), he not only
deepened an already profound study of the great religions of the East
but was able to realize at first hand what in the religious experience
which they enshrine is specific and unique and what on the other hand
is common to all genuine religions, however diversely expressed in
sacred writings, ritual, or art (ix-x).

115

Fig. 10. Rudolf Otto (1869-1937)
http://student.britannica.com/comptons/art-13317/Rudolf-Otto-1925
Thus Otto developed an expanded focus more oriented to the great worldreligions (ix-x). The numinous is the primary topic of Das Heilige, and for Otto the
numinous is necessarily non-rational and has two characteristics, a sense of
creatureliness and a sense of tremendous mystery. Regarding the former, Otto
references 19th Century German theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher’s commentary
about a “feeling of dependence.” There are distinctions between the theories of Otto
and Schleiermacher:
Schleiermacher’s ‘feeling of absolute dependence’, it may be noted at
this point, does not correspond to what are sometimes considered to be
the typically ‘religious’ emotions of awe and wonder in face of the
‘numinous’, to use the famous terminology of Rudolf Otto (1869–
1937). Like Schleiermacher, Otto sought to identify a specifically
religious element in human experience, and located it in the sense of
the mystery which is both fearful and attractive, the mysterium
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tremendens et fascinans. Such a ‘numinous’ encounter comes as a
strange irruption into the world of normal experience (Clements 38).
Otto, however, differs from Schleiermacher. Otto describes the numinous as
“something other than, merely a feeling of dependence” (9). He revises
Schleiermacher’s feeling of dependence:
Desiring to give it a name of its own, I propose to call it 'creatureconsciousness' or creature-feeling. It is the emotion of a creature,
submerged and overwhelmed by its own nothingness in contrast to that
which is supreme above all creatures (9-10).
While bracketing out Otto’s religious belief reference above to “that which is
supreme above all creatures,” it is still relevant to note that his reference is very much
about a feeling sensibility to something more than the conventional notion of selfreferencing. This reference to a feeling sensibility becomes more relevant as this
chapter develops.85
The second characteristic of the numinous, its tremendous mystery, or as Otto
calls it, mysterium tremendum, to which he subsequently adds the element of
fascination, or fascinans, is more directly relevant to a philosophicophenomenological understanding and use of numinous. Otto describes this mystery as
a presence that can be profane or divine, demonic or purely glorious and ecstatic (1213). But the point here is that it is a mysterious presence available spontaneously
through a feeling sensibility. Analyzing mysterium tremendum as a plurality, one Otto
also refers to at times as “states of mind,” he first considers the details of three states
of minds that he describes as aspects of tremendum. These include “awfulness,” an
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overpoweringness or majestas, and energy and urgency, or orge and urgos. By
awfulness, Otto refers to a form of dread, a species of mystical awe. He especially
draws on Judaic-Christian scriptural references. While discussing the nuances of
majestas, which he relates to creature-consciousness and Schleiermacher’s original
“feeling of dependence” on something greater than the creature, which is to say the
human being, Otto considers mysticism as follows:
A characteristic common to all types of mysticism is the Identification,
in different degrees of completeness, of the personal self with the
transcendent Reality. This identification has a source of its own, with
which we are not here concerned, and springs from 'moments' of
religious experience which would require separate treatment.
'Identification' alone, however, is not enough for mysticism; it must be
Identification with the Something that is at once absolutely supreme in
power and reality and wholly non-rational. And it is among the
mystics that we most encounter this element of religious consciousness
(22).
Otto also references a description, originally collected by William James, of a
mystically oriented incident of religious sensibility recalled by a clergyman:
It is impossible fully to describe the experience. It was like the effect
of some great orchestra when all the separate notes have melted into
one swelling harmony that leaves the listener conscious of nothing
save that his soul is being wafted upwards, and almost bursting with its
own emotion. The perfect stillness of the night was thrilled by a more
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solemn silence. The darkness held a presence that was all the more felt
because it was not seen. I could not any more have doubted that He
was there than that I was. Indeed, I felt myself to be, if possible, the
less real of the two (James 56).
While there may be hundreds, if not many more, descriptions of sensibility to
the numinous,86 the countless varieties of such epiphanic experiences challenge, in
their multifarious details, the task of framing the consciousness of a sensibility to the
numinous. Given the specific topic at hand of relating the numinous to image
consciousness, that task becomes more possible and more clearly defined when
applying the theories and experiences of working artists in the chapters ahead.
To continue with Das Heilige, Otto also explicates the third part of
tremendum, the element he describes as energy or urgency, and how it is associated
with the numinous. Describing this energy as vitality, passion, emotional temper, will,
force, movement, excitement, activity, and impetus, he states that all of these forms of
energy or urgency reflect “a genuine aspect of the divine nature—its non-rational
aspect—a due consciousness of which served to protect religion itself from being
'rationalized' away” (23). Otto also for the first time mentions the work of
Schopenhauer, whose 19th century anti-religious sentiments and commentaries were
well known to philosophers, theologians, and artists of the 20th century.
The element of 'energy' reappears in Fichte's speculations on the
Absolute as the gigantic, never-resting, active world stress, and in
Schopenhauer's daemonic 'Will'. At the same time both these writers
are guilty of the same error that is already found in myth; they transfer
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'natural' attributes, which ought only to be used as 'ideograms' for what
is itself properly beyond utterance, to the non-rational as real
qualifications of it, and they mistake symbolic expressions of feelings
for adequate concepts upon which a 'scientific' structure of knowledge
may be based (24).
This quote is also referenced to foreshadow a common misunderstanding of
Schopenhauer, whose aesthetic will assume ahead a pronounced and integral function
within this study. Otto is presuming (perhaps because of what he perceives to be
Schopenhauer’s atheism) that Schopenhauer cannot access or even directly
experience the non-rational aspect of the numinous except through symbolic
expressions of feelings. This is simply not the case in Schopenhauer’s philosophy of
art, which is, as we shall see, very much about a direct non-rational experience of
self-transcendence, albeit in his mind not a religious experience (World as Will, Vol.
1, 167-267; Vol. 11, 406-447).
Otto goes on to assert that the two aspects of the mysterium tremendum can
function together as a reciprocally overflowing dynamic, or singularly as tremendum
or mysterium. The three functional elements of the tremendum—awfulness,
overpoweringness, energy or urgency—altogether serve a qualitative descriptive
function of what is tremendous about the numinous, but Otto does note (25-26) that
the meaning of mysteriousness is different from the adjective tremendous, and that
the levels of meanings germane to mysterium are also different:
Taken, indeed, in its purely natural sense, mysterium would first mean
merely a secret or a mystery in the sense of that which is alien to us,
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uncomprehended and unexplained; and so far mysterium is itself
merely an ideogram, an analogical notion taken from the natural
sphere, illustrating, but incapable of exhaustively rendering, our real
meaning. Taken in the religious sense, that which is 'mysterious' is—to
give it perhaps the most striking expression—the 'wholly other' (ganz
anders), that which is quite beyond the sphere of the usual, the
intelligible, and the familiar, which therefore falls quite outside the
limits of the 'canny', and is contrasted with it, filling the mind with
blank wonder and astonishment (26).
What exactly is Otto asserting about the mysterious? Is it an invisible presence
forever unknown but just sensed, a state of consciousness forever out of reach of
human rationality? Or is it a temporary mystery that can eventually be solved by the
logic, neuroscience, and other scientific evidence? Otto tries to address some
questions, stating that the mysterious is not simply something that could be called a
“problem” because it temporarily eludes understanding: “The truly 'mysterious' object
is beyond our apprehension and comprehension, not only because our knowledge has
certain irremovable limits, but because in it we come upon something inherently
'wholly other', whose kind and character are incommensurable with our own, and
before which we therefore recoil in a wonder that strikes us chill and numb” (28).
Again, Otto’s “wholly other” denotes a religious deity or presence that is common
with dualistic religious concepts. More esoteric spiritual orientations, ones that
propose a nondualistic spirituality, assert an ontological or cosmological unity, a form
of what is ultimately non-dual consciousness.
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The most important question that needs to be addressed here and throughout
the present study is one that falls outside of Otto’s theological parameters, which, as
he continues into a consideration of the element of fascination, or fascinans, reflects a
degree of westernized misunderstanding of some primordial forms of the numinous
and sensibility to the numinous that are too exclusively Christian to be of thematic
use here. Otto’s somewhat intolerant views of meditation and shamanistic ritual are
demonized in his theology (31-39) within the consideration of fascinans so that any
degree of philosophical objectivity established earlier is undermined. In the interest
of staying on track with the present study, one must simply ask how is the numinous
aligned with a sensibility to that presence within the context of art and aesthetics?
Otto does briefly discuss art and the numinous, but I propose here to preface his
discussion of art with a clarifying interjection.
The Numinous and a Sensibility to the Numinous
Since the extended force of conviction inherent in Otto’s Lutheran Protestantism can
be overwhelming, as in (despite his radical reformative tone) a scholarly sermon, it is
useful here to make a navigational adjustment, so to speak, between Otto’s gusts of
principles about the numinous and the more steady numinous headwind of this
specific dissertation. The distinctions and contrasts between Otto’s religiously
oriented numinous and the use of the numinous in the aesthetic context of this study
will become clearer ahead, but meanwhile there are a few points that merit immediate
clarification, whether in concurrent or dissimilar terms. First, it is correct to assert that
the usage of numinous in Otto’s study and in this investigation are both “nonrational” and, in some sense, not accessible via discursive thought alone.
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However, unlike Otto, this study is not explicating recognition and worship of
what religion and theologians often refers to as “Divine Presence.” Adding personal
religious belief and judgment to an issue creates a sense of exclusivity around a topic,
one that diminishes the effectiveness of any scholarly explication of philosophical
and phenomenological topics. Indeed, one reason Husserl’s epochē is invaluable is
because it suspends personal belief and opinion or any kind of preconceived and fixed
subjectivity that might undermine phenomenological investigation. Husserl appears to
have kept his personal religious life out of his phenomenological investigations, at
least for the most part, although he did have a genuine interest in spirituality (Bello,
Divine in Husserl, 65-79), and there is evidence of his “religious search” (Bello,
“Archeology,” 5-7). His conversion from Judaism to Christianity, something not
uncommon among Jewish professionals working in the larger context of Europe,
especially Germany, where anti-Semitic prejudices might negatively influence a
career, is not as important here as Husserl’s direct communications with Otto, which
will be considered in more detail shortly.
Husserl and Otto
The respective investigations of Edmund Husserl and Rudolf Otto are
important to this study. Thus any connection between the two scholars needs to be
examined. Otto initially taught at Göttingen, where he was a colleague of Husserl
(Cox 55).87 To some extent, both Husserl and Otto (especially Husserl) were working
within the stream of modern phenomenology:
Although phenomenology had already existed for almost two decades
as a fairly esoteric form of academic philosophy, after the war it
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received increasing public attention, and came to be regarded by some
as a means for restoring European culture. Among those to have
regarded Das Heilige as a contribution to phenomenology were two of
the movement’s leading representatives, Husserl and [Max] Scheler.
Husserl had been professor of philosophy at Göttingen around the turn
of the century, when Otto was also there, and the two appear to have
been personally acquainted (Gooch 160-161).
In 1919, Husserl read Das Heilige and wrote to Otto, saying, despite
methodological reservations, he regarded the book as ‘ein erster Anfang für eine
Phänomenoligie des Religiösen’ [A beginning for a phenomenology of religion.]”
(Dahl, Phenomenology 18).88 The details of the actual letter are far more telling,
however, in that it discloses much about Husserl’s thoughts about Das Heilige and
also about phenomenology’s relationship to both religion and metaphysics in general.
As in most of his writings, Husserl is passionate about protecting the purity of his
transcendental phenomenology. Since it offers a sustained and intimate encounter
with both Husserl and Otto’s work, an excerpt of the final page of Husserl’s letter is
quoted in full here:
Through Heidegger and Oxner [sic]89 (I no longer know who took
precedence in the matter) I became aware last summer of your book,
Das Heilige [The Idea of the Holy], and it has had a strong effect on
me as hardly no [sic] other book in years. Allow me to express my
impressions in this way: It is a first beginning for a phenomenology of
religion, at least with regard to everything that does not go beyond a
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pure description and analysis of the phenomena themselves. To put it
succinctly: I cannot share in the additional philosophical theorizing;
and it is quite non-essential for the specific task and particular subject
matter of this book, and it would be better left out. It seems to me that
a great deal more progress would have to be made in the study of the
phenomena and their eidetic analysis before a theory of religious
consciousness, as a philosophical theory, could arise. Above all, one
would need to carry out a radical distinction: between accidental
factum and the eidos. One would need to study the eidetic necessities
and eidetic possibilities of religious consciousness and its correlate.
One would need a systematic eidetic typification of the levels of
religious data, indeed in their eidetically necessary development. It
seems to me that the metaphysician (theologian) in Herr Otto has
carried away on his wings Otto the phenomenologist; and in that
regard I think of the image of the angels who cover their eyes with
their wings. But be that as it may, this book will hold an abiding place
in the history of genuine philosophy of religion or phenomenology of
religion. It is a beginning and its significance is that it goes back to the
“beginnings,” the “origins,” and thus, in the most beautiful sense of the
word, is “original.” And our age yearns for nothing so much as that the
true origins might finally come to word and then, in the higher sense,
come to their Word, to the Logos.
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I am sure that you will not take amiss this free expression of
mine. From our Göttingen years you know how highly I esteem you
and with what pleasure seek out intellectual contact with you. Now
that you have brought us phenomenologists worthwhile gifts, we
would be very happy if new ones were to follow these. With cordial
greetings and constant esteem, F. Husserl (“Letter” 25).90
The connections between Husserl and Otto are relevant, especially when one
considers that “Otto begins by employing a kind of epochē to cordon off a number of
prejudices which obstruct the pure access to the phenomenon” (Dahl, In Between,
27). What are the prejudices Otto brackets out? He first challenges the notion that the
holy at its most fundamental root, which is to say the numinous, can be conceptually
understood or identified. Nor can conceptual thinking call forth the numinous (2728), since, Otto asserts, the nature of the numinous is completely non-rational.91
Otto and Art
When Otto states, “In the arts nearly everywhere the most effective means of
representing the numinous is 'the sublime',” (65) his assessment of the role of art does
coincide with the present investigation, although his religious motives for recognizing
this are different from the thematic direction intended here. Somehow, the beauty and
sublime nature of art brings Otto’s tolerance and open-mindedness to the surface,
which is in itself a testimony to the power of art:
The art of China, Japan, and Tibet, whose specific character
has been determined by Taoism and Buddhism, surpasses all
others in the unusual richness and depth of such impressions of
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the 'magical', and even an inexpert observer responds to them
readily. The designation 'magical' is here correct even from the
historical point of view, since the origin of this language of
form was properly magical representations, emblems,
formularies, and contrivances. But the actual impression of
'magic' is quite independent of this historical bond of
connexion with magical practices. It occurs even when nothing
is known of the latter; nay, in that case it comes out most
strongly and unbrokenly. Beyond dispute art has here a means
of creating a unique impression--that of the magical--apart
from and independent of reflection. Now the magical is nothing
but a suppressed and dimmed form of the numinous, a crude
form of it which great art purifies and ennobles. In great art the
point is reached at which we may no longer speak of the
'magical', but rather are confronted with the numinous itself,
with all its impelling motive power, transcending reason,
expressed in sweeping lines and rhythm. In no art, perhaps, is
this more fully realized than in the great landscape painting and
religious painting of China in the classical period of the T'ang
and Sung dynasties (66-67).
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Fig. 11. Ma Yuan, Song Dynasty. Dancing and Singing
(Peasants Returning from Work) 1160-1225. Ink on silk.
75.8 × 43.7 in. Beijing Palace Museum. Beijing, China.
Otto’s assertion that great art can be a vehicle of the numinous itself, signals
an aspect of this thesis, although this thesis does specifically explore how a sensibility
to the numinous is related to the art of Varo and Borges. The Chinese landscape
painting Otto admires could be described as expressing a distillation of perceptual
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reality, a moment of seeing, as well as an instance of mysterium tremendum and
perhaps in some version an experience of the sublime.
The Sublime
In Chapter VIII of Das Heilige, Otto considers how the mysterium tremendum
element of the numinous is related to “analogies and associated feelings” (41-49). An
essential task is to consider how the numinous is the same or distinct from the
aesthetic concept of the sublime. Describing contrasting elements in mysterium
tremendum requires Otto to reference the sublime:
No attempt of ours to describe this harmony of contrasts in the import
of the mysterium can really succeed; but it may perhaps be
adumbrated, as it were from a distance, by taking an analogy from a
region belonging not to religion but to aesthetics. In the category and
feeling of the sublime we have a counterpart to it, though it is true it is
but a pale reflexion, and moreover involves difficulties of analysis all
its own. The analogies between the consciousness of the sublime and
of the numinous may be easily grasped.1 To begin with, 'the sublime',
like 'the numinous', is in Kantian language an idea or concept 'that
cannot be unfolded' or explicated (unauswickelbar). Certainly we can
tabulate some general 'rational' signs that uniformly recur as soon as
we call an object sublime; as, for instance, that it must approach, or
threaten to overpass, the bounds of our understanding by some
'dynamic' or 'mathematic' greatness, by potent manifestations of force
or magnitude in spatial extent. But these are obviously only conditions
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of, not the essence of, the impression of sublimity. A thing does not
become sublime merely by being great. The concept itself remains
unexplicated; it has in it something mysterious, and in this it is like
that of the numinous. A second point of resemblance is that the
sublime exhibits the same peculiar dual character as the numinous; it is
at once daunting, and yet again singularly attracting, in its impress
upon the mind. It humbles and at the same time exalts us,
circumscribes and extends us beyond ourselves, on the one hand
releasing in us a feeling analogous to fear, and on the other rejoicing
us. So the idea of the sublime is closely similar to that of the
numinous, and is well adapted to excite it and to be excited by it, while
each tends to pass over into the other (41-42).
That a religious purity—or “high” versus “low” conceit around authenticity—
exists in Otto’s account has been noted by critics and scholars (Harten 76),92 but
before contrasting the numinous and the sublime we should ask: what is the sublime?
The long history of the aesthetic concept of the sublime began with the Greek figure
Longinus, who may have lived in the 1st century AD and wrote On the Sublime, a
critical treatise about writing style, which began to be translated in the 10th century
but did not evolve into the powerful aesthetic concept we know as the sublime until
the 18th century with Edmund Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of
Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757) and Immanuel Kant’s seminal texts:
Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (Beobachtungen über das
Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen) (1764) and The Critique of Judgment (Kritik der
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Urteilskraft) (1790). Kant, described as “the great theorist of the sublime” (Kirwan
159), would tremendously influence, in one direction or another, the majority of art
theorists, aestheticians, and philosophers of art who followed. Kant’s aesthetic, and
especially his explication of the sublime, “has grown exponentially in recent years”
(Pillow 1). As has already been noted in this study, Kant’s overall aesthetic theory did
influence to some degree the philosophies of Husserl and Otto, and as we shall see,
Kant greatly influenced Schopenhauer’s aesthetic.93
Asking what the sublime is might be compared to picking up a palm-size
stone in a field and slowly turning it over while closely inspecting each aspect of the
stone that comes into the viewer’s perceptual field of vision. Each angle offers a new
perspective with its own details. This analogy works thematically here because the
interpretations and explications of the sublime are multifarious in meaning and usage.
Sublimis, or sub and limen, the Latin roots of sublime, combine “up to” (sub) with
“lintel” or the top section of a door (limen). The Oxford English Dictionary’s ten
definitions and numerous secondary definitions of sublime indicate the variety of uses
of the word (“sublime”). Nonetheless, the first definition, “Set or raised aloft”
(“sublime”), signals a primary starting point in the use of the sublime, one that Philip
Shaw emphasizes “also describes a state of mind,” and he uses as an example the
sense of awe or high emotion one feels when encountering a cathedral’s “cavernous
interior” or the dying words of King Lear (1).
One interesting point emphasized by James Kirwan is how 18th century
writers not only broke with Longinus’ examples of the sublime in writing, but also
used the words and examples of other writers. As noted by Kirwan, “Burke illustrates
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the material sublime with quotations from the classics; Kant, the great theorist of the
sublime, exemplifies it with the effect of the Pyramids and St. Peter’s, which he had
never seen; Radcliffe, the great novelist of the sublime, describes a landscape she had
not visited; Whitman, singing the song of himself, dredges up every cliché of the
genre” (159). Thus one might say that a magnified type of intertextuality, one that is
emphatically employed almost to the point of appropriation, exists with 18th century
writing about the sublime.
Intertexual interpretations represent only one aspect of studying the sublime.
A major characteristic often emphasized is terror.
Burke, Kant, and Schiller on the Sublime
Besides Longinus, the writings of Edmund Burke, Immanuel Kant, and
Friedrich Schiller were primary influences on subsequent interpretations of the
sublime. In a section titled “Mapping the Contemporary Sublime” (Morley 19-21) in
the anthology writings about the sublime he edited, Simon Morley points to these four
figures as precursors of the present day orientations to the sublime, although each
emphasized his own orientation to an experience or a version of encountering reality
(19).94
How did the evolution of the sublime evolve after Longinus? Paul Guyer
notes that the title of Kant’s 1764 Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and
Sublime was influenced by Burke’s 1757 A Philosophical Enquiry into the Original
of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful, especially by including “feeling” in the
title, “although Kant does not provide an extensive psychological and physiological
analysis of these feelings, as Burke did, but is instead primarily concerned with
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differences in the capacities for these feelings between the two sexes and diverse
cultures and nations” (xv). There are several differences between the two thinkers’
approaches to the sublime. First, Kant seems to question, in his 1790 Critique of the
Power of Judgment, whether Burke’s enquiry is even actually philosophical: “To
make psychological observations (as Burke does in his book on the beautiful and the
sublime), and thus to gather material for rules of experience that will be
systematically connected in the future, without yet seeking to comprehend them, is
certainly the only true obligation of empirical psychology, which only with difficulty
could ever lay claim to the rank of a philosophical science” (38). In other words, Kant
asserts that “it would be absurd” (39) to explain a judgment in psychological terms.
Later, when Kant compares his “transcendental exposition of aesthetic judgments” to
“the physiological exposition, as it has been elaborated by a [sic] Burke and many
acute men among us, in order to see whither a merely empirical exposition of the
sublime and beautiful would lead,” and then directly describes Burke by name as
someone who is “the foremost author of this sort of approach” (158), he is essentially
drawing a line between Burke’s empirical methodology and his own transcendental
aesthetic rendering of the sublime.
In considering poet and dramatist Friedrich Schiller’s contribution to the
evolution of the sublime, one must remember that Schiller was born in 1759, two
years after Burke’s book was published. One of the primary influences in Schiller’s
life was his later friendship with Goethe. However, the fact that Schiller’s series of
letters, On the Aesthetic Education of Man (Über die ästhetische Erziehung des
Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen), was published in 1794, during the years that
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Schiller and Goethe began a lifelong friendship, does not mean that these two artistic
geniuses completely agreed about the nature of the sublime.95 Schiller’s letters
pivoted around his disenchantment with the violence of the French Revolution, which
also inspired in him the ideas expressed in his poem “The Artists” (“Die Künstler”):
In labor is the bee your master,
In skillfulness the earthworm has your teacher grown,
Your knowledge you do share with spirit minds far vaster,
'Tis {Art,} O Man, you have alone!

The land which knowledge does reside in
You reached through beauty's morning gate.
Its higher gleam to now abide in,
The mind on charms must concentrate.
What by the sound of Muses' singing
With trembling sweet did pierce you through,
A strength unto your bosom bringing
Which to the world-soul lifted you.
That Schiller’s response to the sublime as ecstatic experience (Morley 19) is
most directly revealed in his poetry, points to the creative expression artists bring to
the sublime, and more specifically in this study, to the numinous.
Modern and Contemporary Uses of The Sublime
When the 18th century sense of terror mixed with awe in the face of nature’s
overpowering and threatening vastness is reseeded in the chaos of twentieth-century
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violence, sublimity becomes an aesthetic abstraction, because its aesthetic
significance becomes secondary to its sociopolitical implications. I say an abstraction,
because the contemporary sublime is in some sense a non-object, or at least a
complex version of a non-object. For example, Kristeva connects obliquely with the
sublime when she designates the abject as something that is the “well-spring of sign
for a non-object, on the edges of primal repression, one can understand it skirting the
somatic symptom on the one hand and sublimation on the other” (11). Describing the
night sky, oceanic vistas, or light coming through stained glass, Kristeva notes how
“the ‘sublime’ object dissolves in the raptures of a bottomless memory” (12). She
then offers one of the richest, verbally poetic renderings of the sublime ever written:
As soon as I perceive it, as soon as I name it, the sublime triggers—it
has always already triggered—a spree of perceptions and words that
expands memory boundlessly. I then forget the point of departure and
find myself removed to a secondary universe, set off from the one
where “I” am—delight and loss. Not at all short but always with and
through perception and words, the sublime is a something added that
expands us, overstrains us, and causes us to be here, as dejects, and
there, as others and sparkling. A divergence, an impossible bounding.
Everything missed, joy-fascination (12).
Besides the emphasis on psychoanalysis in her general writings, Kristeva in
this excerpt signals an interpretation of the sublime that is somewhat different from
the traditional definitions and even from many contemporary understandings. When
she states that the sublime surfaces “always with and through perception and words,”
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that is unusual. Most definitions of the sublime so frequently emphasize a nonverbal
aspect to this experience that one could almost presume that the sublime could be
described as that for which words are inadequate, or something words cannot express.
Yet as Shaw notes (1-4) often the declaration of the failure to communicate in words
what the sublime actually becomes a communication in words of the nature of the
sublime; he uses, as an example, lines from Keat’s 1817 poem “On Seeing the Elgin
Marbles,” in which Keats uses words like “undescribable” and “dim-conceived” to
emphasize the “magnitude” of what he is encountering.
Interestingly, though not surprisingly, Kristeva,96 creates her own definition
and explication of the sublime, one that could really not be described as eighteenthcentury, modernist or postmodernist, but simply Kristevian. Nonetheless, what is the
significance of Kristeva’s comments? Does her description of “always with and
through perception and words” point to an entirely subjective response, or is it an
indication of modern and contemporary responses to the sublime in general? Shaw, in
a chapter titled “The Sublime is Now: Derrida and Lyotard” (115-129), explicates the
postmodernist orientation to the sublime. “The difference between Romanticism,
modernism, and postmodernism can therefore be measured in their contrasting
attitudes to the unpresentable” (115), stressing that rather than ideas of the divine or
the humanist concept of mind, the unpresentable sublime in postmodernism remains
“absolutely other” (115).
While both Lyotard and Derrida offer a rereading of Kant, Lyotard argues that
the postmodernist presentation of the unpresentable is a search for a new presentation
that accentuates not a form of enjoyment but of pain because the unpresentable is
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impossible to see. Derrida’s deconstructive methodology, on the other hand, stresses
the contrivance of any system that conceptually conditions the sublime. For Derrida,
what is transcendental is never free of the empirical. Shaw points (116-117) to
Derrida’s argument in The Truth in Painting about the Kantian parergon—a
bordering device such as the frame of a painting, or something subordinate or
embellishing—as evidence that the formlessness of the sublime eliminates the
possibility of a parergon for the sublime. Even so, some critics suggest that Derrida
does suggest that the sublime is “bounded” and thus not “wholly other or beyond,”
and Shaw references (117-118) critic Mark Cheetham’s comments in Kant, Art, and
Art History: Moments of Discipline, about Derrida’s many “seems” as leading to the
possibility of a sublime that is bounded. That Cheetham’s argument ultimately yields
a postmodernist interpretation of Kant’s “Analytic of the Sublime,” points to the
contemporary revising of the Romantic sublime: “The pleasure that arises from the
sublime consists, therefore, precisely in the setting of, rather than the overcoming of,
limits, for reason, unlike imagination, can put such a border in place and take
emotional pleasure from this accomplishment” (117).
“Pleasure,” however, is an inadequate description of Kristeva’s response to
the sublime. Saying her encounter with the sublime is pleasurable does not match in
interpretation, intensity, and depth her experience of the sublime as “a spree of
perceptions and words that expands memory boundlessly” (12). Ultimately, as will be
considered later, at least part of the answer may lie in Kristeva’s orientation to the
“decentered subject,” a concept that adds a dimension to the sublime that also serves,
in some artistic cases, as an additional means for understanding the varieties of
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numinous sensibility. An immediate observation is that while a broad understanding
of the sublime, especially in the 18th century was of a phenomenon that words cannot
express, Kristeva’s “a spree of perceptions and words that expands memory
boundlessly” is actually more aligned in some sense with Longinus’s focus on writing
and rhetoric.
Lyotard, whose writings led to a 1985 Centre Pompidou exhibition on the
sublime that he curated,97 explicated the implications of Kant’s version of the sublime
in his 1991 Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, taking the Kantian thought in a
new direction. “Postmodernism, as Lyotard sees it, is not a deviation from but rather a
radicalization of Kant’s original ‘Analytic’; it aims to maintain the shock of the
sublime so as to prevent the ascendancy of the rational over the real” (Shaw 116).98
The modern and postmodern sublime is most effectively understood directly
via the art of the artist-philosopher, and his or her artmaking. In that context, both the
aesthetic relevance of the sublime and its reciprocal relationship with the numinous,
and vice versa, is revealed, especially in regards to the thematic explication central to
this study. Non-rational aspects of the sublime and the numinous that surface while
explicating topics such as sacred cultures and alternative states of consciousness can
be communicated by artists in more concrete language through the experience of their
own artmaking activities.
Comparing the Numinous and The Sublime
While the sublime has generally been contrasted with the beautiful, in this
study it is essential that the sublime be compared to the numinous. The concepts are
so close as to be synonymous at times. Thus to distinguish the distinctions between
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the two requires some painstaking explication, especially since every scholar seems to
have his or her version of articulating that difference. In reality, the similarities are
what one first notices. As Otto emphasized, “the idea of the sublime is closely similar
to that of the numinous” (41-42). He notes that the numinous and the sublime are
alike in two respects—each includes “something mysterious” and each “exhibits the
same peculiar dual character” (41-42). When discussing Asian art, for example, Otto
compares the sublime and the numinous:
Besides silence and darkness oriental art knows a third direct means
for producing a strongly numinous impression, to wit, emptiness and
empty distances. Empty distance, remote vacancy, is, as it were, the
sublime in the horizontal. The wide-stretching desert, the boundless
uniformity of the steppe, have real sublimity, and even in us
Westerners they set vibrating chords of the numinous along with the
note of the sublime, according to the principle of the association of
feelings (69).
Also, for Otto, the sublime is a “means” to represent the numinous in art, and
he goes into some detail to argue for this idea:
In the arts nearly everywhere the most effective means of representing
the numinous is 'the sublime'. This is especially true of architecture, in
which it would appear to have first been realized. One can hardly
escape the idea that this feeling for expression must have begun to
awaken far back in the remote Megalithic Age. The motive underlying
the erection of those gigantic blocks of rock, hewn or unworked, single
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monoliths or titanic rings of stone, as at Stonehenge, may have well
been originally to localize and preserve and, as it were, to store up the
numen in solid presence by magic; but the change to the motive of
expression must have been from the outset far too vividly stimulated
not to occur at a very early date. In fact the bare feeling for solemn and
imposing magnitude and for the pomp of sublime pose and gesture is a
fairly elementary one, and we cannot doubt that this stage had been
reached when the mastabas, obelisks and pyramids were built in
Egypt. It is indeed beyond question that the builders of these temples,
and of the Sphinx of Gizeh, which set the feeling of the sublime, and
together with and through it that of the numinous, throbbing in the soul
almost like a mechanical reflex, must themselves have been conscious
of this effect and have intended it (65-66).
One naturally wonders why Otto cannot address the numinous without
referencing the sublime. It has been noted that philosopher Max Scheler, while using
and in some ways extending Husserl’s phenomenological approach, also commented
on Otto’s approach to the numinous: “Scheler specifically affirms Otto’s allegation
that the numinous constitutes a primary datum sui generis, which, as such, is
incapable of being defined and must be approached instead by means of description
and comparison” (Gooch 161).99 Certainly Otto is using description and comparison
in his writing about the sublime and the numinous. Scheler also suggested:
Otto’s method of successively exploring, comparing and contrasting
the various layers and nuances of the experiences that he describes, in
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order thereby to isolate and exhibit the numinous, “is the way that
leads to the phenomenological intuition of essence (Wesensschau)”
(162).
sui generis and Wesensschau
Thus it is useful to consider in more detail—in regards to Otto’s presentation of the
numinous—two terms: sui generis and Wesensschau. The more common former is
defined as “Of one's or its own kind; peculiar” ("sui generis, n." OED Online); the
latter, Wesensschau, means the intuition of essences, or eidetic intuition, which can
also has been described as “Husserl ‘s famous Wesensschau” (Levinas, Theory of
Intuition, 105). Levinas goes farther in elucidating Husserl’s Wesensschau, noting,
“Just like individual objects, ideal beings and essences admit of truth and falsity.
Essences are not fictions about which one may say anything” (105). It is interesting
that Levinas points out that Husserl, in his explication of imagination said that ideal
objects cannot be divided between actually perceived and imagined objects (105), a
point that is clearly relevant to the art of Borges and Varo.
In other words, sensible intuition is not eidetic intuition. The key to
understanding this approach lies in the understanding (as accentuated earlier and
reemphasized farther ahead) Husserlian presentation (Vorstellung), givenness
(Gegebenheit) and Intentionality (Intentionalität).
It is useful here to remember that there are numerous attempts to deal with the
ineffable. For example, the Kantian noumena refers not to experience, but to the
underlying conditions of experience that are not knowable as things-in-themselves,
yet which nonetheless must be presupposed in order for an experience of phenomena
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to be able to “cohere” (Shaw 155). Essentially, this means that the Kantian thing-initself “exists independently of experience” (156). While the Kantian noumena is not
Otto’s numinous, Otto does reference Kant at times, and in fact, while discussing how
Kant separates what he means by “aesthetic” from logical judgment, Otto references
Kant and then goes on to quote both Schiller and Goethe in order to illustrate Kant
(148), a superb moment of intertexual gymnastics:
Kant's distinction between the 'aesthetic' and logical judgement did not mean
to imply that the faculty of 'aesthetic' judgement was a judgement upon
'aesthetic' objects in the special narrow sense of the term 'aesthetic', as being
concerned with the beautiful. His primary intention is simply and in general
terms to separate the faculty of judgement based upon feeling of whatever sort
from that of the understanding, from discursive, conceptual thought and
inference; and his term 'aesthetic' is simply meant to mark as the peculiarity of
the former that, in contrast to logical judgement, it is not worked out in
accordance with a clear intellectual scheme, but in conformity to obscure, dim
principles which must be felt and cannot be stated explicitly as premises. Kant
employs sometimes another expression also to denote such obscure, dim
principles of judgement, based on pure feeling, viz. the phrase 'not-unfolded'
or 'unexplicated concepts' (unausgewickelte Begriffe); and his meaning is here
exactly that of the poet, when he says:
It waketh the power of feelings obscure
That in the heart wondrously slumbered.
Und wecket der dunklen Gefühle Gewalt,
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Die im Herzen wunderbar schliefen.
( Schiller: Der Graf von Habsburg.)
Or again:
What beyond our conscious knowing
Or our thought's extremest span
Threads by night the labyrinthine
Pathways of the breast of man.
Was von Menschen nicht gewußt
Oder nicht bedacht,
Durch das Labyrinth der Brust
Wandelt bei der Nacht.
(Goethe: An den Mona.)
As a literary artist who was also a thinker and scientist, Goethe presents a
perspective to the numinous that is less burdened with sentimentality or romantic
idealism, and more about the artist in the world. Nonetheless, Otto accessed Goethe’s
writings in Das Heilige, albeit at times to contrast his orientation to the numinous
with Goethe’s “pagan” orientation (153).100 Paul Bishop, a contemporary professor of
German literature and someone who has written about C. G. Jung in a context of
German literature and the numinous, describes Otto’s use of Goethe’s writings,
including Faust, to describe the German use of the numinous via the term das
Ungeheure. Bishop quotes “the famous scene from Part Two where Faust visits the
Mothers” (Bishop 117):
Our sense of awe’s what keeps us most alive.
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The world chokes human feeling more and more,
But deep dread still can move us to the core.
Das Schaudern ist der Menschheit bestes Teil.
Wie auch die Welt ihm das Gefühl verteuere,
Ergiffen fühlt er tief das Ungeheure (Bishop 117).101
The Jungian Numinous and the Numinous in the Present Study:
Distinctions and Similarities
Another area in which the sublime and the numinous appear together is when
the Romantic sublime meets the Jungian numinous. Although the latter will be
examined in more detail shortly, it is important to note right away that Wordsworth’s
poetry is a poetry of the sublime, so that its relationship to the numinous is always
near at hand. “Rather than invoke the vast library of works on Wordsworth and the
sublime, for the purposes of my discussion, I propose that for Wordsworth, the
sublime is an aesthetic and affective experience of the environment that becomes
something numinous” (Goss 1). Goss, referencing Otto, goes on to define numinous
as something beyond oneself and generally inaccessible except “in the moment of
encounter with the numinous, one is afforded a momentary glimpse into, or intuition
of, hidden depths in a view, image, object, sound or other sensory stimulus” (Goss 1).
The idea of the numinous as something that is hidden or invisible does not in
itself distinguish the sublime from the numinous. The sublime is not always as visible
as a distant volcano or the pyramids. In gothic literature as well as modern horror
fiction, an invisible presence which may only be perceived via a sensibility initially
conveys a kind of thrill of terror, a variety of the sublime, that pivots on the
anticipatory edge of the possibility of the unseen becoming a visible, destructive
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“something” that will disrupt, terrorize, or end one’s existence.
For Jung, however, the numinous represents other qualities. While Jung did
appropriate Otto’s term (Main 158),102 he used the numinous in his work more with
“healing and with the psychological process of individuation” (Stein 43) than Otto’s
usage, which was defining the numinous as “a feeling of the supersensual” and thus
as “the experiential basis of religions” (41). Unlike most theologians of his time, Otto
stressed direct experience rather than conceptual thought about religious experience
as the basis of his theory, and his “preference for feeling over thought set him apart
from his theological fellows” (39).103
Jung’s focus on the unconscious as a site of the numinous experience can be
contrasted with Otto’s religious orientation, but there are numerous reciprocities, not
least of all because of Jung’s interest in how religious symbols and ideas evoked the
numinous (45). One such agreement in regards to a sensibility to the numinous is that
certain artistically inclined individuals—artists and those who have an ongoing
appreciation of art may have an intensified sensibility to the numinous (45).104
Returning to the topic of art also reengages the primary focus and purpose of
this chapter, which is to elucidate the meaning of the numinous as used here. While
“numinous” has been used to describe the spiritual impulse in contemporary art,105 it
has also been used in a more scientifically oriented evolutionary vein as a prehistoric
developmental characteristic.106
How are art, art-making and art-viewing related to the numinous? Is this only
a “transcendent” issue? Otto frequently uses the word transcendent (transzendent) in
his references to God, but to what extent is that concept a factor in the investigation
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of a numinous sensibility to art and image consciousness? Jungian scholars question
the role of a transcendent force. For example, Bishop, quoting from Goethe’s
“Trilogy of Passion,”107 argues against such a force:
Thus the sense of the Numinous does not so much reveal the Divine as
reside in a way of seeing things, seeing them with “the eyes of the
spirit,” so that we realize the divine nature of all things. This, then, is
the true sense of the Numinous in Goethe—and, by extension, in Jung
as well. For him, the sets of “feelings,” “ideas,” and “events,” that Otto
described as numinous, can be understood in terms of Goethe’s “eyes
of the spirit” as aesthetic experiences, ones that “shape” us, “impress”
us, and “leave their mark” upon us: in other worlds, they are
“archetypal.” The power of the Numinous, the transformative effect of
the archetypal, resides not in a breakthrough from some transcendent
realm, but in a profound, even life-changing alteration in the way we
view the present and our life in it. Such a de-metaphysicized, demystified conception of the Numinous would reveal the divine nature
of life itself—divine, that is, not in terms of an external, transcendent
force, but inherently, immanently, immediately. As Jung pointed out,
the philological root of the Numinous lies in the notion of divinity and
of respect for the religious, but can we have a conception of the divine
without God? The ancient Epicurean and Stoic belief in the sanctity of
the moment might provide such a model of the divine without the
belief in transcendence” (Bishop 129-130).
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Bishop is quoted at length because there are both affinities and disparities
between his argument and the present investigation. Even though the present study of
the numinous is not a Jungian study, some aspects of Bishop’s explication of the
Jungian numinous—for example, that aesthetic experiences can be expressions of the
numinous—are congruent with this study, while others are not. When Bishop, for
example, describes the Jungian archetypal effect as a type of numinous factor that is
de-metaphysicized, metaphysics is not rendered for this study as a conception of God
or exterior deity, so that argument is not valid for this study. In the next chapter, the
importance of aesthetics and art in the writings of Schopenhauer, who was a severe
critic of religion and the God idea, is presented in order to subsequently be
interwoven with a Husserlian transcendental phenomenological methodology, and
other philosophical and phenomenological strands, to construct an original aesthetic
of the numinous to investigate image consciousness in abstract art.108 The point here
is that metaphysics is actually not defined in religious terms, but instead is described
formally as “a branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things or
reality” (“metaphysics”). There are other affinities and disparities. The assertion that
life itself reflects a divine nature is not antithetical to this study, but the idea that the
transcendent must be some exterior realm is incompatible with the inherent thesis
here.
The Numinous and the Transcendent Experience
Some fundamental questions about the transcendent must be considered first.
For example, do transcendent experiences actually exist, and if so what is a
transcendent experience?
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Sociological surveys report that a significant percentage of the
Australian, British, and north-American population (from 35 percent
up to 50 percent) recall having had a transcendent experience.109 A
transcendent experience can be characterized as an event in which
individuals, by themselves or in a group, have the impression that they
are in contact with something boundless and limitless, which they
cannot grasp, and which utterly surpasses human capacities. While
many reach a positive judgment regarding the status of what has been
apprehended, others discount such incidents a purely subjective and as
not indicative of anything real. In contrast to this dismissive attitude, I
would like to look at such experiences favorably and interpret them in
accord with thinkers who envision the human self as essentially open
to the infinite (Roy Transcendent xi).
Roy goes on to note that such experiences are likely to be of unequal value
and may be problematic, even psychotic, in various ways, and describes the reasons
he decided against a theological approach in favor of a “phenomenology of
transcendent experience” (xii).110 The present study proposes several ways through
the somewhat daunting labyrinth that arises when considering the varieties of the
transcendent experience.
Intentionality and the Numinous
One gateway through that labyrinth is intentionality, which is also considered
to some extent by Roy,111 but which cannot be fully explicated beyond an elementary
orientation until the next chapter. For now, the reader should know that Husserl’s
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three concepts of consciousness include: “(1) Consciousness as the entire, real (reelle)
phenomenological being of the empirical ego, as the interweaving of psychic
experiences in the unified stream of consciousness; (2) consciousness as the inner
awareness of one’s own psychic experiences; (3) consciousness as a comprehensive
designation for ‘mental acts’, or ‘intentional experiences’ of all sorts” (Husserl
Logical Investigations vol 2, 81).
His third concept of consciousness, intentionality, is of deep interest to
Husserl and is discussed at length and in much detail in all his writings except those
on mathematics, but its relevance here is that Husserl declared intentionality to be
“prior to all theories” (Husserl Phenomenological Psychology 9).112 This notion of
intentionality as an antecedent event, one that occurs before conceptually
encountering the object was introduced in Chapter One, along with Husserl’s
intention to create an apodictic science via his transcendental phenomenology.
How does intentionality enter into this? Roy attempts to clarify this in his
examination of the transcendent experience by noting that “human intentionality is an
intersubjective capacity for reaching out to what exists; when such intentionality feels
that it is in the presence of the mystery [which is to say in terms of this study, the
numinous], it does encounter a reality” (Transcendent xii). Roy goes on to say that
emotion enhances a person’s response to reality: “The feeling of being in touch with
something absolutely transcendent is the affective side of an intentionality oriented
toward the mystery” (Transcendent xii). Later, Roy resources the work of Bernard
Lonergan, a Canadian philosopher-theologian who thoroughly studied intentionality:
Lonergan helps us move further away from the widespread
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perceptualist model of mysticism, by clarifying the nature of
consciousness. Inspired by Husserl, his intentionality analysis
distinguishes the data of a twofold awareness: the objects of one’s
operations, and the operations themselves. The human self who wants
to know and interact with reality intends what is other than itself. In
doing so, the inquiring subject is aware of both the intended objects
and the several acts that constitute its intending. Difficult as it is to
pinpoint, the intending is no less conscious than the intended, since
people are conscious of their cognitive and affective operations (133).
That an accomplished scholar like Lonergan has understood the implications
of one of the principles of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology indicates how a
Husserlian methodology within a fully developed aesthetic of the numinous can
coherently address and respectfully explicate the many varieties of art having an
element of the transcendent experience.
Gefühl
To return to Otto, in addition to the phenomenological complexities of
intentionality, another means for navigating the varieties of the transcendent
experience, one already touched on when Roy said “emotion enhances a person’s
response to reality” (xii) is signaled in Louis Roy’s Transcendent Experiences:
Phenomenology and Critique in a chapter titled “Rudolf Otto and the Numinous.”
Roy discusses Otto’s comments about feeling, and how the German expression
Gefühl, although it can be translated as feeling or emotion, does not have the same
meaning as the English word “emotional.”113 Otto notes that “Gefühl” is in some
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ways more intensely magnified and penetrating than ordinary emotional expressions
and can point to “a form of cognizance in an unconceptual or preconceptual way”
(Roy Transcendent 106-107). Roy suggests that “Otto is involved in a forceful
rehabilitation of feeling, in opposition to the rationalism of those who exalt
conceptual thinking over against emotion” (107). Roy also suggests that for Otto
Gefühl is a powerful emotional expression that is connected to a sensibility to the
numinous.114
Gefühl and the Numinous in the Artistic Process
This study proposes to use Gefühl as an expression of a heightened version of
emotion in the special sense suggested by Otto, one that can be understood as a
nonconceptual or preconceptual means of cognizance, a form of intensified emotional
awareness or perception that occurs prior to conceptual thought, even though it is
likely to spark conceptual thought. In that context, Gefühl can be understood as a
significant component in the creative processes of artists examined, so that within the
thematic territory of this study, Gefühl serves as a kind of initiating fuel to drive the
aesthetic consolidation of a sensibility to, or awareness of, the numinous with actual
art-making and art-viewing activities, which ultimately blend and become a blur, so
to speak, of a single dynamic.
Another way of describing this phenomenon is simply to say that all the artists
considered in this study show some form of seeking the numinous through their art
and their art commentaries; they were seeking as artists to communicate that seeking
and understanding through their work. How did they do that?
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If what one is sensing standing in front of a 12th century painting is the
numinous, even if the viewer does not label that sensibility as the numinous, it is clear
that ultimately descriptive words are secondary in that the art speaks in its own
fullness with great visual articulation, whether it is a cave drawing of a bison or bear,
a Chinese landscape, or a Rothko color field painting.
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Chapter Four— Seeking the Numinous in Modern Art
The purpose of this chapter is to establish evidence—before explicating the
work of Varo and Borges in more detail—attesting to the fact that many other
modernist and contemporary artists have created work that reflects an aesthetic
impulse rooted in a sensibility to the numinous. In other words, the purpose of this
chapter and the next one is to lay the art historical and philosophy of art foundation
for subsequently explicating, in the final chapter, the art of Varo and Borges.
Having already established in the foregoing chapter what the numinous is, the
point now is to present instances in modern art-making that reflect artistic sensibility
to the numinous. Far from being a complete survey or exhaustive investigation of the
numinous in art, this chapter simply asserts that Varo and Borges were not the only
artists working within this thematic territory. Processes examined at the end of this
chapter, and subsequently in Chapter Six, investigates how and why Varo and
Borges’s respective oeuvres pivot around their respective sensibilities to the
numinous. In addition, it should be emphasized that, that with a few exceptions,
visual art, and specifically the work of painters, is a primary focus; there simply is not
space enough here to include relevant auxiliary topics such as photographic art and
the broad stream of literature. Since Varo was a painter and Borges a poet, mostly
paintings by other painters and a few poems by other poets will be referenced. The
central intention is to show that modernist artistic interest in and sensibility to the
numinous is well-known, albeit in a variety of verbal descriptions by critics and
artists themselves, even if sometimes dismissed as being irrelevant to whatever work
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has been created. Nonetheless, during the modernist era seeking what is described in
this study as the numinous was a prevalent theme, and to some extent this theme did
continue to a much less degree into what is generally considered to be the
postmodernist era and beyond.
Another point to clarify is that while it may be true that a given artist is
working via a sensibility to the numinous to create a work of art that is in some sense
greater than the artist, or overpowering to the artist who is making the art, that kind of
artistic practice may or may not be consciously what might be described as
worshipping a presence. Certainly in some sacred or explicitly spiritualized contexts
artistic practice serves a devotional purpose that is self-transcending in nature, but
this is not necessarily what is consciously occurring when someone “allows” a
sensibility to the numinous to fuel the art-making process. Nor is a viewer who is
“allowing” a sensibility to the numinous in a participatory viewing process
necessarily involved in a devotionally or consciously spiritual action.115 This seems
obvious, and in the context here the sensibility to the numinous can be used in
multifarious ways that may or may not be explicitly religious as Otto describes the
numinous. Nor is this assertion unique. Artist and scholar Jungu Yoon describes in
his Spirituality in Contemporary Art: The Idea of the Numinous his merging of three
orientations to numinous, those of Rudolf Otto, C.J. Jung, and Mircea Eliade:
My own understanding of the numinous draws on all three definitions.
Like Jung, I conceive the numinous to be an experience of an
archetype. In contrast to Otto, however, I argue that this experience is
not limited to the context of organized religious traditions. One
154

example of this can be seen in the East Asian idea of the numinous in
Taoist philosophy, which is not dependent on the existence of a deity.
However, it is unhelpful to conceive of Taoism and the numinous as
interchangeable concepts, since Taoism makes no distinction between
its understanding of the numinous and its understanding of natural
mysticism. Therefore this interpretation is too all-encompassing and
requires refining. Natural mysticism can be said to include the concept
of the numinous, but at the same time it is more extensive and
inclusive than the concept of the numinous itself (28-29).
Continuing with the line of thought, and regarding the present orientation to
the numinous and any artistic sensibility to the numinous, a definite difference is
apparent, for example, between a Tibetan Buddhist mandala painting created by an
anonymous Buddhist monk, and an abstract painting created by a modernist painter,
or an installation by a contemporary artist, even though a strong impulse so seeking
the numinous may be evident in all three.
The Mandala of Vajradhatu (fig. 12), was created by a 19th century Tibetan
monk who lived and practiced both esoteric spirituality and artistic expression of that
esoteric spirituality within the parameters of a monastic community somewhat set
apart from larger society. An important aspect of Tibetan Buddhism teachings is the
transcendence of separative self-identification, a spiritual erasing of the artist’s
personal identification, not as self-suppression, but as a gesture of self-expansion that
includes all beings, a “feeling of mystic oneness apart from ordinary reality” (Bass,
Smile 211).116
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Fig. 12. Mandala of Vajradhatu. Anonymous Tibetan artist.
Tibetan Buddhist thangka painting. 19th century.
Public domain image. Web accessed, September 26, 2013.
A peripheral question to ask is whether anonymity is a key to the distinction
between traditional esoterically oriented spirituality and the modernist sensibility to
the numinous. This seems unlikely, given that artistic sensibility responds to the
same ineffable mystery regardless of era and other circumstances. Can modern art
reflect the same feeling sometimes assigned to what is called sacred art? This does
seem possible.
Then there is the question of whether sacred art has influenced modernist art.
While numerous connections to an aesthetic rooted in a sensibility to the numinous
over the course of history are evident, one obvious artistic propinquity surfacing from
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that alignment would be that of the modern artist influenced by an earlier sacred
culture. Strong influences on artist Charmion Von Wiegand (1898-1983), for
example, included her personal friendship with the Dutch modernist Piet Mondrian
that yielded her 1940’s Neo-Plasticism geometric abstractions, and her later intense
interest in and practice of Tibetan Buddhism. Her Invocation to Adi Buddha (fig. 13)
does express the structural radiance of a Tibetan mandala, while also showing the
earlier Mondrian influence, a fascinating combination of influences.

Fig. 13. Charmion Von Wiegand. Invocation to Adi Buddha. 1968-70.
Oil on canvas, 50x27 inches. Michael Rosenfeld Gallery, New York.
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One point that arises from this kind of juxtaposition is the universality of
geometric elements in human culture, which element might even be described—if one
reflects on the evolution of Paul Cézanne’s painting, for example—as being inherent
in the natural world. Even though the modernist abstract geometric influence is
perhaps more compositionally more evident in Von Wiegand’s painting (except for
the Tibetan lettering at bottom), the 19th century Mandala of Vajradhatu (fig. 12)
composition, while having numerous representational elements, remains like most
Tibetan mandalas within a compositional geometric infrastructure of squares, circles,
pyramids, or various straight divisional lines. At the same time, the geometric
elements of both works, while visually prominent, are not the central feeling being
expressed. The expressed feeling is a sensibility to the numinous, which while
presented differently are nonetheless, to this viewer, analogous in sensibility.
To bring this into a more contemporary setting, it can be argued that Tibetan
Buddhism scholar Robert A. F. Thurman’s “feeling of mystic oneness apart from
ordinary reality” (quoted on page 149 by Bass) is also evident in contemporary artist
Teresita Fernández’s Fire (fig. 14), albeit in a 3-dimensional rendering that is less
like a mandala but nonetheless conveys a circular, contemplative, meditative quality
that echoes Tibetan painting. The meditative quality merges with a dynamic quality
of action in Fernández’s piece, and that amalgamation of the dynamic and
contemplative is likewise a motif of Tibetan Buddhist mandalas. Both convey a
sensibility to the numinous, even if that is not the exact wording that would ordinarily
be used in a discussion of these two works.
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Ultimately, this issue of discussing a sensibility to and seeking of the
numinous is a matter of semantics—a botanist who is discussing some finer points of
plant life may not use words like “vegetation” or “plant” at all in a discussion of
photosynthesis, but that scientist is discussing a phenomenon universal to all plant
life, even if more obvious in the specific type of tree or other vegetation that he or she
is referencing and discussing.

Fig. 14. Teresita Fernández. Fire, 2005. Silk yam, steel armature, and epoxy.
96 in x 144 in. Collection SFMOMA.
(In the 2013 exhibition Beyond Belief: 100 Years of the Spiritual in Modern Art.
A collaboration between the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art
and the Contemporary Jewish Museum SF.)
Modernist Abstraction and the Numinous
Abstract art in general, and especially modernist abstract art, has been a genre
closely associated with a seeking and revelation of the numinous. Kandinsky, Rothko,
Mondrian, Malevich and many other abstract modernist artists openly discussed art as
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a means of spiritually related expression. They discussed this in different ways, but
what is proposed here is that they were attempting to discuss a common sensibility to
the numinous.
In considering similarities between the Rothko color field painting (fig. 15)
and the Chinese landscape (fig. 11, p.128), there is similar phenomenon of the
miniscule within immensity. The tiny human figures at the bottom of the Chinese
landscape and the intersecting multilinear-to-single-point in the center of the Rothko
occur in midst of a domain of vastness (rather than vast domain), an overwhelming
vastness. A disruption of perceptual scale and focus captures attention and allows a
sense of being overwhelmed in consciousness. The heightened color in the Rothko
with its chromatic afterimage effect that induces each colored segment to change the
perceptual reality of adjacent segments occurs as a dynamic penetration, a motion in

Fig. 15. Mark Rothko. No.5/No.22. 1949-1950.
Oil on canvas. 297 x 272 cm. Museum of Modern Art, New York.
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the midst of stillness, which to this viewer reflects a sensibility to the numinous. Just
so, the Chinese peasants returning from work allows a similar dynamic rooted in that
sensibility. That there is a sense of “prior” or precursory infinite unity, an inherent
quality of the numinous, surfaces in both works. This is more than compositional
mechanics, although the dynamic itself can appear in a great variety of ways. As
Rothko, for example, famously said, "If you are only moved by color relationships,
then you miss the point. I'm interested in expressing the big emotions—tragedy,
ecstasy, doom" (Baal-Teshuva 50).
As artists working in some form of abstract imagery, the modernist artists
were especially focused on understanding and communicating the implications of
invisible reality. If we consider the pioneers of abstraction in the early twentieth
century, many artists were aware of a sensibility to the numinous, albeit in a different
context for each individual that evolved as a given artist’s work evolved into
abstraction.
Transcendental Phenomenological Influences on Abstract Art
Husserl’s work as a primary means for investigating art and the numinous has
already overflowed at times to working artists themselves. Alexandra Munroe, the
Senior Curator of Asian Art at the Guggenheim and the curator of the exhibition The
Third Mind: American Artists Contemplate Asia, 1860-1989, discusses in that
exhibition’s catalog the influence of phenomenology on Minimalist abstraction, and
especially artistic interest in Husserl’s epochē. Munroe goes on to describe how west
coast artists of that time such as Robert Irwin used Husserl’s epochē in another way,
namely to “go back to the beginning and rethink …, [which] looks like the realm that
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has always been the Orient, the East” (297).117
In other words, artists such as Irwin used Husserl’s “questioning back”
(Rückfragen) to locate the “primary foundation” (Urstiftung) (Moran and Cohen 70)
in their creative processes, whether they used those phrases and concepts consciously
or not. Phenomenological influences on artists stretch beyond using the Husserlian
epochē, “back to the things themselves,” and “questioning back.” Discussing the
influences of Asian art and aesthetics on sculptor Robert Morris and other American
artists, Munroe also noted the parallels between phenomenology and Buddhism:
Unsurprisingly, the theories of Husserl and his disciples Martin
Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whose writings on
phenomenology were so influential among Morris and the Minimalist
critics, have been analyzed in light of their parallels to and
appropriations from the Madhyamaka and Yogacara traditions of
Buddhism. These Western and Buddhist systems ground the egoexperienced spatio-temporal realm in a primordial consciousness and
dismiss discursive consciousness (as ordinary or delusionary) in favor
of a radical empiricism (297).
Again, one must remember that Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger were deeply
influenced by Husserl, even if that influence has been only lightly acknowledged by
some scholars. Even Heidegger and Derrida, both of whom veered away from
Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology to establish their own phenomenologically
rooted theories, acknowledged their intellectual debt to Husserl.
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To continue with the topic at hand, if any outer artistic impulse is bracketed
via Husserlian epochē, the artist can be observed allowing and receiving the mystery
of the unrecognizable object, or the mystery of a reshaped irreal object. The artist
receives the outer influence not just as recognition of natural beauty, but in Husserlian
terms as givenness—an object is “given” to perceptual consciousness—(Lyotard 44)
of the object itself. This orientation ultimately allows the artist to receive the
givenness of the art object he or she has created, or even has visualized creating. The
same process could be described as being a dynamic of givenness active in the
participatory viewer who can see a modernist painting without instantly assigning
conceptual or preconceptual attributes to a work of art.
Invisibility and the Numinous
While the significance of invisibility and the numinous in relation to
individual artists is relevant, it is useful here to note that a sensibility to the numinous
also surfaces through an interest in “the notion of a dimension behind the visible
reality” (Müller-Westerman “Painting for the Future” 45). Often this interest
coincided with an interest in scientific phenomena, especially microscopic cellular
phenomena, but also the interest in invisibility led to or coincided with an interest in
the occult. An interest in microscopic cellular phenomena can be found in the creative
thinking and art-making of both Kandinsky and Duchamp, for example, two
prominent but distinctly different artists—the former being the quintessential
modernist, the latter being probably the best-known pioneer of postmodernism. Both
expressed a passionate interest in the invisible world.
For now it is useful to acknowledge how the seminal role of intentionality,
163

when applied to art, can ultimately serve the aesthetic investigation not only of the
art-making of Varo and Borges, but abstract modernist art as well—everything from
Mondrian’s Neo-Plasticism and Kandinsky’s nonobjective abstraction to Hilma af
Klint’s spiritualistically sourced paintings and the healer-pendulator Emma Kunz’s
mandala-like geometric abstractions. These last two figures are more conceptual in
their orientations than a casual observer might presuppose, given the occult contexts
each of them functioned within and that to some degree prevented them and their
work from being recognized by the broader mainstream art world during their
lifetimes.118
That early abstract artists like Kandinsky, Mondrian, Malevich, and Kupka
were also interested in various degrees of occultism, especially through theosophy, is
well documented.119 To reiterate a point, while this is not a study of occultism or
spiritualism in art, but a philosophico-phenomenological investigation of the
implications of wonder and the numinous in image consciousness, it is nonetheless
useful and necessary to acknowledge the ways individual artists expressed these
interests through their art-making, even if some of those ways seem eccentric or
strange to mainstream society. A number of artists wrote or talked about aspects of a
sensibility to the numinous. “The Futurist painter Umberto Boccioni (1882-1916),
formulated the conversations of many of his avant-garde contemporaries as follows:
‘What must be painted is not visible, but that which was previously regarded as
invisible, namely what the clairvoyant painter sees’ ”( Müller-Westerman “Painting
for the Future” 45).
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Fig. 16. Jeanne Nathalie Wintsch. Je suis radio [I am Radio], 1924.
Embroidery on linen, 42.5 x 103 cm. Sammlung Rheinau, Zurich
Web accessed, November 20, 2013.
Not only the works of these famous artists attest to this focus. The work of
lesser-known artists, including many of those sometimes categorized as outsider
artists, also may reflect a connection between art-making and the numinous. For
example, this needlework (fig.16) by early-20th-century Swiss artist and psychiatric
patient Johanna (Johanna) Natalie Wintsch (1871-1944) mixes enigmatic visual
language with theosophical symbolism, giving expression to inner thoughts within
private worlds.
Inner and Outer Versions of Consciousness
as Components of the Artistic Process
Yet another consideration relevant to a seeking of the numinous is the
distinction between inner and outer versions of the transcendent experience. The
shifting focus on inner and outer experience is a recurring theme, one that is evident
in the creative processes of many artists. All artists seem to have some degree of both
inner and outer perceptual and art-making dynamics. Although an artist may feel that
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he or she has a single and simple aesthetic for making art, one that is straightforward
and without complexity, another artist may feel overwhelmed by complexity and
multiple forms of consciousness.120

Fig. 17. Agnes Martin. Untitled, c. 1960.
Collection Emily Fisher Landau, New York.
Hilma af Klint, Emma Kunz, and Agnes Martin all stressed inner
consciousness in their art:
The drawings of af Klint, Kunz, and Martin reflect the inner necessity
of any creative activity as two-dimensional projections of a process
beyond space and time. The emphasis rests on the fact that it is not the
product that is the artwork but the working of the mind—the slow time
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of viewing and thinking as working. Through a combination of
perception, joy, and vision and a sense of reciprocity, their work has a
dimension of both inner and outer coherence that sets it apart from the
familiar conventions of Modernism and its avant-garde (de Zegher
“Abstract” 37).
Agnes Martin is the most recognized and perhaps the least oriented to the
occult of the three artists discussed here, but the point is that she, like Emma Kunz
and Hilma af Klint, openly discussed the influences of what is being explicated here
as the numinous. Her work is meditative and visionary, and she neither hid nor
proselytized her interest in Zen Buddhism and other spiritual paths.

Fig. 18. Hilma af Klint. Altarpiece, No. 1, Group X.
Altarpieces, 1915. Stiftelsen Hilma af Klints Verk.
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Hilma de Klint, whose work has begun to gain some posthumous recognition,
was, though a very private person, open about her interests in occult issues like
“channeling.” That a sensibility and expression of the numinous is inherent in her
paintings is obvious.

Fig. 19. Emma Kunz. Work No. 014. n.d.
Emma Kunz thought of herself as a healer and researcher. In fact, Kunz, who
usually did not give her drawings a title or date, “considered her artistic practice to be
a process of research and discovery” (Teicher 127).
The end result of the abstract art of Martin, af Klint, and Kunz—each created
via distinctively personal approaches—is that they each felt a inner sensibility to the
numinous and attempted to outwardly express that sensibility via art.
How does that sensibility manifest prior to making art? To some extent,
although not exclusively, modernist non-objective modernist abstraction developed as
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a means to reflect an invisible numinous gateway that becomes visible through the
experience and phenomenon of wonder. Some of the later paintings of Gordon
Onslow Ford, for example, visually transmit the unfathomable wonder and beauty of
deep space. Ford was the youngest and last surviving member of the 1930s Paris
Surrealist group associated with André Breton, and he was also a friend of Remedios
Varo when she lived in Paris and later in Mexico. Some of the exhibition names of
Ford’s work invoke his sense of space: Surrealism: New Worlds, Stellar Orbits, and
Voyager and Visionary.

Fig. 20. Gordon Onslow Ford, Constellations in Hand, 1961
Parle's paint and aqua polymer on canvas, 72 1/8 in. x 108 in.
Collection SFMOMA © Estate of Gordon Onslow Ford.
Ford also expressed an interest in theory and philosophy, and thus
occasionally spoke or wrote about his lifelong interest in the metaphysical
significance of the artistic process. Like many modernist artists, Ford also had some
sense of the value of Asian aesthetics.
To use a more contemporary example, Robert Percy, who worked as a studio
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assistant to Ford in California for several years, and who is an accomplished
contemporary abstract artist in his own right, has long reflected in his work a vividly
developed sensibility to Asian aesthetics. Percy’s calligraphic uses of brushes, Sumi-e
ink, casein, and kozo paper reflect a general orientation to his art that is rooted in trips
to China and Japan, and come together to erase any east-west dichotomy.121

Fig. 21. Robert Percy, Same-in-All, 2004.
Collection of the Artist, Marin County, California.
The Asian influence on Percy’s work also serves to visually illustrate some
points surfacing in Schopenhauer’s interest in Hinduism and Buddhism, and in the
influence of Asian aesthetics on western artists altogether. An aspect of Percy’s
aesthetic—described by him in vernacular terms as “Whatever happens happens”—
actually reflects a complex sequence of artmaking techniques that are clearly related
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to his study of calligraphic art.122
It is useful to remember that artistic abstraction actually did not originate in
the twentieth century. This point was made by a contemporary cultural critic in a

Fig. 22. Illustrations accompanying G. Roger Denson’s exhibition review,
Huffington Post review of the 2013 Museum of Modern Art exhibition in New
York, Inventing Abstraction, 1910-1925:
Shouldn't the most authoritative of our cultural institutions be as
mindful of the language used in representing the history of
international art, especially a history in which mitigating the injuries
historically wrought by political and cultural colonizations still within
memory are required to facilitate a new global civilization eager for
crosscultural exchange? I'm referring to the title of the Museum of
Modern Art's current exhibition, Inventing Abstraction, 1910-1925. It
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may seem a benign choice of words to Europeans and Americans who
have been educated with little orientation to our former roles as
colonizing nations, but to art audiences from the myriad nations with
whom we are building the new global agora, the title conveys a
dishonest attempt to sell the world on a genesis of abstraction that is
entirely a modern European enterprise. How much more historically
accurate and relevant the show's title would have been had the curators
added two small letters--the "Re" of Reinventing Abstraction.
(“Colonizing Abstraction: MoMA's Inventing Abstraction
Show Denies Its Ancient Global Origins.”
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/g-roger-denson/colonizingabstraction-mo_b_2683159.html 2013. Web April 2014.)
While Inventing Abstraction, 1910-1925, was a significant exhibition,
especially for any viewer interested in the history of modernism, Denson’s point is
clearly valid, and remains relevant both for the MoMA exhibition and any study of
abstract art. In fact, the Eurocentric bias in Western philosophy and art history is one
reason for choosing and discussing the multicultural work of Schopenhauer in
Chapter Five. Furthermore, an additional point to be noted is that in the examples
Denson offered the cultures wherein those earlier examples of abstract art appeared
did not need to justify or explain either the sacred nature or the aesthetic abstraction
of those artifacts. One could argue that only a post-industrial, scientific materialist
society would require the justification of the sacred or an explanation for a sensibility
to the numinous in much abstract art.
For Kandinsky, perhaps the most influential and spiritually oriented of
preeminent modernist abstract artists, inner and outer versions of consciousness
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remain germane to his creative process. Whether or not there is, philosophically and
phenomenologically speaking, an actual genuine distinction between “inner and
outer” is a complex issue that will not be addressed in this study. However, the
difficulty inherent in explicating the intuitive property of what Kandinsky called inner

Fig. 23. Composition VIII, 1923, oil on canvas, 55x79
The Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, New York
necessity, or is called here a version of a sensibility to the numinous, signals why this
is such a challenging topic, especially given that Kandinsky was far more open about
his work being a conjunction of spirituality and art than most modern artists,
including other modernists, but also including postmodernists.
At this juncture, then, it is useful to consider the work of an artist who is
usually considered by many to be the original postmodernist in spite of his modernist
beginnings and his longtime friendships with modernist artists such as Francis Picabia
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and many others.
Search and Stoppage: Marcel Duchamp as Bridge
Marcel Duchamp remains special for several reasons, not the least of which is
how postmodernist aesthetics and art history adopted Duchamp’s work as the marker
that initiated postmodernism. Duchamp’s Fountain (fig. 24), for example, is
sometimes considered to be the seminal work of postmodernist art, and there are
reasons for that:
Were the readymades art because Duchamp declared them to be, or
were they “based on a reaction of visual indifference, a total absence
of good or bad taste, a complete anesthesia,” as he argued much later,
and so a challenge to such authority? Never shown in it initial guise,
Fountain was suspended in time, its questions deferred to later
moments. In this way it became one of the most influential objects in
twentieth-century art well after the fact (Foster, el al 129).

Fig. 24. Marcel Duchamp, Fountain, 1917 (1964 replica)
Readymade: porcelain, 36 x 48 x 61.
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Thus Duchamp is discussed here at some length, partly to make the point that
an artistic seeking of the numinous is not an isolated incident relevant only to a few
modernist artists, and partly to emphasize (albeit in what is not the usual thematic
orientation for such a proposal) that the impulse of seeking the numinous is a theme
that actually does bridge the divide between modernism and postmodernism, even if,
in the latter, via a more disguised and convoluted style.
Duchamp also referenced and discussed at length here to emphasize that this
study is not simply about modernism and the numinous, nor about abstraction and the
numinous. The sensibility to the numinous extends far beyond art history and art
theory categories. An aspect of this study is that a sensibility to the numinous is
ultimately a universal phenomenon. Thus one could naturally ask why a universal
sensibility should be restricted to a modernist trope, or why postmodernist and
contemporary art should represent exclusions from the present theme, even if
emphasized less than in the earlier so-called modernist era?
Two figures who were friends with modernist artists as well as friends with
each other, and who are both sometimes considered to be both modernist and
postmodernist artists, are Marcel Duchamp and John Cage. Cage’s work, which is
primarily influential in music, performance art, and fluxus will not be considered here,
even though to some degree the work of both of these artists straddles modernism and
postmodernism and simultaneously expresses a strong interest in the numinous, even
if that interest is seldom acknowledged in the world of art scholarship. This lack of
acknowledgment is especially true of scholarship about Duchamp.123
At first glance, it would seem that Duchamp is not very interested in topics
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like the numinous and wonder. That is, however, a presumption. The fact is,
Duchamp did at times express a passionate interest in a merging of spirituality and
art—in spite of his iconoclastic orientation to art and the art world:
Religion has lost much of its territory and it is no longer a source of
spiritual values. [It is up to the artist] to conserve the great spiritual
tradition with which even religion, it would seem has lost
contact...[and] keep the flame of inner vision, which the work of art is
perhaps the most faithful interpreter for profane man (Chalupecky
136).

Fig. 25. Marcel Duchamp. Network of Stoppages. Paris 1914.
Oil and pencil on canvas, 58 5/8" x 6' 5 5/8" (148.9 x 197.7 cm).
Museum of Modern Art, New York.
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Duchamp’s aesthetic orientation is not easy to summarize. One might say that
a map is required, and in fact, one of Duchamp’s works, Network of Stoppages (Fig.
25) is a map of sorts. When viewing Network of Stoppages what registers first for this
viewer is a quality of meaningful beauty, a kind of cartographic beauty that, like most
maps, can be translated into a topographical territory of exploration. One visual
expression, then, is that of a neurological map of circuitry or synaptic networking
within the brain’s cortex, which in visual art is related to the perceptual mechanics of
seeing, or related to neurobiology and neuroaesthetics, and ultimately can be
understood as the physical neurological side of aesthetics. Viewing Network of
Stoppages as a map of search and stoppage, as well as invisibility and alterity, is akin
to exploring the geography of unknown territories via a multiplicity of routes,
junctions, starts and stoppages. All but one of the lines in Network go “off the map”
and into the black, but all lines have barrier-like marks and definite stops.
One means to describe Duchamp’s art-making orientation as a kind of search
and stoppage phenomenon is to consider the titles of several of Duchamp’s works.
Besides combining Network of Stoppages and the precursory and historically
significant 3 Standard Stoppages (figs. 23-24), the term “search and stoppage” also
describes Duchamp’s style of working in which he would combine actual artworks, as
is essentially the case with Network of Stoppages.
To what extent was Duchamp conscious of his work as even being a search,
and how did he perceive it? As seen in the quotations, usually from interviews, there
were times when Duchamp openly connected the numinous and art, yet given his
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somewhat indecipherable character, as well the way his oblique and ironic approach
to investigation merged with an admirable contempt for labels or categorization,
Duchamp’s seeking of the numinous remains largely indefinable by conventional
language. Is it even about art as commonly defined? Duchamp’s work has been
described as “Art as Anti-Art” (Mink 3).
When considering the areas of investigation and exploration that influenced
Duchamp’s search, it is clear that to describe his search as “spiritual” would be
inaccurate, given that word’s religious connotations. The numinous, with its
characteristic invisibility and it inherent universal quality is—given Duchamp’s
intense interest in invisibility and his impulse to break loose from the confines of the
art world and “retinal painting”—a more accurate indicator of his search.
Also relevant is that Duchamp was an artist-philosopher, although his was a
more metaphysical orientation to search—“metaphysical” in the most general sense
of a “philosophical investigation of the nature, constitution, and structure of reality”
(Audi 153). Metaphysical is in fact the descriptive term Duchamp least resisted,
though he questioned the validity of even that word. Asked by William Seitz which
adjective he would use to describe his work, Duchamp replied:
Metaphysical if any. And even that is a dubious term. Anything is
dubious. It’s pushing the idea of doubt in Descartes.... to a much
further point than they ever did in the school of Cartesian: doubt in
myself, doubt in everything...in the end it comes to doubt the verb “to
be” (Ades, Cox, Hopkins, Marcel Duchamp, 61).
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It should be noted that because Duchamp did not define his own search as
spiritual does not mean that he considered irrelevant or false the emphatically stated
interests in the confluence and conjunction of spirituality from Kandinsky and other
artists. In 1912 in Munich, for example, Duchamp purchased Kandinsky’s
Concerning the Spiritual in Art and subsequently translated it from German into
French for his brothers (Howard 166). This is not irrelevant. The catalog to the 1986
Los Angeles County Museum of Art exhibition, The Spiritual in Art: Abstract
Painting 1890-1985, notes the inclusion of this book: “Duchamp’s copy of
Kandinsky’s book, with his own extensive translations, is presented” (Tuchman 47).
Although one scholar noted that “no artist could be more diametrically
opposed to Kandinsky than Duchamp” (De Duve 159), another points out that
Duchamp, in a letter to Jean Crotti in 1920, “proposed a scheme to transform the
chessboard into a shifting field of symbolic color strikingly reminiscent of
Kandinsky’s theory of color essence in Concerning the Spiritual in Art” (Joselit 159).
The fact is, Duchamp was friends with Kandinsky and respected him, even visiting
the Kandinskys in Paris not long before Kandinsky’s death.
Part of the issue here is that Duchamp, unlike Kandinsky and others, seldom
disclosed the details of his inner aesthetic experiences except through his art. For
example, while Duchamp’s artist sister Suzanne and her husband Jean Crotti “openly
examined occult notions in their paintings” even though “in Duchamp’s work such
ideas were characteristically hidden” (Tuchman 46-47), this was a difference in
communication that reflects Marcel’s relatively undisclosed approach to everything.
His own interests in the influences of occultism and spirituality on the art of that time
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may have been largely concealed, but this was an open topic for his family and
friends.
Since Duchamp said and wrote very little about anything in a straightforward
and explicit manner, what is most accurate, though admittedly weak in its generality,
is to simply acknowledge Duchamp’s search (without adjectival labels) as his attempt
to understand what cannot be seen with ordinary vision, which includes not only
invisible force or structure, but also forms of alterity and chance. Interviews with
Duchamp over the years have provided some of the documented resources that are
most relevant to understanding his search. Also relevant are interviews in some cases
referencing earlier comments in previous interviews, as in the following 1967
exchange with curator and author Lanier Graham. In it, Graham refers to a
conversation the artist had with American critic J.J. Sweeney a decade earlier. This
excerpt also reflects Duchamp’s orientation to philosophical interpretation, including
his opposition to defining art with words:
Graham: It seems that almost from the beginning of your work as an
artist, you have had a philosophical attitude toward what being an
artist is. In one of your interviews with Sweeney, for example... you
describe Dada as a “metaphysical attitude.” What you have talked
about and written is permeated with the thought-feelings of a
philosopher. At the end of your 1956 interview with Sweeney, you
spoke of art as a path "toward regions which are not ruled by time and
space."
Duchamp: Was that the one filmed in Philadelphia?
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Graham: It was.
Duchamp: Yes. Perhaps that is about as much as you can say in a film
being made for wide consumption. If one says too much more, the
result is simply a great deal of misunderstanding. Understanding can
emerge from a co-experience, a non-verbal experience which the artist
and the onlooker can share by means of aesthetic experience. So I
leave the interpretation of my work to others.
Graham: Nevertheless, I think it would be correct to say that you
regard the practice of art as a philosophical path toward that which is
beyond time and space.
Duchamp: That is correct. This is my view, but only part of my view.
My view is beyond and back. Some get lost “out there.” My frame of
reference is out of the frame and back again.
Graham: That sounds like the dance of the finite and infinite, stepping
back and forth between three dimensions and four dimensions, as
Apollinaire or Mallarme would say.
Duchamp: So it does. No one says it better than Mallarme!
Graham: May we call your perspective Alchemical?
Duchamp: We may. It is an Alchemical understanding. But don’t stop
there! If we do, some will think I’ll be trying to turn lead into gold
back in the kitchen [laughing]. Alchemy is a kind of philosophy, a
kind of thinking that leads to a way of understanding. We may also
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call this perspective Tantric (as Brancusi would say), or (as you like to
say) Perennial (Graham 41-43).124
Irony is one of the keys to understanding Duchamp. In regards to “stoppage,”
for example, it has been pointed out that Duchamp intended 3 Standard Stoppages,
made in 1913-1914, as a play upon the rigidity of officially imposed standards of
measure:
As much is suggested in its French title 3 Stoppages Etalon, [it is]
supposed to play on the word ‘stoppages’ meaning to mend invisibly
(a shop sign in Paris carrying the word had inspired Duchamp), so that
it can be said he is imposed upon us legally and scientifically”
(Parkinson 114-115).125
There is another meaning to the English word stoppage, one more literal in
that it also expresses the evolutionary development of Duchamp’s work:
An evolutionary sequence is really a network of catastrophes:
development occurs through an irregularity that escapes a general
peril. Evolution moves by collisions, weaknesses, failures, accidents; it
only looks tidy and teleological after the fact, and to the outsider.
Similarly, Duchamp’s career has its stalls, lurches, and burnouts, with
development evidencing itself only after mutations and adjustments
have occurred (Masbeck 1).
Duchamp’s abandonment of what he called “retinal painting” in 1912
represents a form of stoppage, perhaps his most dramatic one. Later he would also
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“retire” from being an artist, though as stated here, abandonment might be a more apt
description:
This process of “retirement” was already well under way by the end of
1912 because, amazingly, at the moment of his greatest triumphs as a
painter, Duchamp decided to abandon painting...apparently bored with
the process of painting, had now given up the idea of a career of as a
painter, enrolling in a librarian’s course at the Ecle des Chartes in late
1912 instead (Parkinson 27).
Over time Duchamp’s interests in investigating forms of invisibility merged
with his stated emphasis on restoring the mind’s preeminent role to art making as a
source of ideas and conceptual thought, a role he felt had been lost in “retinal
painting.” Two specific factors that remained stable despite Duchamp’s capricious
nature— his interest in invisibility and his innate attraction to alterity—steadily
informed and fueled his impulse to understand reality. Duchamp’s interest in
invisibility along with multifarious kinds of alterity fueled the combination of search
and stoppage, the latter being yet another multiple or layered factor in Duchamp’s
existence, and thus in his work:
Marcel Duchamp’s art operates on more than one level of
meaning and in more than one dimension of form. Disliking
the exoteric, Duchamp’s esoteric mind created images which
would open upon hidden perspectives beyond the merely
visible (Masbeck 72-79).
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Professor Linda Dalrymple Henderson’s scholarship in both her The Fourth
Dimension and Non-Euclidian Art in Modern Art, and in her Duchamp in Context:
Science and Technology in the Large Glass and Related Works, can be described as
two original and penetrating examinations of Duchamp’s fascination with invisibility
and his search for underlying reality, or reality as it might exist through and beyond
the senses, and especially that version of reality that may manifest as a force,
presence, or idea beyond the readily apparent physical and materialistic version of
reality. In other words, Duchamp’s intense interest in invisibility and his search for
underlying reality substantiates the assessment here of his seeking the numinous.

Fig. 26. Marcel Duchamp, Portrait of Dr. R. Dumouchel, 1910.
Oil on canvas. 100 x 65 cm. Philadelphia Museum of Art
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Duchamp’s interests and investigations of occultism, alchemy,
electromagnetism, radioactivity, x-rays, and various other natural and technological
phenomena are linked to visual perception and art. The first artistic evidence of
Duchamp’s interest in “invisibility” is in his 1910 Portrait of Dr. Dumouchel (fig.
26), with the aura around the hands of the figure as an expression of magnetism,
popular at that time. Duchamp’s use of an aura in that painting, signals an interest in
the numinous:
A curious coloured emanation surrounds the figure’s hand and head
are haloed in a deeper pink, which indicate the subject’s possession of
special powers. The probable source is the idea of the aura as
promoted in Theosophical writings such as Annie Besant and Charles
Leadbeater’s [1896] Thought Forms (Ades, Marcel Duchamp, 26).
Another influence often suggested was Duchamp’s mentor during that time,
Czech painter, Theosophist, and spiritualist medium Frantisek Kupka, who was an
early artistic explorer of X-ray imagery (Henderson, Duchamp 3-4). Along with
those influences should be added the wide-ranging conversations the Duchamp
brothers participated in with the Paris “Salon Cubists”, who debated topics such as
simultaneity and the fourth dimension (Ades, Marcel Duchamp, 36).
Duchamp’s study of non-Euclidean geometry and the fourth dimension
exceeded even the consideration of these elements in Cubist theory. Speaking in
general, the investigation among pre-WWI artists of X-rays as evidence of perceptual
relativity, however, served as a precursor to exploring “higher spatial realms”
(Henderson, Duchamp 4) and also provided a neutral topical territory where in
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science and occultism could co-exist and exchange influence, experimental evidence,
and possibility. His deep interest in chance also points to a version of seeking the
numinous: “Another notorious Duchampian pursuit, never before considered from an
exclusively esoteric perspective, is that of Chance, le Hasard” (Moffitt 304). Moffitt
goes on to describe Duchamp’s reading of Pierre Camille Revel’s book on the laws of
chance:
Revel’s work was “esoteric” in that he also studied and wrote about
the transmigrations of spirits or metempsychosis. This is especially
important to mention since Revele’s two-part book, as published in
1905, presently remains the single documented, published source for
Duchamp’s notorious preoccupation with le Hasard, or Chance (304305).
Describing Revel’s books as “the single documented, published source” may
make literal sense, but experience is a major factor for Duchamp as well, as becomes
evident when one reads some of Duchamp’s comments about the role of “chance” in
several published interviews, including in an interview with Katherine Kuh. In
response to Kuh’s question, “Has the accidental played a role in your work?”
Duchamp said:
My first accidental experience (what we commonly call chance)
happened with the Three Stoppages, and as I said before, was a great
experience. The idea of letting a piece of thread fall on a canvas was
accidental, but from this accident came a carefully planned work. Most
important was the accepting and recognition of this accidental
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stimulation. Many of my highly organized works were initially
suggested by just such chance encounters (Kuh 92).
How does Duchamp’s Network of Stoppages, now in the Museum of Modern
Art in New York, visually register elements inherent in Duchamp’s art-making that
are relevant to his quest to understand reality? As already emphasized, Duchamp’s
native impulse toward search and stoppage are visually expressed in the
cartographically styled graphic dynamics in Network of Stoppages, while his
fascination with invisibility and alterity become apparent in that work, regardless of a
variety of possible thematic interpretations of that work. Search, stoppage,
invisibility, and alterity are interrelated in a variety of ways in Duchamp’s art. For
example, when considering how the artist actually made Network of Stoppages and
how it relates to his work both previously and subsequently, those four key
elements—search, stoppage, invisibility, alterity—visually surface.
Although this paper is not an investigation of Duchamp’s interest in alchemy
as proposed and investigated by some scholars126, one might say that these four
themes of search, stoppage, invisibility and alterity are like elements in an alchemical
process. This process does unfold as a stirring of multiple dynamics, or as a swirl of
amalgamations and disintegrations, all of which repeatedly resurface as artistic means
and even as specific motifs in Duchamp’s work, as well as reflecting biographical
details in his life.
Nonetheless, given the plethora of interpretations and presumptions and
theories about Duchamp and his art, a single definitive study of him and his work
remains unlikely, if not impossible. Multiple interpretations of Duchamp and his
187

work arise because, as art historian David Joselit wrote, “There is no single Marcel
Duchamp but many” (Joselit 3).
It should be noted here that Joselit’s insightful scholarly study of Duchamp
begins with an interpretation of Network of Stoppages that considers how that work
“summarizes his cubist art,” and also notes its positioning between 3 Standard
Stoppages and The Large Glass (fig. 30). Joselit goes on to suggest that “Network of
Stoppages is structured as an agonistic and gendered form of semiosis in which a
feminine body is submitted to a masculine graph” (9-18).127
There are two splits, or alternate routes that eventually rejoin, and there are
multiple off shoots, which end in their own unique stops. The lines shapes are
actually made from the curved meter measure templates created from the way lines of
the 3 Standard Stoppages. The painting Network of Stoppages uses each of the
stoppages three times to describe the nine channel-like lines which touch and join
together into a two-dimensional pattern suggestive of circuitry, but which actually are
the “capillary tubes” of The Large Glass. The black lines with white shadow or
seemingly illuminated capillary tubes appear, one might assert, to be aura-like visual
expressions of search and stoppage. Thus, in addition to the numerous visual
stoppages, there is a sense of alterity, of chance and of choice in this visual network.
Invisibility comes into play when one considers how Duchamp made this work,
which is directly related to his 3 Standard Stoppages.
As is often the case with Duchamp, irony extends even to sequential
relationships between individual pieces; if Network of Stoppages is “his only
thoroughly abstract painting” (Masbeck 16), its source, so to speak, 3 Standard
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Stoppages, is “a monument in Duchamp’s development of an aesthetic of chance”
(16).

Fig. 27. Marcel Duchamp. 3 Standard Stoppages. Paris 1913-14.
Wood box 11 1/8 x 50 7/8 x 9" with three threads 39 3/8", glued to three
painted canvas strips 5 1/4 x 47 1/4" each mounted on
a glass panel 7 1/4 x 49 3/8 x 1/4", three wood slats 2 1/2 x 43 x 1/8" (6.2 x
109.2 x 0.2 cm), shaped along one edge to match the curves of the threads.
Museum of Modern Art, New York.

Fig. 28. Marcel Duchamp. 3 Standard Stoppages. Paris 1913-14.
Secondary Images
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Duchamp considered 3 Standard Stoppages a breakthrough moment in 1913:
That was really when I tapped the mainspring of my future. In itself it
was not an important work of art, but for me it opened the way—the
way to escape from those traditional methods of expression long
associated with art. I didn’t realize at the time exactly what I had
stumbled on. When you tap something, you don’t always recognize the
sound. That’s apt to come later. For me the Three Stoppages was a
first gesture liberating me from the past” (Kuh, The Artist’s Voice, 81).
3 Standard Stoppages, although not a readymade, does vividly demonstrate
the role of chance in Duchamp’s work, albeit chance that is combined with precision,
or as he described it in one of his dialogues with Pierre Cabanne, he had “canned
chance” (47).
Parkinson also notes that Duchamp intended 3 Standard Stoppages as a play
upon the rigidity of officially imposed standards of measure and the connotation of
“mend invisibly” in the word stoppage, “so that it can be said he is (a)mending with
thread the unit of length imposed upon us legally and scientifically” (114-115). That
Duchamp used three works, a painting and two drawings, to make Network of
Stoppages itself attests to his use of alterity:
Network of Stoppages consists of three superimposed works, whose
connections with each other may not be purely fortuitous. The earliest
is an enlarged, unfinished version of Young Man and Girl in Spring
probably dating from 1911. Its sides were then painted over with black
bands to produce the dimensions of The Large Glass, in which he
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drew a half-scale plan, consisted largely of measurements. The
uppermost layer is the ‘network of stoppage’ itself, almost certain
undertaken in 1914. Chance, then, in the guise of the 3 Standard
Stoppages, equipped Duchamp with drawing instrument for The Large
Glass (Ades, Marcel Duchamp, 81).

Fig. 29. Young Man and Girl in Spring, oil on canvas 1911
While this study is not a study per se of Marcel Duchamp’s work, it should be
noted that elements in both 3 Standard Stoppages and Network of Stoppages are
intricately involved in other works by the artist, including his The Bride Stripped
Bare by Her Bachelors, Even, (The Large Glass) (fig. 30). That Duchamp merged
the two drawings for his Large Glass with the 1911 Young Man and Girl in Spring
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speaks to the relevance of that work as a reflection of what occurred in Duchamp’s
artistic process both before and after 3 Standard Stoppages. For Network of
Stoppages Duchamp rotated Young Man and Girl in Spring and incorporated the two

Fig. 30. Marcel Duchamp, The Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors, Even
(The Large Glass), 1915-23 . Oil, varnish, lead foil, lead wire, and dust on two
glass panels. 9 ‘ 1 1/4 “ x 69 1/4 “.Philadelphia Museum of Art.
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drawings for The Large Glass. This incorporation reflects a sensibility that is related
to invisibility as well, since one must look closely at Network of Stoppages (fig. 25, p.
176) to even see the three works made into one.
Another point is that Network of Stoppages can be read cartographically not
only temporally as a record of the “past” 3 Standard Stoppages and the “future” The
Large Glass, but also as a visual work representative of Duchamp’s modernist cubist
root that he abandoned and the postmodernist and conceptualist work that would be
described as “readymades.” In that sense, Duchamp’s Network of Stoppages is a
statement of a transition in the history of modern art, which might be described as a
record or primary example of the transition from modernism to postmodernism.
Taking this orientation to Duchamp’s work as a dynamic of that modernist-topostmodernist transition farther and relevant to the present thematic context, it was
Duchamp’s search that fueled that dynamic. To say that, for example, The Large
Glass is an example of conceptual art, or was an idea made into art, is not entirely
accurate since Duchamp was seeking, among other purposes, to move beyond art:
Pierre Cabanne: “Several interpretations of The Large Glass have
been given. What is yours?”
Marcel Duchamp: I don’t have any, because I made it without an
idea. There were things that came along as I worked. The idea of the
ensemble was purely and simply the execution, more than descriptions
of each part in the manner of the catalogue of “Armed de SaintEtienne” [a sort of French “Sears, Roebuck”]. It was a renunciation of
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all aesthetics, in the ordinary sense of the world...not just another
manifesto of new painting (Cabanne 42).
Ultimately even androgyny, another manifestation of his attraction to alterity
and chance, remained insufficient for Duchamp, primarily because of his intention to
leave art behind in the wave of his art-making:
They [androgyny and chance] remained gestures...Duchamp came to
resemble a religious figure, a visionary, an ecstatic, a shaman. In any
case, he was well aware of how close the artistic and the religious
experiences were to each other. At the same time he argued against all
religious systems, and against the Christian system in particular, and
this was done in the same spirit in which he attempted to keep his
activities from being classified as “aesthetic”, that is, classified with
the established system of art. He was interested in something more
original. He spoke of himself as an “anartist” and at the same time, of
the “parareligious” nature of artistic experience. Both expressed his
conviction that mere immanence, mere dependence on an existence
enclosed in the given world, was not enough. As far as Duchamp was
concerned, therefore, art should be more like a religious act than the
manifestation of a skill. It had to have some relationship to the
transcendent dimension of existence” (Chalupecky 133).
Admittedly, that statement is an interpretation of Duchamp, as is this
Duchampian section of the present study. Nonetheless, including Duchamp is
necessary and valid in order to interpret Duchamp’s art and art-making as an example
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not only of straddling the divide between modernism and postmodernism, but also as
an example of seeking the numinous. Duchamp’s oblique and ironic approach to his
art does not annul that seeking impulse, although obviously it complicates and
camouflages it.
This consideration of Duchamp leads to a consideration especially of Borges’s
work, since he too was a master of complication and camouflage.
The Numinous and the Irreal Fabulism of Varo and Borges
Now that the widespread impulse towards and sensibility to the numinous in
modernism and postmodernism has been noted, how is this applied to the work of
Varo and Borges? With these two artists another layer of complexity surfaces. That
distinction might be distilled down to the word narrative, or in essence, storytelling.
Varo and Borges are working in irrealism and fabulism. Their art is not ineffable or
abstract (although one could argue that in some respects their work is ineffable
because it is irreal).
There are floods of recognizable elements, albeit presented in a wide variety
of appearances. While one might argue that irrealism is a form of abstraction, it is not
abstract in the sense of modernist abstract art that seeks to express the numinous.
Non-objective abstract art is a visual rendering of the ineffable qualities of abstraction.
Irrealism is related to surrealistic abstraction, yet that it is not purely surrealistic has
been discussed in the introduction. However, the irreal fabulism of Varo and Borges
is very much about the rupture of so-called reality, wonder, that opens onto the
mutable, dynamic, and seemingly invisible territory of the numinous. Part of the
argument here is that the fabulist art of Varo and Borges represents a version of
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seeking and locating the numinous that is more humanly oriented than non-objective
abstract art. Memory, fantasy, image consciousness, and the dynamic energies of
subjectivity as described in the previous chapter, all have salient functions in the art
of Varo and Borges, as will be fully disclosed and elucidated in Chapter 6—Art as
Life—Varo and Borges as Artist-Philosophers. Until then, the next chapter on
aesthetic thinkers and intertextuality will provide the general groundwork for the
conjunction of philosophy and art that becomes evident in the artist-philosopher.
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Chapter Five—Philosophico: An Intertexual Orientation to Aesthetic Thinkers
The work of several thinkers remains central to the thematic territory of
understanding the roles of wonder, the numinous, and image consciousness in Varo
and Borges’s fabulist art, including the writings of Edmund Husserl, Arthur
Schopenhauer, Rudolf Otto, all of whom were influenced to some extent by
Immanuel Kant and Plato. While Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, examined
in the opening chapter, forms the central methodological means for investigating art
and art theories, this chapter brings other philosophical concepts to the forefront,
especially the concepts in Arthur Schopenhauer’s aesthetic philosophy. Two other
figures whose work serve an elucidation of Borges and Varo are Mikhail Bakhtin and
Georges Bataille.
Schopenhauer
Schopenhauer’s work combines well with other features here. As mentioned
earlier, Borges made clear over his lifetime that Schopenhauer was, for Borges
himself, the consummate philosopher. Other points are that Schopenhauer does
acknowledge the role of wonder in philosophy and art, and his aesthetic reflects a
global orientation that can mitigate the limitations of Eurocentric, scientific
materialist, and Christian-Judaic exclusivity in thought and art. An additional positive
feature is that Schopenhauer's writing style is for the most part clear and accessible. It
is interesting to note that as a teenager, he spent some time in a boarding school in
England, where he learned to fluently speak and write English, which influenced his
writing style thereafter.128 The challenge in working with Schopenhauer’s writings
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have less to do with his writing style and more to do with the occasional ambiguous
and contradictory aspects of some of his concepts. Nonetheless, Schopenhauer’s
philosophy of art is, thematically speaking, an appertaining and necessary element for
this dissertation.
Schopenhauer and Art
The predominant point about Schopenhauer is that art is of seminal
importance in his thought. His emphatically positive assessment of artistic genius,
and the positive and liberating role he assigns to art in a world dominated by the
highly negative aftereffects of the will and its selfish, survivalist self-fulfillment have
greatly influenced musicians, writers, and artists, from Wagner to Beckett (Jacquette
“Schopenhauer’s Metaphysics” 1).129 In regards to art scholarship, modernist,
postmodernist and contemporary thinkers and artists have studied Schopenhauer’s
aesthetic philosophy and found it relevant to understanding the uniquely important
role of art in the world. While discussing Schopenhauer’s influence on nineteenth and
twentieth century traditions, for example, Dale Jacquette points to the relevance of
Schopenhauer for understanding modern and contemporary art and philosophy:
With its roots firmly embedded in a particular interpretation of Plato,
Kant, and Asian philosophy, Schopenhauer’s theory sheds light on
these important intellectual and mystical religious traditions. Through
its diffusion into the history of post-nineteenth-century art, especially
idealism, symbolism, romanticism, and certain phrases of naturalism
and gothic and neoclassical rivals, Schopenhauer’s aesthetics provides
the philosophical subtext for major artistic moments, as it does for
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particular psychological and philosophical developments. It is
consequently no exaggeration to say that Schopenhauer’s aesthetics is
central to understanding the history of modern and contemporary art
and philosophy of art (Jacquette, “Schopenhauer’s Metaphysics” 31).
Jacquette’s assertion that Schopenhauer’s aesthetic is key to understanding
modern art and contemporary art, especially for providing, as stated above, “the
philosophical subtext for major artistic moments,” signals the purposes of this
chapter. The primary elements of a Schopenhauerian philosophy of art serve an
explication of the thematic features of this study—wonder, the numinous, image
consciousness—while also elucidating the broader implications of conceiving an
intertexual philosophico-phenomenological orientation. It is important to consider
how in the present context a Schopenhauerian aesthetic includes both metaphysical
and phenomenological facets, as well as issues about how the contemplation of art
and self-forgetting are related to subject and object. Beauty and a Schopenhauerian
version of the numinous are key components to Schopenhauer’s philosophy of art,
although that issue may be more frequently described in other studies as beauty and
sublimity. Nonetheless, and as discussed in Chapter Three, the numinous and the
sublime are so closely related as to be considered, at times, synonymous, and this
subtopic needs to be revisited specifically in Schopenhauer’s work.
A part of Schopenhauer’s intense interest in the arts might be traced to the
interest in all the arts that his parents passed to him. Besides an emphasis on
education and reading, his parents took Arthur to art galleries, museums, theaters, and
other artistic venues all over Europe (Cartwright lii). As an adult, Schopenhauer
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continued these interests, including playing the flute daily for an hour as a break from
reading and writing.

Fig. 31. Arthur Schopenhauer 1788-1860
3 September 1852, Schopenhauer Archiv,
Stadtund Universitätsbibliothek, Frankfurt am Main
Schopenhauer’s “Better Consciousness”
Schopenhauer’s aesthetic philosophy cannot be separated from his general,
metaphysically oriented philosophy, which includes a passionate interest in
consciousness:
Adapting the thought of both Plato and Kant, he had become
convinced that there was a split between ordinary consciousness and a
higher or “better” state in which the human mind could pierce beyond
mere appearances to knowledge of something more real. The thought
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had aesthetic and religious overtones: Schopenhauer wrote of both the
artist and the “saint” as possessing this “better consciousness”—
though it should be said straightaway that his philosophical system is
atheist through and through. He also struck one of the keynotes of
pessimism, saying that the life of ordinary experience, in which we
strive and desire and suffer, is something from which to be liberated.
Such thoughts were well established in Schopenhauer’s mind by 1813
(Janaway, Schopenhauer, 6).
Although Schopenhauer did not describe his work “in any of the books that he
prepared for publication” (Cartwright 125) as being pessimistic,130 the notoriety of his
pessimism (Cartwright xl), when combined with his well-known anti-religious
opinions and his rejection of the idea of an absolute (1) might seem to preclude any
relevance to a study that emphasizes numinous sensibility. However, Schopenhauer’s
writings about art are relevant to this study for the several reasons mentioned, and not
simply because his extensive writings about the significance of art have influenced
artists. Schopenhauer considered philosophy and art to be two means of resolving the
same issue—existence, as when he wrote, “Not only philosophy but the fine arts too
are fundamentally working toward solving the problem of existence” The World as
Will and Presentation II, 459).
Thus it is necessary to ask, what is Schopenhauer’s general philosophy
regarding the issue of existence? Beginning with his 1813 University of Jena doctoral
dissertation, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Ground: A
Philosophical Treatise (Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden
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Grunde: Eine philosphische Abhandlung), Schopenhauer examines perceptual versus
abstract presentations of objects in the world, and how we daily experience the world
as an object.131 The first three versions of objective presentation are material objects,
structures of space and time, and abstract concepts. Later, a fourth concept of an
“inner” relation that is psychological in nature is also examined.
Schopenhauer’s 1819 magnum opus, The World as Will and Presentation
(henceforth WWP I)132 is comprised of four large sections called books. In summary,
Book One argues that the world is presentation; Book Two argues that the world must
necessarily be viewed as will, which via desire and seeking, is the source of the
world’s suffering, and to which all individuals, being caught up in the unrelenting
force of the will, are enslaved; Book Three argues that aesthetic contemplation that
allows a forgetting and loosening of separative self-identification eliminates willing
in that individual, thus at least temporarily lifting the person out of suffering and
enslavement to the will; and Book Four argues that another way of eliminating will in
the individual is through denial of the will, essentially through an ascetic orientation
(Janaway, Schopenhauer, 28-29).133 Schopenhauer argues that the daily experience
of the world is an interactive subject/object dynamic—no object without a subject,
and vice versa, no subject without an object. It has been noted that “for
Schopenhauer, subjects and objects are thus of different, though complementary,
metaphysical kinds” (Wicks 35). Thus it is necessary in this chapter to compare
Schopenhauerian and Husserlian distinctions in regards to subjectivity, and the
encountering and engaging of the art object.
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Vorstellung as “Presentation” in a Philosophico-Phenomenological Orientation
An initial translation issue must be addressed before discussing
Schopenhauer’s writings in more detail—namely, why in this study the English word
“presentation” is used for the German Vorstellung. In the first volume of
Schopenhauer’s WWP, his opening sentence, Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung, usually
translated as “The world is my representation” (Schopenhauer, Payne, 3), points to an
inherent translation challenge (Schopenhauer, Aquila xii). Among the words in that
first sentence, Vorstellung has been translated into several different English words in
translations of Schopenhauer’s writing, including representation, idea, and
presentation, with “representation” being the most widely acknowledged English
noun for Vorstellung, partly because of the widespread use of the 1958 Payne
translation (Schopenhauer, Payne).134 “Idea” has also been used for Vorstellung,
albeit less universally.135
This study uses the word “presentation” based on the 2008 Aquila and Carus
translation (Schopenhauer, Aquila) for several reasons, even though translating
Vorstellung as presentation may seem too literal. As Aquila states, “Etymologically,
Vorstellung connotes placement in a position (Stellung) before (vor) or as present to
someone” (xii). “Presentation” (along with “givenness” and “intentionality” and other
concepts) was a key idea in the first chapter about the methodology fueling Husserl’s
transcendental phenomenology. Thus using Vorstellung in the sense of presentation
rather than as idea or representation is one means of strengthening a necessary bridge
across any Husserlian-Schopenhauerian divide within the philosophicophenomenological orientation to this treatise.
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The translation of Vorstellung as representation is a Kantian rendering of
Vorstellung, but this is neither a study of the Kantian aesthetic per se nor is this
exclusively a Schopenhauerian-Husserlian dynamic. However, understanding
Vorstellung as presentation allows a rudimentary combining of some common
concepts pivoting around perception and image consciousness.
Interwoven Phenomenological and Metaphysical Strands
A few phenomenologically accentuated strands of both Schopenhauer’s
general philosophy and his aesthetic philosophy parallel and merge with Husserl’s
transcendental phenomenology. Presentation as givenness—something is given in
consciousness—is a fundamental phenomenological understanding. While Aquila
does not present Schopenhauerian presentation as a phenomenological concept, his
description of Schopenhauer’s use of Vorstellung is not radically different from
Husserl’s use:
In any event, as suggested, the case for “presentation” goes hand in
hand with the need to avoid the sense of possession generally attaching
to possessive pronouns. More positively, the point is to promote what
we take to be the central intention in Schopenhauer’s use of the term:
not possession by, but presentation of objects to, a cognizant subject
(xii-xiii).
A “presentation of objects to” above could easily be described as being given
to consciousness, and Aquila’s point about avoiding the sense of possession signals
how the topic of subjectivity has been philosophically explicated in a variety of ways.
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Another approach Aquila recommends is to understand Schopenhauer’s use of
the subject as a kind of witness or spectator, and presentation as a theatrical
phenomenon:
With respect to this central sense, it may also be useful to note that the
term Vorstellung is commonly used to refer to theatrical presentations.
Several times, Schopenhauer in fact calls the side of the world that he
calls meine Vorstellung a Schauspiel, or a “show” (or “play”): a show
that is “mine” in the sense that I am its spectator. But as it turns out, it
is also mine in another sense. Just as with the corresponding English
term, Vorstellung can refer either to what is presented or to the
processor action of presenting it (xiii).136
On a humorous note, this sounds appropriate enough given Schopenhauer’s
proclivity for human (and often contrarian) showmanship. While Schopenhauer’s
aesthetic philosophy contributes to the philosophico side of the study, and Husserl’s
transcendental phenomenological methodology contributes to the phenomenological
side, there are also inverted and reversed approaches, as when Schopenhauer becomes
somewhat phenomenological in his writings about vision or the object, or when
Husserl discusses a philosophy of art topic that is more philosophical or metaphysical
than it is phenomenological. Husserl, for example, sometimes discusses existential
factors, and Schopenhauer discusses the significance and ramifications of perceptual
mechanics and consciousness that do at times sound very similar to what one finds in
key phenomenologists such as Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, and Heidegger.
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Schopenhauer actually assigns a more far-reaching meaning and function to
art than Husserl. In spite of that, an advantage of referencing the writings of both
Schopenhauer and Husserl is that both thinkers considered the aesthetics of visual art
within a larger context of perception that includes the seeing of all “things.”
The Central Role of Intuitive Perception: Anschauung
In a broader Schopenhauerian and Husserlian thematic territory, topics like
diversity and unity, the plasticity of visual mechanics, and classical aesthetic topics
like the essence of beauty and the role of spontaneity can be considered. In a
statement that serendipitously summons up Husserl’s epochē, Schopenhauer writes:
In order to see that a purely objective and therefore accurate
apprehension of things is only possible when we consider them
without all personal involvement, thus under complete silencing of the
will, we might call to mind how much every emotion or passion
obscures and falsifies cognizance, indeed how every inclination or
disinclination warps, colors, distorts—no, not merely, e.g., judgment—
even the original perception of things (Schopenhauer, WWP II, 422423).137
In other words, the natural attitude needs to be bracketed out. Also, in his
consideration of vision and intuitive perception, Schopenhauer argues for a
knowledge he calls “pure understanding,” an essential argument worth reviewing in
detail:
All intuitive perception [Anschauung] is intellectual. For without
understanding we could never arrive at intuitive perception,
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observation, and apprehension of objects; rather, all would remain
mere sensation, which could have at most a meaning in reference to
the will as pain or comfort, but otherwise would be succession of
states devoid of meaning and nothing resembling knowledge. Intuitive
perception, that is, knowledge of an object, comes about first of all
because the understanding refers every impression the body receives
to its cause. It shifts this cause into the a priori intuitively perceived
space—to the point from which the effect originates—and thus
recognizes the cause as acting, or actual, that is, as a representation
[presentation] of the same kind and class as the body. However, this
transition from the effect to the cause is a direct, vivid, and necessary
one, because it is knowledge of the pure understanding, not a rational
conclusion, not a combination of concepts and judgements according
to logical laws. The latter is instead the business of the faculty of
reason, which contributes nothing to intuitive perception, and whose
object is an entirely different class of representations [presentations]
which on earth belongs solely to the human race—namely the abstract,
not intuitively perceivable representations [presentations], that is,
concepts (Schopenhauer, On Vision, 48).
Schopenhauer’s commitment to reason is important because he disallows, for
the most part, any resort to supernatural or magical solutions that circumvent
applications of conceptual thinking. While supernatural and magical elements in Varo
and Borges’s work, or at least elements assigned in their work as supernatural or
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magical descriptions or roles, do occur and must be acknowledged rather than ignored
or avoided, it is important to permit intellectually accessible handholds, so to speak,
to those elements to whatever degree that is possible. As noted earlier, any topic
rooted in belief rather than experience is axiomatically rendered self-enclosed and
invulnerable to investigation. Belief systems—scientific, religious, or philosophical—
have little if any scholarly value here.
Generally, Schopenhauer used Anschauung to refer to “our apprehension of
empirical objects, that is spatio-temporal particulars that stand in causal relations to
others, like objects” (Cartwright 88). Schopenhauer also argued, contrary to Kant,
that intuition requires no thinking or discursive thought (Cartwright 88). Nonetheless,
“All intuitive perception [Anschauung] is intellectual” (Schopenhauer, On Vision,
48). When Schopenhauer explains that understanding is a precursor to “intuitive
perception, observation, and apprehension of objects” (48), and that without
intellectual understanding, there would be only sensation, which, while it could act as
a reference to “will or pain or comfort” (48), could not lead to meaning or knowledge,
the reader (whether agreeing or not with Schopenhauer’s arguments and concepts)
receives a sense of the depth of Schopenhauer’s thought about perception and the
world.
What also surfaces is evidence of Schopenhauer’s ambivalence, or at least his
equivocal assessment of the role of intuition. On the one hand, intuition is a
nondiscursive experience that underlies the phenomenon of reason creating abstract
concepts, or as Cartwright states it, “Schopenhauer argued that intuition requires no
thinking or discursive thought” (Cartwright 88-89), and yet, “all intuition is
208

intellectual” (88). Thus what role, if any, does not knowing or unknowing serve in
Schopenhauerian philosophy? Is the sudden and initial experience of wonder a
thinking experience for Schopenhauer? Does he even acknowledge wonder and the
numinous? For Schopenhauer, the answers lie in part with the influence Plato and
Kant had on his theories.
Influences on Schopenhauer’s Aesthetic: Plato and Kant
Schopenhauer, Husserl, and Otto were all influenced, albeit each in somewhat
different ways, by Kant and Plato. The influences on Otto’s thought were discussed in
the chapter on the numinous, but Schopenhauer and Husserl’s respective combining
of Kantian transcendental idealism and Platonic ideals or essences points to one of
several contextual elements that contribute to the philosophico-phenomenological
emphasis of this study. The three major influences on Schopenhauer’s philosophy of
art—Plato, Kant, and Asian philosophy and spirituality are acknowledged by him and
by Schopenhauerian scholars. Still, Schopenhauer’s references to and uses of the
philosophies of Plato and Kant are so interwoven that it is more accurate, at least at
times, to explicate them as a single (albeit multi-faceted) topic.
While a student, Schopenhauer’s first philosophy professor, G.E. Schulze at
the University of Göttingen, recommended that he study Plato and Kant, the two
philosophers Schopenhauer came to regard as the greatest in the Western
philosophical tradition (Cartwright 131). In WWP I, translator Aquila added subtitles
to each section of the book, which are useful signposts pointing to key steps in
Schopenhauer’s argument throughout the “Third Book” of WWP I. Thus in § 30, the
translator subtitle “Levels of Objectification of Will as Platonic Ideas” (211) helps to
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clarify more succinctly Schopenhauer’s own subtitle for his “Third Book:
Presentation Independent of the Principle of Sufficient Ground: The Platonic Idea:
The Object of Art.”
Explicating the Third Book requires a familiarity with the theme of
Schopenhauer’s dissertation, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient
Ground: A Philosophical Treatise (Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom
zureichenden Grunde: Eine philosphische Abhandlung) (WWP I, 11). In the
introduction to that book,138 Schopenhauer acknowledges some principles from Plato
and Kant that he is using in his own argument:
The divine Plato and the marvelous Kant unite their firm and
impressive voices in recommending a rule for the method of all
philosophizing, indeed of knowledge in general. We should comply
with two laws, they say, namely with those of homogeneity and
specification; they should be equally observed, neither to the detriment
of the other. The law of homogeneity tells us to start with kinds by
observing the similarities and agreements in things, and also to unite
these kinds into species, and these again into genera until we
ultimately arrive at the highest concept that embraces everything (1).
Homogeneity and specification appear to be more of an organizational
resource than an explicating principle. The Principle of Sufficient Ground, on the
other hand, accounts for the appearance of individuals. However, in WWP I,
Schopenhauer describes the world as an object for a subject and discusses how the
will alone is beyond presentation, and that our cognizance of this fact leads to an
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“objectivization of will, both in its entirety and in its parts” (211). Ideas, moreover,
are not covered by The Principle of Sufficient Ground (212). Understanding what
Schopenhauer means by individuation is key here. He refers to space and time as the
principium inviduationis,139 or the principle of individuation. In Book One of WWP I,
he considers presentation as it appears in time and space, whereas Book Three has
another orientation—presentation as it appears independently of space and time, and
this points to the significance of Schopenhauer’s use of the timeless Platonic Ideas
(Wicks 82). Regarding the similarities between Platonic ideas and Kant’s thing-initself, the latter, Schopenhauer asserts, is an “obscure and paradoxical doctrine” that
is “the weak side of his [Kant’s] philosophy” (212).
Schopenhauer notes that both Plato and Kant’s philosophies emphasize that
the ordinary world, the world of objects in space and time, is not the true world
(Wicks 83). Plato describes the true world as one of Ideas, while Kant calls it the
thing-in-itself, a difference that allows Schopenhauer to delineate the two-fold nature
of the Will—its permanent Platonic Ideas beyond space and time and the temporal
and perishable thing-in-itself. According to Kant, no experience or insight is possible
with the thing-in-itself; it is forever unknowable. Schopenhauer differs from Kant
here, saying that an intuitive reception of the timeless dimension is possible (Wicks
84). In his explication of the Kantian thing-in-itself and the eternal Platonic Idea,
Schopenhauer considers modes of cognition, and an enhanced presentation of
Platonic ideas through art:
What mode of cognition, however, is concerned with that aspect of the
world that is alone truly essential, standing beyond and independent of
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all relation—the true content of its phenomena—that which is subject
to no change and thus for all time cognized with equal truth, in a word:
the Ideas that are the immediate and adequate objectivization of the
thing-in-itself, of will? —It is art, the work of genius. It replicates the
eternal Ideas that are apprehended through pure contemplation, that
which is essential and enduring in all the world’s phenomena, and
depending on the material in which it replicates them, it is plastic or
pictorial art, poetry, or music. Its single origin is cognizance of Ideas,
its single goal communication of this cognizance (WWP I, 228).
Schopenhauer goes on to note that unlike science, which is always moving
towards “something else” without ever reaching an ultimate goal, “art, to the
contrary, is always at its goal” (WWP I, 228). Although not every single concept
within Schopenhauer’s thought will require explication in this chapter, some concepts
do require some specific elucidation as to their Schopenhauerian meanings. One of
his strongest contributions to western thought is that of the world as will (Wille).
The Will (Der Wille)
Aquila points out in the translator’s introduction in WWP I that for
Schopenhauer Der Wille is what the world is in its innermost essence or “in itself”
(WWI xxiv). While his work with the will is most elaborated and central to his work
in The World as Will and Presentation, Schopenhauer also considered the role of the
will earlier in On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.
According to Schopenhauer, all knowledge inevitably presupposes subject and
object. Thus self-consciousness is not absolutely simple, but, like our consciousness
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of things (i.e., the faculty of intuitive perception), is divided into a known and a
knower. Now here the known appears absolutely and exclusively as will:
Accordingly, the subject knows itself only as a willer, not as a knower.
For the ego that represents [presents], thus the subject of knowing, can
itself never become representation [presentation] or object, since, as
the necessary correlative of all representations [presentations], it is
their condition. On the contrary, the fine passage from the sacred
Upanishad applied: “It is not to be seen; it sees everything; it is not to
be heard: it hears everything; it is not to be known: it knows
everything; and it is not to be recognized: it recognizes everything.
Besides this seeing, knowing, hearing, and recognizing entity there is
no other” (Schopenhauer, Fourfold, 208).140
Thus in the present context, the “recognizing entity” Schopenhauer is
describing is the invisible numinous being recognized via a sensibility to the
numinous. In general, one can only have a sensibility to the numinous because of it
ineffable, or mysterious quality. But there is far more to this if one travels completely
down a Schopenhauerian path. The world to Schopenhauer is both will and
presentation. The will is the a posteriori essence of the empirical world; thus in a
basic Schopenhauerian sense, everything is will, including the thing-in-itself (Dingan-sich). If there is a oneness or a prior unity to Schopenhauer’s thought, it is present
as will in nature and in each person, but not in the sense of plurality; i.e., the will is
not restricted to or within space and time, nor is it related to the principium
individuationis, which is to say that the will is not related to individuation. In fact,
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Schopenhauer describes the will as being free and transcendental, not having anything
to do with presentation. Presentation to Schopenhauer is simply a reflection of the
will. What additional vicissitudes of the will are utilized in Schopenhauer’s thought?
He uses the phrases “affirmation of the will” (Die Bejahung des Willens) and “denial
of the will” (Die Verneinung des Willens) to designate, in the former, how everything
in the world is an objectification of the will, and thus an affirmation of the will. The
affirmation of the will has also been referenced by Schopenhauer as the will to live
(Wille zum Leben) (Cartwright 182). The most potent manifestation of the affirmation
of the will is the sex drive, the urge to reproduce.
The denial of the will (Die Verneinung des Willens), on the other hand, is
ultimately a positive phenomenon. Schopenhauer argued that cognition (Erkenntnis)
is what is occurring within every living thing:
All animals, human and nonhuman, have nonrational cognitions of the
external world, Schopenhauer argued, but only humans have the
faculty of reason, and thus, he held that only humans have the capacity
to have abstract representations [presentations] of concepts.
Consequently he held that only humans are capable of rational,
discursive thought while nonhuman animals are capable of only
perception (Cartwright 28).
The denial of will expressed through cognition or intellectual awareness leads
to a liberating kind of rebirth (Cartwright 183). This liberating dynamic is without a
subject and object interplay, and it cannot be thought or known in the usual sense of
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knowledge. However, one can have a sensibility to what Schopenhauer calls the
denial of the will.
The Central Conundrum
Is Schopenhauer’s transition from the denial of the will to a liberating
reorientation an example of a “belief” system because it is invulnerable to thought?
This question points to more than a Schopenhauerian conundrum, which in fact does
exist in that this question is, at least at times, the central conundrum of the entire
study.
Again in Varo’s words, the intention herein is to communicate the
incommunicable. But what does that mean? Besides being a puzzling statement
connected to a pun, other wordplay, or paradox, a conundrum is, in this context, “Any
puzzling question or problem; an enigmatical statement” (“conundrum, n.” 4.b.). In a
philosophical context that is stressing the elucidation of concepts over language per
se, how does one address an inherently contradictory concept or action wherein the
invisible becomes visible or the logically nonsensical statement is made
comprehensive?
In this study, the answer is simultaneously straightforward and complex. The
conundrum is solved, answered and clarified through artistic work. “Art” is the
primary answer in the present context. As already discussed in the two chapters on
the numinous and the artistic seeking of the numinous, outside of new age
declarations and theological approaches, artists have been society’s forward wave of
seekers attempting to communicate the incommunicable. While this is not an
exclusivity in the sense of art being the only means to investigate and communicate
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knowledge, other activities like scientific research, behavioral psychology or
psychoanalysis, study of language, and other activities, art does not require words,
although in word and image studies, storytelling as literary art, and even various
languages of storytelling themselves address that non-requirement. One needs to be
aware that Borges, in fact, is a master—via his fabulist irrealism, of playing with
words and language. In fact humor can always be heard, metaphorically speaking,
rustling around and clearing its throat just outside the door in the work of both Borges
and Varo.
This will be addressed in more detail in the next and final chapter on Varo and
Borges as artist-philosophers. In the meantime, Schopenhauer argues that what one
can be liberated from the suffering of the will and survivalist self-identification, as he
emphasizes in a chapter of WWP II titled “On Death and Its Relation to Our Essence
in Itself.” This is quoted at length because it gives a sense of this conundrum and
what some readers may consider to be contradictory about Schopenhauer’s thought in
regards to subjectivity and transcendence:
During one’s lifetime a person’s will is without freedom: on the basis
of his inalterable character, his action proceeds necessarily along the
chain of motives. But now everyone carries within his memory a great
number of things that he has done and with regard to which he is not
satisfied with himself. If he then goes on living, he would, by virtue of
the inalterability of character, also go on forevermore acting in the
same manner. Accordingly, he must cease to be what he is, in order to
be able to emerge from the seed of his essence as a new and different
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being. Therefore death loosens those bonds: the will becomes free
again, for freedom lies in esse, not in operari [‘in being, not in
doing”]: Finditur nodus cordis, dissolvuntur omnes dubitationes,
ejusque opera evanescunt [“The heart’s knot is cloven, all doubts are
dissolved, its works pass away”: from the Mundaka-Upanishad 2,2,8]
is a very famous saying of the Veda, which all followers of the Veda
often repeat. Dying is the moment of that liberation from the onesidedness of an individuality that does not constitute the inner most
core of our essence, rather is to be thought of as a kind of aberration
from it; true original freedom returns at this moment, which, in the
sense that has been stated, can be regarded as a restitutio in integrum
[“restoration to original condition” (expression from Roman law)]
(WWP II, 567).
Reading this passage, one is also struck by Schopenhauer’s profoundly
positive attraction to Indian spirituality. The liberating death described by
Schopenhauer may simply seem like bodily extinction, but Schopenhauer places the
phenomenon in a spiritual context, one that buffers or detoxifies the nihilist
connotation that often surfaces with the topic. Nonetheless, a question also arises. Is
there no way to be liberated from the will except through death? As mentioned
previously, according to Schopenhauer there are two ways to transcend the bondage
of the will while alive: asceticism and art. The latter is the one of primary significance
in this study.
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Schopenhauer’s Freedom from the Will in the Contemplation of Art
The contemplation of art is germane to Schopenhauer’s consideration of
liberation from will, and the making and contemplating of art is a means in this study
to use the hinge or disruption of wonder to access the numinous gate. In that
circumstance, the invisible numinous becomes to some extent visible, and the
incommunicable suddenly become communicable.
Arguing that the world is will and presentation, and that even the thing-initself is the will, and that consequently the world is a place of intense suffering and
conflict and death because of the universal predominance of the will, Schopenhauer
begins to examine subject-object presentations that are not affected by the principle of
sufficient reason (Satz vom zureichenden Grund), which he proposed was not
applicable to the thing-in-itself, but was a priori applicable to all the possible objects
of cognition, which are presentations (Cartwright 138-139).
Art, the object of contemplation, remains as an apparently individual thing
outside of time, butt in the case of a work of art, it is “only that which is essential, the
Idea, is an object for it” (WWP I, 228). Wicks notes that Plato’s Allegory of the Cave
inspires Schopenhauer’s “aesthetics in general, and in particular, his understanding of
aesthetic perception, artistic genius, and the nature of art” (90). Schopenhauer goes on
to describe art as “that way of regarding things which is independent of the Principle
of Sufficient Ground” (WWP I, 229). For Schopenhauer, since the Principle of
Sufficient Ground is rational in character and helpful in practical life and science,
“that which turns away from the Principle of Sufficient Ground is the genius’s way of
regarding things, which is applicable and helpful only in art” (WWP I, 229). He
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describes the essence of genius as a capacity for pure contemplation, “entirely
absorbed in its object” (WWP I, 229). For Schopenhauer, only through the pure
contemplation of the artistic genius are Ideas apprehended:
Accordingly, genius is the capacity for maintaining a purely perceptual
state, for losing oneself in perception, and for withdrawing cognizance
from service of the will that it existed originally but to serve, i.e.,
entirely losing sight of one’s interest, one’s willing, one’s purposes,
and thus getting utterly outside one’s own personality for a time, so as
to remain as purely cognizant subject, clear eye of the world (WWP I,
229).
Like Kant’s aesthetic methodology, Schopenhauer’s aesthetic stresses the
subjective experience of art instead of the qualities of the object, but unlike Kant,
Schopenhauer has the subject undergo an aesthetic experience of wonder, unknowing,
and self-forgetting rather than a Kantian judgment.
Whether or not one completely agrees with Schopenhauer—and there are
reasons to question his philosophy of art—in the present investigation the
contemplation of art is an essential element, playing a role in all of its primary
features: wonder, the numinous, and image consciousness. However, the element of
artistic genius as a mandatory means to liberation through art is not necessarily valid.
The contemplation of art is not restricted to the idea of genius in the present study.
One does not have to be a genius to perceive, contemplate, meditate, enact, or create
art, nor does one have to be a genius to experience wonder and a sensibility to the
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numinous. In fact, the use of the word genius may itself be a presupposition that
requires bracketing.
The earliest meaning of the word contemplation is a religious one, which the
Oxford English Dictionary describes as “religious musing, devout meditation”
("contemplation, n."), an interesting and relevant factor when considering
Schopenhauer and the numinous. Is Schopenhauer religious? He claims not.
The Spiritual-Atheistic Root of Schopenhauer’s Aesthetic
While Schopenhauer is often classified as an atheist by conventional
definition, his thinking, referenced in the foregoing pages, is clearly related to certain
theological and spiritual issues. Addressing some of the seemingly contradictory
issues and points in Schopenhauer’s work can begin by considering how this thinker
may well be described as a “spiritual-atheist.” While “spiritual-atheistic” is not a
descriptive term Schopenhauer or any Schopenhauerian scholar has used, some
scholars have noted the seemingly paradoxical orientation:
Life is not worth living! This is the thought most associated with
German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, who was virtually
unacknowledged when he died one hundred fifty years ago.
Increasingly, however, we understand that behind the mask of a
pessimist Schopenhauer was a Zen master and arguably the greatest
mystic of the nineteenth century. Schopenhauer roused more than two
thousand years of Western philosophy from its delusion about who we
really are, by declaring that materiality—the life of the body, rather
than the mind—was the driving force of existence (Schirmacher,
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“Living Disaster” vii).141
If the reader does acknowledge and at least momentarily accept a concept that
combines the seemingly contradictory and admittedly rather amusing joining of
antonyms—spiritual and atheist—much of the seemingly contradictory constitution of
Schopenhauer’s thought becomes clarified. It is of paramount importance to
understand that while Schopenhauer was anti-religious, he was not anti-spiritual.142
He did not believe in God or a god idea, or in some form of religious absolute, yet he
did acknowledge, via his passion for Asian thought and spirituality, a reality greater
than the individual that is clearly related to the Asian concept of a divine presence.
The notion of Schopenhauer as spiritual-atheist is accentuated and to some
extent authenticated by the sense of wonder in Schopenhauer, and wonder does have,
as already considered, a seminal role in the artistic process. This chapter ultimately
considers Schopenhauer’s interest in the numinous to be more than a peripheral
interest, one that is best elucidated in a more detailed consideration of how Hinduism
and Buddhism parallel his philosophy. As evidenced by his emphatically positive
interest in Asian thought, terms like intuition, ecstasy, epiphany, self-forgetting, selftranscendence, eternity, unity, and so on neither intimidated Schopenhauer nor
defined his thinking. In actuality, what defined his thinking was how he applied to his
western philosophy his Asian philosophy. It is well-known that original or traditional
Asian philosophy is very often integrated with Asian spirituality.
The Influence of Asian Philosophy and Spirituality on Schopenhauer’s Aesthetic
After Plato and Kant, the third, and in some ways the strongest influence on
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Schopenhauer’s thought was Hindu and Buddhist ideas. Schopenhauer’s interest in
Eastern thought was not a unique phenomenon in early 19th Century Germany, but
part of a larger “Oriental Renaissance” (Cross 9). Nonetheless, Schopenhauer was the
first major Western philosopher to openly advocate and testify to the deep value of
Indian thought:
It is a sobering thought that more than a century and a half after his
death Arthur Schopenhauer remains, as Bryan Magee143 has pointed
out, the only major Western philosopher to have shown a serious and
sustained interest in the thought of Asia and to have consistently
sought to relate it to his own philosophical ideas; he goes much further
in this direction than does Heidegger, for example (Cross xiii).
Cross also notes Schopenhauer’s criticisms of Christian translators of Indian
texts misleading readers by using Christian diction like “soul and capitalized He in
place of atman, God for Brahman, etc.” (Cross xiii). Repeatedly in WWP and other
writings, Schopenhauer referenced Asian concepts and writings very positively,
especially in, for example, his reading of the Upanishads, where he finds every line
imbued with “firm, definite, and harmonious significance” (Parerga and
Paralipomena 376). His interest in Indian thought was more than a hobby or passing
fancy, as he explained in the preface to the first edition of WWP:
The philosophy of Kant, then, is the only one with which a thorough
acquaintance is directly presupposed by that which is to be here
expounded. If beyond this, however, the reader has lingered in the
school of the divine Plato, he will be all the better prepared and the
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more receptive to hearing me. But if he has even yet further shared in
the benefaction of the Vedas, access to which, opened up to us through
the Upanishads, is in my eyes the preeminent greatness that this still
young century has to show over earlier ones—in that I presume that
the influence of Sanskrit literature will be no less deep in its reach than
that of the revival of Greek literature in the 15th Century—if, I thus
assert, the reader has in fact already received and embraced
consecration from the ages-old Indian wisdom, then he is best of all
prepared to hear what I have to expound to him. It will then not speak
to him, as to many others, in foreign, indeed hostile terms. For, if it
does not sound too vain, I would maintain that every one of the
individual and disparate pronouncements that constitute the
Upanishads can be derived as a consequence from the thought to be
communicated by me, although in no way, conversely, is the latter
already to be found there (WWP I, 13).
What precisely stimulated such a positive orientation in a man whose
otherwise negative assessment of human life is so emphatic, or as some would argue,
an assessment of life that is exaggeratedly negative? How did the Schopenhauerian
rendering of the elements of art and Asian thought combine so comprehensively with
Kant, Plato, and Schopenhauer’s own theory of the will to form a unique force in
Continental philosophy, a force that continues even today to challenge the
presuppositions and exclusivities of Eurocentric thought? Several elements in
Schopenhauer’s philosophy of art were in some respects at least as related to his study
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of Asian philosophy as to the foundation influence of Plato, Kant and Occidental
philosophy in general.
Schopenhauer’s Optimism as Rooted in Asian Spirituality
Themes and concepts such as wonder, aesthetic contemplation, selftranscendence, intense feeling (Gefühl) and intuitive (intuitiv) cognizance while not
by any means exclusively Asian nonetheless are very directly acknowledged and
studied in generous detail in Hindu, Buddhist, and other Asian aesthetics. That a
vibrant optimism is operative in Schopenhauer’s philosophy is especially evident in
his relationship with Asian thought has been less acknowledged in Continental
philosophy than it might have been, not just because of the Eurocentric nature per se
of western thought, but perhaps for other biases only reflected by Eurocentrism. Ideas
that address the limitations of scientific materialism or that emphasize the key
importance of wonder and the numinous or more often addressed by Asian thought
and practices than by European ideas. Also, one must push past the arbitrary label of
pessimism to appreciate the depth and originality of Schopenhauer’s work:
If optimism and pessimism were the stuff of temperament only, they
would have no place in the tenets of a noble philosophy. A
philosophical system must be more than a hypostasis of wishful
thinking, or a rationalized frustration. And the argumentum ad
hominem applied as a serious charge against a philosophical doctrine
would be amusingly irrelevant if it were not superlatively misleading.
Refutations must be made of firmer stuff. Thus that late nineteenth
century critique of Schopenhauer144—an approach still unfortunately
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sometimes practiced—that seeks to trace the source of his ideas top
alleged strains of pathological melancholia and emotional obsession in
himself and his ancestry, amounts in fine to a simple case of gossiplogic (Muses 19).
Muses’s small volume East—West Fire: Schopenhauer’s Optimism and the
Lankavatara Sutra identifies, clarifies, and compares numerous parallels between The
Lankavatara Sutra, a seminal text in Mahayana Buddhism, and various aspects of
Schopenhauer’s writings. This is all the more interesting in that while Schopenhauer
did read the Vedas, and especially the part of the Vedas known as The Upanishads, as
well as some Buddhist texts, he “never read the Lankavatara or any other of the great
Mahayana scriptures; for they, together with the entire Canon they represent, have
enjoyed only a relative recency of authentic knowledge in the Western acquirement of
learning” (21).
In other words, Schopenhauer read the Asian literature that was available in
his lifetime. Muses does acknowledge that one could also find parallels between
Schopenhauer’s thought and the Asian texts that he did read, but that some of the
confluences between the powerful Lankavatara Sutra and Schopenhauer’s philosophy
do reveal places where Schopenhauer’s native optimism does in fact surface. For
example, the core of The Lankavatara Sutra is its teaching of a “two-fold
egolessness,” or the truth behind world-illusion described traditionally as the veil of
Maya. According to Muses, illusion is an error in perception, whereas delusion is a
belief in the validity of that illusion (Muses 23-25). In the concept of two-fold
egolessness, no entity is actually separate from other entities. First, the self-nature of
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a conscious entity is not truly separate from the self-nature of all other conscious
entities; likewise, the self-nature of an object or group of objects is not separate from
the self-nature of all other objects because “all meanings and indeed all activities
[are] springing from the interrelations of all things” (Muses 25). That the two-fold
egolessness in The Lankavatara Sutra corresponds to Schopenhauer’s world as
presentation and world as will opens a consideration of related aesthetic and
metaphysical themes—whether the emphasis is Western, Eastern or both.
It cannot be emphasized enough that for Schopenhauer, the challenge to linear
or discursive knowledge comes from a source he considered authentic, one that has
been and continues to be an inspiration to artists—Asian thought and aesthetics.
The art theories of many modern artists have been influenced by both Asian
and Schopenhauerian thought. John Cage, for example, was influenced not only by
Zen Buddhism, but also by Schopenhauer, whom Cage read with genuine interest.
Once it is understood that a primary element in the Schopenhauerian aesthetic
is the contemplation of art, it is then necessary to examine some of the
Schopenhauerian concepts related to that contemplation.
Wonder [thauma], Quotidian, tat tvam asi, the Sky, the Circle
The possibilities inherent in wonder and the absence of expectation deserve to
be considered and explored in more detail. It can be argued that the experience and
phenomenon of wonder is not restricted to a set of parameters or locked inside a
system of circumstances. Music alone challenges these restrictions, not to mention
many other phenomena. As noted in the earlier quote by Cartwright about
Schopenhauer’s need for metaphysics, “He attributed this need to a sense of wonder
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or astonishment, one that arises from the recognition of the ubiquity of suffering and
death within the world” (145). The seminal element informing Schopenhauer’s
aesthetic is a sense of wonder, which is also a phenomenon that straddles Eastern and
Occidental aesthetics. Furthermore, inherent in Asian aesthetics is a broader reach
that more directly and openly allows for the possibility of a sensibility to the
numinous in art and life in general.
Before labeling any experience or phenomenon as an occurrence of wonder,
the numinous, the sublime, or any other name, there is the nameless experience or
phenomenon itself. Neither spiritual nor philosophical understanding should rotely
depend on categories or names. Not-knowing or unknowing is not a form of stupidity,
nor a lack of intelligence or understanding. What is referred to metaphorically as the
gateless gate in Zen Buddhism, for example, or any other authentic form of esoteric
spirituality, does not require verbal labeling before being experienced. In this sense,
language is more like a street map for navigation through life rather than an entire
(ontological) city in itself. Even though language is an aspect of being, it is also a
means to describe non-linguistic being, a means that can obviously influence to some
extent ontological perception. Even though an absence of verbal or textual
description or language can occur, to assert that language is inconsequential or
irrelevant would be erroneous. On the contrary, language, as many thinkers145 have
asserted, is very relevant to philosophical understanding. Virtually every philosopher
has worked with language, including Plato, through the Socratic dialogues, although
modern and contemporary thinkers have clearly worked far more extensively with
language. Indeed, Russian literary theorist Mikel Bakhtin’s brilliant work with
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language is utilized ahead. Also, as has been noted earlier, the Husserlian epochē and
“back to the things themselves” (Wir wollen auf die ‘Sachen selbst’ zurückgehen) are
part of a methodology that navigates through secondary aspects of phenomenon,
including the presuppositions of language.
After Sophia Vasalou says, “Schopenhauer’s philosophical wonder forms an
illuminating category through which to calibrate the way we read his philosophy”
(Vasalou, Schopenhauer 3), she goes on to argue, “Schopenhauer’s own analysis of
the sublime” combines with “a therapeutic of wonder at its heart—a therapeutic of the
passions that is simultaneously a therapeutic of the subjectivity that underpins them”
(Schopenhauer 5). The present argument is that when Schopenhauer’s aesthetic
emphasizes the liberating dynamic of contemplating art, a dynamic that generates
self-forgetting and freedom from the devastating drive of the will, his aesthetic is—
through the contemplation of art—rooted in a sense of wonder that is, at least in some
case, caused by art. By its nature as a phenomenon universal to human consciousness,
the sense of wonder is restricted neither to European nor Asian experience.
Schopenhauer’s sense of wonder is enhanced and magnified for him via the influence
of and reference to Indian philosophy, but also through the influence of Platonic Ideas
on his thought.
What are the elements within the phenomenon of wonder that connect
Schopenhauer with Indian philosophy and spirituality that are relevant to the current
investigation? A primary element surfaces in Schopenhauer’s acknowledgement of
overcoming individuation through the contemplation of art, which he articulates,
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while discussing the many forms of nature, by borrowing a well-known Sanskrit
term:
But were we to communicate for the sake of the observer’s reflection,
and in a single word, an insight into that nature’s inner essence, then
we could best employ for that purpose the Sanskrit formula that
appears so often in the holy books of the Hindus and is called
Mahavakya, i.e., great word: Tat twam asi. Which means: “This living
thing is you” (WWPI 266).
When Schopenhauer is discussing aesthetics, he references either art and
nature, or both, while considering simultaneously the role of Platonic Ideas and how
overcoming individuation might occur. As one scholar describes it:
This special attitude of our consciousness, which Schopenhauer calls
“aesthetic contemplation,” is the most important factor in seeing
through the principium individuationis, the knowledge of the Ideas as
the essence of the phenomena, or, at last, the deeper insight into the
thing-in-itself, the will-to-live as the common ground of all beings.
The objective contemplation of works of art, of vegetative forms or of
animalistic behavior and actions allows us to forget our individuality
and its limited and dissociative harmful character. We see instead “the
manifold grades and modes of manifestation of the will that is one and
the same in all beings,” and reflecting this experience, we recognize
the will-to-living as our common inner nature, essentially beyond any
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individuation. The condensed version of this insight is the tat tvam asi
(Ruffing 99).
While remaining within a contextual sphere of artistic knowledge, what in
Schopenhauerian terms underlies a spontaneous and positive sense of transcending
separative self-identification though a sense of wonder? Platonic Ideas are key here:
If the subject is to perceive Platonic Ideas which exist outside space,
time and causality and which, therefore, are not individuals, the
subject must forget about his or her individuality and, in the process of
perceiving the extraordinary, must not have any self-awareness as a
person of our common world. To achieve this, the subject must
undergo a change which deeply alters the whole mode of perception
(Pothast 34).
In the interest of relating this to ordinary human existence, this might also
simply be called self-forgetting, which is something everyone experiences in some
moments, as when driving somewhere or being absorbed in some activity or other
person or object. An aspect of the argument here is that self-forgetting occurs
temporarily in a moment of wonder in both art-making and art-viewing. The details of
this experience are more phenomenological in nature than metaphysical.
Schopenhauer notes that, first, “these worlds exist only in a presentation to us, only as
modifications of the eternal subject of pure cognition that we find ourselves to be as
soon as we forget individuality” (251), which essentially serves to refine a
metaphysical orientation by acknowledging the phenomenological point of
presentation. Secondly, Schopenhauer uses a non-Eurocentric reference to elucidate
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his assertions:
All of this does not enter reflection at once, however, but shows itself
as a merely felt consciousness that we are in some sense (which
philosophy alone explicates) one with the world and thus not crushed,
but lifted, by its immensity. It is the felt consciousness of that which
Upanishads of the Vedas repeatedly pronounce in such manifold
variations, particularly in the passage already quoted: Hae omnes
creaturae in totum ego sum, et praeter me aliud ens non est [“All these
creatures together am I, and beyond me no beings exists.”] (251).146
Music
Another major art theory confluence, a kind of aesthetic intertexuality,
occurred with both Schopenhauer and Kandinsky—the importance of music.
Kandinsky’s emphasis on music is well-documented,147 and for Schopenhauer, music
was the supreme pure form of art, one that is independent of the phenomenal world,
because it bypasses Ideas and stands uniquely on its own:
And since our world is nothing other than the phenomenon of Ideas in
the form of multiplicity, by means of their entry into the principium
individuationis (the form belonging to the sort of cognition possible
for individuals as such), it follows that music, since it bypasses Ideas,
is also entirely independent of the phenomenal world, completely
ignores it, could even to a certain extent exist if the world were not
there. This cannot be said of the other arts. In other words, music is
just as immediate an objectivization and image of will as a whole as
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the world itself is, indeed just as much as the Ideas whose multiplied
phenomenon constitutes the world of individual things. Thus music is
in no way, like the other arts, an image of Ideas, but an image of the
very will of which Ideas are also the objectivization. Just for this
reason, the effect of music is so very much more powerful and
penetrating than that of the other arts. For the latter speak only of
shadows; it, rather, speaks of the essence of things (WWPI 307-308).
That Kandinsky and Schopenhauer both emphasized the primary significance
of music points to the role of intense emotion—Gefühl. As discussed previously,
Rudolf Otto’s referencing of Gefühl as a feeling more intense and penetrating than
ordinary emotional expressions also can be understood as one factor that can enhance
a sensibility to the numinous, one that occurs prior to conceptual thought.148 Earlier
than Otto, Schopenhauer also considered the significance of Gefühl, albeit in a far
more complicated way, and generally in relation to music. Schopenhauer argued that
music was not concerned with ordinary emotions. These emotions were considered to
be phenomena, “but Schopenhauer asserted that music contained the inner nature of
these phenomena, the feelings or emotions themselves as aspects of the will” (Hall
167-168). For Schopenhauer, that inner nature is not available through rational
knowledge (Wissen) but “through Erkenntnis, a kind of knowledge suffused with
emotion or feeling (Gefühl).
There are some points of Schopenhauer’s argument that can be challenged,
especially in relation to visual art and the phenomenon of the world. That he presents
music as the most uniquely powerful of the arts, and the only art that directly
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communicates an essence (to Schopenhauer, a direct communication of the will)
rather than, like the other arts, a mere reflection of Ideas) remains debatable. In
particular, Schopenhauer does not take into account thoroughly enough are the forms
and complexities of subjectivity in regards to art, especially in regards to narrative or
storytelling, and specifically in the present case, irrealism and fabulism.
Consequently, it is useful to call on some of the concepts of another thinker to better
clarify and consider the art of Varo and Borges.
Bakhtin
Mikhail Bakhtin is best known for his literary theory,149 which presents his
rendering of aesthetic ideas (the majority of them rooted in his original concepts),
including dialogism, polyphony, polyglossia, theoretism, answerability, outsideness,
intertextuality, heteroglossia, chronotope, finalizability and unfinalizability,
carnivalesque and grotesque realism. While not all of these Bakhtinian concepts are
relevant to this study, some are referenced in the next chapter. Some central points
that makes Bakhtin’s theories relevant are his emphasis on the human beings and his
avoidance of a complete system of artistic theory:
Unlike some of his contemporaries such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty
and Henri Bergson, Bakhtin’s goal was not to create a moral or
philosophical system. Most of his essays are predicated on the
presupposition that the human being is the centre around which all
action in the real world, including art, is organized. In his writing, the
“I” and the “other” are the fundamental categories of value that make
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all action and creativity possible, as in the work of Marin Buber and
Emmanuel Levinas (Haynes, Bakhtin Reframed, 5).
In her discussion of Bakhtin’s aesthetics in Bakhtin Reframed, Deborah
Haynes describes Bakhtin’s orientation to art for life’s sake, not art for art’s sake (1213). To say art is for art’s sake was to Bakhtin an error that signaled a crisis for
modern artists and writers. Even though, as already quoted above, Haynes asserted
that Bakhtin did not set out to create a moral system, she also subsequently
emphasizes, “At its foundation, Bakhtinian aesthetics is profoundly moral and
religious. In fact, Bakhtin’s early aesthetic essays derived many of the terms from
theology” (13). Haynes adds, “Bakhtin reputedly said that aesthetics is similar to
religion inasmuch as both help to transfigure life” (13).150
Nor is a spiritual impulse absent in the writings of Western philosophers
discussed here. Although Husserl is not as anti-religious as Schopenhauer, and at
times authenticates while simultaneously disavowing the influence of
phenomenological theology in his work,151 there can be no denying that Husserl was a
religious person.152 Husserl simply brackets out that aspect of his own life and beliefs
within his writings about transcendental phenomenology.
Schopenhauer’s orientation is not theological per se, but primarily a
metaphysical and aesthetic one. Nonetheless, even though Schopenhauer was
antagonistic towards religion, the fact of his recognition and use of topics such as the
sublime and beauty, artistic and spiritual freedom, Eastern spirituality and aesthetics,
and the transcendence of human suffering through the self-forgetting contemplation
of art does represent altogether a sensibility to the numinous.
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Chapter Six—Art as Life: Varo and Borges as Artist-Philosophers
Extending some of the philosophical topics from the previous chapters to
apply to this final chapter about the artist-philosopher dynamic discloses some
philosophical aspects of the art of Varo and Borges. While a Husserlian
phenomenological methodology provides a primary means or infrastructure for
examining the work of Borges and Varo, additional and multifarious means are
utilized briefly at times to explore the unorthodox work of these two accomplished
and idiosyncratic artist-philosophers. For example, Schopenhauerian, Platonic,
Kantian, Bakhtinian, Bataillean and other multifarious philosophical concepts—or
explicatory points used for elucidating certain concepts—are succinctly referenced
and offered as additional means. This chapter looks at some themes common to both
Borges and Varo, then separately examines in more detail the work of each of these
two artists. First, a distilled and succinctly stated description of the artist-philosopher
dynamic is required, albeit difficult.
The Artist-Philosopher Dynamic
Why describe this phenomenon as a “dynamic” and why is it difficult to
define? Although farther ahead it is also accurately described as an “agency,” to
describe the artist-philosopher as a dynamic is accurate, given the reciprocally
amalgamating process underlying that dynamic. That the artist-philosopher
phenomenon is a dynamic, or the opposite of static or inactive, seems obvious—a
primary characteristic is its continually shifting activities and its functional,
accomplishing nature. It is a unique dynamic of making and thinking, or vice versa,
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and not infrequently it is an expression of the simultaneity of making and thinking.153
That an artist makes things and a philosopher thinks about everything seems at first
glance to be a valid (albeit over-simplified) statement. At the same time, using words
like “things” and “everything” reflects a generality that in itself yields an overview of
interwoven elements of philosophy and art. In that regard, one might argue that every
human being has some characteristics of both an artist and a philosopher. When
someone is primarily a working artist, that fact is often unambiguously obvious.
Likewise, if an individual’s character reflects a strong philosophical bent, in an
artistic context or not, that aspect of their character is usually recognizable and
acknowledgeable through the person’s communications and actions.154 To say that the
actions of an artist-philosopher attest to a process in which the artist addresses
philosophical questions and creates answers through making his or her art is both too
diffused and too adamantine. A working artist is already engaging an artistic process
that generates a wide variety of inquiries, challenges, thoughts and responses, even if
the artist is the only person who witnesses the details of that process. A fixed
definition of the artist-philosopher remains challenging because of evolving stages
and the non-fixed or plastic and shifting directions of both artistic and philosophical
work.
Thus, since the phrase “artist-philosopher” is self-descriptive in a rudimentary
sense, why can a simple description not suffice? If by simple one means universally
concrete, the dilemmas and obstacles begin to surface. Why these challenges appear
is obvious—the creative process itself is a highly individualistic, which is to say a
highly subjective, dynamic, even if initiated through another artist’s or thinker’s
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work. This point is not to assert that artists cannot collaborate, as can be seen in work
of Gilbert & George, Picasso and Braque, Jake and Dinos Chapman, Robert
Mapplethorpe and Louise Bourgeoise, Björk and Matthew Barney, Man Ray and Lee
Miller, and countless other pairings, as well as group artistic efforts. Collaborations,
however, must nonetheless find ways to process individual aesthetic orientations and
inspirations because every established artist who is not strictly a student or disciple
artist presumes and calls upon an individualistic subjective artistic process, even
though, as we have already considered, subjectivity involves more than a common
presumption of utilizing a separative self-identified modus operandi. Art especially
demonstrates this because of inherent cultural and societal influences such as art
historical and sociopolitical factors, as well as marketing issues. The idealistic ivory
tower orientation to artistic endeavors is no longer (and to some extent probably
never was) an accurate description of the creative process, even if an artist or writer
may work alone much of the time.
That seemingly solitary effort is never truly solitary, except perhaps in a
physical sense. While working alone implies (if there is not a literal collaboration) the
efforts of a single individual at work, that is not exactly so because even then one
works with memories of and sensibilities to the other. Almost any formal and honest
statement of one’s own work should generously acknowledge the resources or
support of other people, or at least the influences of other people’s work.
An elementary sense of Husserlian intersubjectivity seems key here, as does
intertextuality, be it a scholarly textual or artistically visual orientation. And as will
be presented shortly, an inevitable Bakhtinian polyphonic dialogism could be said to
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underlie what appears to be a solitary action. Thus, while solitude as well as
loneliness are experiences generally understood by everyone, it remains questionable
if “aloneness” is completely accurate given the myriad forms of relationship
characteristic of humankind.
Nonetheless, there exists, when one begins, the blank page or empty canvas,
the bare stage or the mere thought of a creative project. Both Varo and Borges
communicate a sense of this artistic aloneness, yet paradoxically neither artist fails, in
her or his art, to challenge the validity of that expression. In fact, one could argue that
it is through the philosophical component accessed by each artist that the sense of
existential solitude, positive or negative, is fractured.
For example, while Varo’s painting Revelation or The Clockmaker (figs.3233) and her comments about it emphasize an instance of a temporal theme, complete
with various visual themes Varo used repeatedly in her paintings such as the cat, a
window, and a person working at a table or desk. This painting also reflects how Varo
demonstrates a fractured or multiple sense of self. When Varo comments on this
painting in her wonderfully modest and plain-spoken style, she notes how each
timepiece contain “a figure from very distant epochs,” although she could easily and
just as accurately described each of those figures as a version of herself, or a version
of the central seated figure. Although the artist verbally magnifies the sense of
distinctive epochs, noting how she used period costumes, there remains in fact a
visual sense, when one simply looks at the painting, of those figures expressing the
multiplicity of self:
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Fig. 32. Remedios Varo. Revelation or The Clockmaker (Revelación o El
relojero) 1955. Oil on Masonite. 27 7/8 x 33 in. Private Collection.
This painting is about time. That’s why there is a clockmaker (who in
a sense, represents our ordinary time), but through the window comes
a revelation and all of a sudden the clockmaker comprehends a whole
lot of things. I have tried to make him look both astonished and
enlightened. He is surrounded by a series of timepieces all showing the
same time, but containing a figure from very distant epochs. I achieve
this effect through different period costumes. Each clock has a window
with bars, like a prison (Ovalle 111).
239

Fig. 33. Remedios Varo. Detail from Revelation or The Clockmaker
(Revelación o El relojero) 1955.
Oil on Masonite. 27 7/8 x 33 in. Private Collection.
[Aquí se trata del tiempo. Por eso hay un relojero (que en cierta
manera reprsenta el tiempo ordinario nuestro), pero por la ventana
entra una “revelación” y comprende de golpe muchísimas cosas; he
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tratado de darle una expresón de asombro y de iluminación. A su
alrededor hay cantidad de relojes que marcan todos la misma hora,
pero dentro de cada uno hay el mismo personaje en muy diferentes
épocas; eso lo consigo por medio de los trajes característicos de
épocas muy distintas, cada reloj tiene una ventana con rejas como en
una cácel. (Ovalle 111).]
The Artist-Philosopher Dynamic as Agency
The artist-philosopher dynamic serves as agency for taking action in the world
and addressing humankind beyond the limitation of separative self-identification.
Thinking of the artist-philosopher as agency provides a clearer view of the artistphilosopher dynamic underlying such an agency. What, then, is agency? While the
most common definition is “a person or organization acting on behalf of another, or
providing a particular service” (“agency, n.," I.), a related definition is “action or
intervention producing a particular effect” (“agency, n.," II,5,a.), and more
specifically, “a being or thing that acts to produce a particular effect or result”
(“agency, n.," II,5,b.). In this last description, it is not simply the artistic component
that is called into action to produce a particular affect. By asserting that Borges and
Varo are artist-philosophers, what must be asked is how the philosophical component
is revealed in their work—how does their work become (for each artist-philosopher)
agency?
The Artist-Philosopher Dynamic as Agency in Borges and Varo
Both Varo and Borges emphasize the nonlinear plasticity and ephemeral
qualities of “facts” in their respective bodies of work; they continually challenge the
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presumed concreteness of factual knowledge. To unearth some of the artistic artifacts
Borges and Varo left in the wake of their irrealistic journeys, and to look at some of
the philosophical ideas pervading their creative processes and art, requires a
Husserlian bracketing out of presumptions not only about what reality is, but what
philosophical discourse is presumed to be. Borges’s writings, including his nonfictional essays, fictional stories, and poetry, attest to the consistent, sinewy
philosophical quality of his work. The thematic range of Varo’s paintings, on the
other hand, seem at first appearance to be merely about the occult and other strange or
bizarre themes, but that are nonetheless recognizable representational phenomena.
The numinous sensibility in her simultaneously robust and fastidious work actually
covers a broad philosophical landscape, even if one must sometimes penetrate her
outwardly playful interest in the magical and the occult to recognize her meaningful
philosophical orientation. If one looks at the painting previously considered,
Revelation or The Clockmaker (figs.32-33), the inherent issues such as the temporalspatial theme, intersubjectivity, metaphorical means that signal ontological
significance, symbolism, and other philosophical topics do surface.
When someone is a working artist with a pronounced philosophical
orientation, the artist-philosopher appears, and that confluence and reciprocal
assimilation between thinking and making can be quite complex, as it is with both
Borges and Varo, whose literary and visual artistic compositions are philosophically
proposed and artistically composed or constructed through their irrealistic fabulist art.
Both Borges and Varo address issues and topics such as the nature of
existence and reality, time and space, subjectivity and the other, search and journey,
242

wonder and the numinous. While in a broad sense all artists have a philosophical
strand woven into their creative processes, one that may or may not be evident in the
art they make because some are more emphatically and recognizably philosophical
than others. In spite of this, some artist-philosophers do not claim to be known as
philosophers, and this is the case with both Borges and Varo. When a given artist
disclaims philosophical intentions, even if the philosophical component is clearly
evident, that artist’s denial may be a response to his or her work being described as
philosophical, a description the artist may not seek or desire. And yet the
philosophical seriousness behind the playfulness of each of these artists repeatedly
surfaces.

Fig. 34. Remedios Varo, 1958.
Fotografía tomada del catálogo
razonado publicado por Era
por Kati Horna.

Fig. 35. Jorge Luis Borges. 1968
Central Park, New York City.
by Diane Arbus.

Applying Husserlian Transcendental Phenomenology to Varo and Borges
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At this point it is useful consider more explicitly how Husserlian methodology
in a philosophy of art context can be applied to Borges and Varo. We might begin by
noting that givenness (Gegebenheit) becomes relevant when examining an artist’s
creative process. Givenness in Husserlian terms is essential to understanding
experience as an experience of something, the object appearing (being given in
appearance) and experienced (received), at which point the subject, actually either the
artist or the viewer, is perceiving the object that is given in appearance. There are
multifarious influential elements, depending on the form of consciousness being
experienced, that enter into Husserlian givenness. Remedios Varo’s consciously and
subconsciously fueled visions of art, for example, make visible a process already
aligned with some of the principles of Husserlian phenomenology.
As can be seen, the distinction between image consciousness (Bildbewußtein,
or “depicting consciousness”) (Moran and Cohen 158-159) and perception serves the
explication of both Varo and Borges’s creative processes. When explicating
phantasy155 presentation as pictorialization, Husserl’s observations might be applied
to Varo’s visualization or irreal creativity as it could be done with other artists156 who
might also be considered as creating forms of fantasy:
We characterized perception as an act in which something objective
appears to us in its own person, as it were, as present itself. In
phantasy, to be sure, the object itself appears (insofar as it is precisely
the object that appears there) but it does not appear as present. It is
only re-presented; it is though it were there, but only as though. It
appears to us in image. The Latins say imaginatio. Phantasy
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presentation seems to presuppose or claim for itself a new
characteristic of apprehension; it is pictorialization (Husserl, Phantasy,
18). 157
Husserl’s phrase “re-presented” is a key to understanding how a non-physical
object can be presented or given in phenomenological terms. As proposed in this
study, Borges and Varo repeatedly re-present their work via fabulist irrealism, or
irreal fabulism.158 Irreal fabulism is explicated ahead in more detail and depth.
Along these lines, and as presented in more detail ahead, a thematic literary
strand that accentuates consciousness in Borges’s storytelling surfaces when his
attraction to numinous sensibility becomes the expressive element of his aesthetic.
When that expressive element becomes interwoven with the receptive element of his
aesthetic, albeit in his uniquely presented Borgesian intertextual fashion, the irreal
fabulist search for a numinous gateway surfaces more visibly, albeit in a literary
rendering.
Husserlian intentionality, as noted earlier, does not indicate the common
meaning of intending to do something as in a volitional usage, but instead is
essentially about aiming the experience of attention towards an object and receiving
(in Husserlian terms intuiting) that object. Thus one might say intentionality is the
directedness of the conscious state. Directedness of the conscious state is a key
understanding of phenomenological intentionality.
When Husserlian intuition is activated it becomes the act of incorporating or
“having” or receiving of the object that appears in consciousness, even if that object
is, as in a Varo painting, an imaginary (in Husserlian terms “phantastic”) object. This
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is the artistic imagination at work within a Husserlian phenomenological
infrastructure of methodology. Husserl repeatedly described how imagination is a representation of an object.
If the presentation or re-presentation is the givenness of an object in
consciousness, then the intentionality (directedness) of the artist or viewer of
receiving the object in consciousness becomes, when completed, an intuition (or
reception) of the object. What can be misleading is how this phenomenological
process cannot accurately be described as a linear process. While there seems to be a
give and take process indicating a linear sequence, that linearity does not exist (except
perhaps in a mischievous or playful way for Borges and Varo) because givenness of
the art object and the creative expression of the artist seem to occur, or at the very
least can occur, simultaneously. The creative dynamic between subjectivity and art
could be seen as seamless and indefinable, except that in this case (and undoubtedly
in many instances) the relationship between consciousness and subjectivity, or
consciousness and selfhood, is complex and in some respects nebulous in both Varo
and Borges. “In his earliest essays, such as ‘The Nothingness of Personality,’ Borges
challenged the notion of the self, and a continuing desire to do so runs through much
of his writing” (Griffin 7). This essay presents a proposal of intention (not
phenomenological intentionality, but more like the volitional usage of intending to do
something) in the author:
Intention. I want to tear down the exceptional preeminence now
generally awarded to the self, and I pledge to be spurred on by
concrete certainty, and not the caprice of an ideological ambush or a
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dazzling intellectual prank. I propose to prove that personality is a
mirage maintained by conceit and custom, without metaphysical
foundation or visceral reality. I want to apply to literature the
consequences that issue from these premises, and erect upon them an
aesthetic hostile to the psychologism inherited from the last century,
sympathetic to the classics, yet encouraging to today’s most unruly
tendencies (Selected Non-fictions 3).
Borges’s desire stated above to “tear down the exceptional preeminence now
generally awarded to the self” brings another experience into view, one that surfaces
repeatedly in this investigation, though not directly addressed by Husserl.
If Husserlian intuitions are perceptions or modifications of perception, and
intuition indicates a “location” where an intentional object is directly present via that
intentionality, when an intention is “filled” by the apprehension of an object, that
object is intuited. While the appearance of the object is “given” and Borges’s
reception of the given object, for example, will be as real or irreal as the author
decides it should be, that object—be it the Library of Babel, the Circular Ruins, the
Aleph, a Dreamtiger, a Garden of Forking Paths, or Hakim, the Masked Dyer of
Merv—remains a key element in his creative dynamic.159 His intentionality to render
the numinous visible via layers of irreal and intertextual narrative represents a form of
direct apprehension in which a given object fulfills intentionality as an intuition of the
object. The fantasy aspect of Varo’s creative process reveals how intentionality and
apprehension yield an intuition of immediate structure as evidence of life in art,
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which also echoes Michel Henry’s argument of material phenomenology and
interiority as invisible life.
Henry Applies Husserlian Elements to a Study of Invisibility and Kandinsky
Mentioning Michel Henry’s work generates a series of brief interjections,
beginning with Henry’s use of Husserlian phenomenology in his explication of
Kandinsky’s work, that serve as supportive or secondary materials. Henry’s 2005
Seeing the Invisible: On Kandinsky (published in English in 2009) is a preeminent
philosophico-phenomenological study of Kandinsky’s aesthetic, some of which is
relevant here. Henry discusses at length, for example, the implications and meanings
of invisibility in non-objective abstract art. For instance, Henry does not hesitate to
apply Husserl’s epochē to Kandinsky’s work:
[Kandinsky] showed how by separating a letter or sign from its
linguistic meaning or any other context in which it usually occurs one
could again experience its “pure form,” its “purely pictorial” form. But
once the world and all its meanings have been set aside, once its logos,
which has always been that which is spoken by men, has been
silenced, what exactly is left? According to Husserl and those artists
who gave up realism, we are left with the sensate appearances to
which the true, given world is reduced, the pure experience of the
world (377).
While this is an original explication of how to apply epochē to abstract art, it
is also, if extended, applicable to a sensibility to the numinous in Varo and Borges’s
art. For instance, when Henry is discussing the theory of elements in Kandinsky’s
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work, and specifically commenting on Kandinsky’s Point and Line to Plane and the
positive aspects of studying and analyzing the artistic picture plane, Henry writes:
This derives from the fact that it is an essential analysis, in the
phenomenological sense that Husserl gives the term, leading us to the
essence of the thing, pertaining here to the pure pictorial elements. The
essence of the pictorial element is the abstract content, the invisible
life that this element seeks to express (33).
One might understandably ask what this has to do with Varo and Borges,
since their art is not nonobjective abstraction but irrealist fabulism. However, a
connection in a sensibility to the invisibility of the numinous can occur by any artist
or the viewer or reader (and the reader is a kind of viewer via imagination). While
writing about Kandinsky’s intense emotion in response to viewing but not really
seeing or recognizing Monet’s haystacks at an 1896 Moscow exhibition, Henry
writes:
He joined the lesson from it with the one that he drew from reading
Niels Bohr: physical reality has no substance and in some way no
reality; quanta of energy move in leaps without crossing through it. In
physics as well, matter is broken down in to the dust of dubious,
virtual particles; it dissolves into reality and a sort of immaterialism
(15).
In Husserlian givenness, or the appearance itself, multifarious influential
elements are possible, depending on the form of consciousness being experienced.
This includes forms of the irreal.
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Fabulism, Irrealism and Fantasy
In proposing that Varo and Borges are modern fabulist artist-philosophers,
and that fabulism allows wonder to fuel some aspects of their creative processes,
fabulist storytelling needs to be explicated. Part of that explication is to consider
“irrealism” as contrasted with “magic realism” and “fantasy,” terms sometimes
assigned to these artists’ work. In general, one of the most salient descriptive aspects
of the term “magic realism” is its oxymoronic quality, contrasting realism, or what is
“real,” with “magic,” which is understood not to be real in the usual sense of reality.
The term “magic realism” first appeared in 1920’s Germany. In his 1925 book NachExpressionismus, Magischer Realismus: Probleme der neusten europäischen Malerei
(Post-Expressionism, Magic Realism: Problems of the Most Recent European
Painting), art critic Franz Roh “coined the term that is translated as ‘magic realism’ to
define a form of painting that differs greatly from its processor (expressionist art) in
its attention to accurate detail, a smoother photograph-like clarity of picture and the
representation of the mystical non-material aspects of reality” (Bowers 8-9).
While Remedios Varo was not part of the so-called Neue Sachlichkeit art
movement, Bowers description above also serves as a general description of
Remedios Varo’s uniquely accomplished representational paintings about magic,
mysticism, and mystery. The formal definition of magic realism under “art and
literary theory” in the Oxford English Dictionary, includes: “In extended use: any
artistic or esp. literary style in which realistic techniques such as naturalistic detail,
narrative, etc., are similarly combined with surreal or dreamlike elements” (“Magic
realism”). This term has been referenced primarily to describe “the narrative mode
250

that offers “a way to discuss alternative approaches to reality to that of Western
Philosophy, expressed in many postcolonial and non-Western works of contemporary
fiction by, most famously, writers such as Gabriel García Márquez and Salman
Rushdie” (Bowers 1). Magic realism also brings to mind writers like Julio Cortázar,
Franz Kafka, Günter Grass, John Fowles, Isabel Allende, Angela Carter, Alejo
Carpentier, and Arturo Uslar-Pietri, among many others. Beyond generalization,
however, magic realism has various usages (Bowers 1-7).160
The term “magic realism” is referenced here infrequently, however, because
the present focus is on philosophical, phenomenological, and aesthetic investigations
as related to fabulist storytelling rather than a deconstruction of literary or artistic
categories. To reiterate, this study examines the work of two artists who worked with
irrealistic fabulist art, which, although containing elements of magical realism, is not
magical realism per se.
What attracts both Varo and Borges, and fuels their art-making, is the impact
and influence of a sensibility to the seemingly invisible numinous in life experience
and philosophical thought. This attraction to excavating this invisible presence can
inspire, and in its most undiluted potential, initiate, a sense of self-forgetting, which
in turn is related to memory and time-consciousness, as well as to the dream state,
which is paramount in Varo paintings and especially in Borges’s poetry.
When Husserl describes fantasy or the imagination as a representation of
something, this is of course evident in the sense of storytelling or fabulism in some of
Varo’s paintings and some of Borges’s stories. In the latter, Borges often uses socalled real references within imaginary fabulist contexts. Proper names, for example,
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are both used as they are understood in conventional reality and as used in assigned
literary roles. Although this is obviously not unique to Borges’s literary work, his life
and his literary work interweave in many ways, as do Varo’s life and her paintings.
The Husserlian temporal aspect can be complex because fantasy is not like memory:
The fantasized image is apprehended in the present tense although that
present is not itself experienced as perceptual present tense. By the
same token, the fantasized image can reappear and be recovered in
memory, so it has a certain kind of identity transcending the act of
fantasy (Moran and Cohen, 120-121).
Given the specific fabulist storytelling technique underlying narratively in the
art of Borges and Varo, the content of their work is best described as irrealistic. Thus
it is useful to consider what irrealism is, which is something more than simply being
unrealistic. Since scholarship is obliged to question presuppositions, it would be less
than scholarly to presume everyone knows exactly what reality or realism is. I would
suggest that reality is generally understood to be “what you see is what you get” or—
following the lead of The Oxford English Dictionary in order to deepen that rather
superficial version of reality—“The quality or state of being real. Real existence;
what is real rather than imagined or desired; the aggregate of real things or existences;
that which underlies and is the truth of appearances or phenomena” ("reality, n."). In
other words, imagination itself is not considered to be real but imaginary, and indeed,
Husserl’s use of “phantasy” as a synonym of the imagination signals that usage.
However, the irrealistic work of Varo and Borges (and other artists and
writers) resist conventional definitions of reality, as well as most literary or artistic
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genres, signaling the paramount importance of making art. Noting that the ostensible
“goal of narratology is the objective, almost scientific, classification of literary texts”
(Swinford 176), Dean Swinford defines irrealism as a “particular mode of postmodern
allegory” (176-177) in the sense that artistic products are a response to the mutation
and usurpation of the natural world by the economy and characteristics of
contemporary culture. Swinford does observe, however, that irrealism is not easy to
classify:
The attempt to define Irrealism as a literary and artistic mode allows
for an analysis of a current of cultural development without
overloading the already cumbersome narratological critical
vocabulary. Irrealism is a term which does not define an entire genre, a
single species or family, but a group of characteristics adapted by
different cloth-bound creatures to accommodate for widespread
variations in their increasingly unnatural habitat. To define a new
genre is an impossible project because, to some extent, each individual
text is its own genre, and each specimen a species (177).
This last point is relevant here, and to some extent it is relevant for all
attempts to classify anything. Irrealism can serve as a general label for art challenging
notions of reality, but as Swinford himself emphasizes: “Furthermore, these works
which I classify as Irreal, such as, among others, Italo Calvino’s Cosmicomics, Jorge
Luis Borges’ Ficciones, and the paintings of Remedios Varo, are themselves
interested in patterns, puzzles, classification” (178).
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This is key—that the work of Borges and Varo are inherently irrealistic and
thus continually undermine presumptions about reality, a fact both delightful and
challenging. While acknowledging that one definition of irrealism could be described
as an indicator of postmodern allegory, and in spite of the fact that Borges’s work has
been called both high modern and postmodern, I would hesitate to define irrealism as
a postmodernist phenomenon. One could easily argue that the art of Hieronymus
Bosch, work that greatly influenced the young Remedios Varo, is irreal. In fact,
Swinford does compare two paintings, one by Varo and one by Bosch, using Bosch’s
The Last Judgment (fig. 36) as an example of Christian allegory of symbolic
language.

Fig. 36. Hieronymus Bosch. The Last Judgment.
Oil-on-wood triptych. c. 1482.
Left and right panels: 167.7 x 60 cm and center panel 164 x 127 cm.
Academy of Fine Arts, Vienna.
Irrealism is a principle key to understanding Borges and Varo, and while
Swinford’s theory of the irreal as allegorical postmodernism is not inherently invalid,
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there are other definitions and theories for irrealism. In his The Art of Fiction, writer
and critic John Gardner describes irrealism as one of several genres that are “nonrealistic movements—Kafkaesque expressionism, and the formalist ‘irrealism’ of
writers like Borges and Barthelme” (136). Gardner, discussing the fiction of Donald
Barthelme, notes that writers who, like Barthelme, are irrealists are working outside
of conventional fiction, and have abandoned “the attempt to deal directly with reality”
(138).
Alice Whittenburg agrees with Gardner that irrealism aims to translate
psychological reality into physical reality. Whittenburg adds that an attempt to depict
psychological reality as physical reality “imitates the reality of a dream” (149), and
she goes on to discuss Erich Fromm’s discussion of “accidental symbols” in
individual writers:
However, we contend that, in irreal fiction, the dreamlike nature of the
work is sustained precisely by the writer’s use of accidental symbols
without comment. Borges’ labyrinth, Kafka’s bureaucratic mazes,
Carrington’s horses161 all seem to come from intense personal
experiences but are used in fiction as they occur in a dream—without
comment and with intense emotional and psychological import. As a
result, irreal fiction, like dreams, is both deeply personal and truly
international (150).
The definition of irrealism used in this study is closest to a combination of
descriptions offered by Alice Whittenburg and G.S. Evans. In describing the
distinction between magical realism, fairy tales, and other forms of fantasy related
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realism as compared to irrealism, Evans notes, “One of the key differences is that in
these other genres, there is an internal consistency to the ‘impossible’ physics of the
story; that is, once the reader understands and accepts this alternative physics, he or
she can assume that the story and the world it describes will be consistent with it”
(153). In other words, in the other genres a special physics is set up by the author of
the story so that this physics is maintained throughout the story: “In an irreal story,
however, not only is the physics underlying the story impossible, as it is in other
genres, but is also fundamentally and essentially unpredictable (in that it is not based
on any traditional or scientific conception of physics) and unexplained” (Evans,
“What is Irrealism?” 154). These two elements—the unpredictable and the
unexplained—are clearly primary to the work of Borges and Varo. Interestingly, this
description works of irrealism stands as a description of wonder as well.
Also, while Borges’s creative process bears some resemblance to other
“literary philosophers” such as Italo Calvino and Umberto Eco,162 the point here is
that Borges’s fictional writing and poetry contain a combination of philosophical,
fabulist, and other literary elements, including an erudite intertextuality and an
interest in mysticism, all of which are topics or aspects of storytelling that are not
alien to the fable. Varo combines these elements and uses them in her visual
narratology. Both artists present an irreal quality to their fabulist storytelling, which
are not simply a fantasy, a term too general to describe their work.
“Fantasy” has a broader range of meanings and uses ("fantasy | phantasy,
n.")163, but rather than used as a literary genre or as a psychological term, fantasy is
emphasized and explicated as a Husserlian phenomenological understanding of
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fantasy as “imagination, or the process or the faculty of forming mental
representations of things not actually present” (“fantasy | phantasy, n." definitions 4a,
4b, 4c). That process is evident in the work of both Varo and Borges. As was
explicated in Chapter One on Husserlian transcendental phenomenology, the
structural aesthetic workings of fantasy or creative imagination can be examined in
detail in the fabulist work of Varo and Borges. That their work is rooted in wonder
even before being subsequently called magical, mysterious, fantastic or imaginative
would seem to be a simple point, but as will be seen ahead, it is a complex topic less
explored than one might expect.
The fable is a distinct form of fiction. In fact, fable can be understood to be
different from fiction, according to Foucault, who notes that fiction is “an ‘aspect’ of
the fable” (Aesthetics 137). The fable, Foucault emphasizes, is what is functioning
within a narrative as episodes, characters, or other content being related, whereas
fiction is the narrative system (Aesthetics 137). Nonetheless, a fable is generally
considered to be a genre of storytelling, or what would be categorized under fiction.
How a fable differs from a fairy tale, folk tale, anecdote, parable or apologue is clear
in some respects and nebulous in other ways. The last two categories mentioned—
parable and apologue—are the closest in kind to fables, although the distinctions
between even those three labels are less than absolute. The main difference between a
parable and a fable is that a fable can include anthropomorphized characters—
animals, plants, and even inanimate objects, while a parable does not; both can
express a moral lesson, but this moral instructive quality is not an obligated
characteristic for a fable. The apologue usually does contain moral instruction, but
257

like a fable can have anthropomorphized animals, plants and objects. George
Orwell’s Animal Farm, for example, can be described as an apologue. Thus, while
apologue is perhaps the nearest literary cousin of fable, inherent moral instruction is
not mandatory for a fable. Again, these distinctions are not always clear. The fable,
like some of the other categories of storytelling, is an ancient form, and one that is
universal among the world’s cultures. Storytelling in India and Africa in particular
have strong connections to fabulism. Famously classic fabulists in Europe include
Aesop, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, and even Leonardo da Vinci. In modern times,
Leo Tolstoy, Franz Kafka, Ambrose Bierce, James Thurber, Italo Calvino, and Jorge
Luis Borges have all been described as fabulists. In the interest of consistency, but
also because these artists are often (although not always) creating work within a
sphere that can be described as fabulism, the term fabulist is used here for both
Borges and Varo.
The highly idiosyncratic oeuvres of Varo and Borges reflect the synergetic
interaction that arises between individual consciousness and a sense of universality
and prior unity inherent in many artistic sensibilities aimed at locating and expressing
the numinous in art. Borges and Varo’s respective preferences to acknowledge and
portray human consciousness and human self-identification at the root of their
fabulist storytelling—no matter how irrealistic and strange—becomes one of the most
accessible and most luminous factors of their art.
Borges and Varo’s uses of irreal fabulism are related to subjectivity and
intersubjectivity. Thus it is relevant to understand how Husserl’s work with
fantasy164 is related to Borges and Varo’s irrealism, because much about Husserlian
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fantasy or imagination can be incorporated into fabulist storytelling, including their
orientations to time and space.
The Temporal-Spatial Theme
There are a number of themes that appear in the work of both Varo and
Borges, albeit via different approaches, that define both artists’ work as irrealistic
fabulist narratives. While narrative remains central to the creative processes of each,
it must be emphasized that when we speak of narrative in Varo and Borges, we must
necessarily accentuate nonlinear narrative. Time and space are challenged and
reshaped for artistic purpose in their work, while at the same time subjective selfidentification disintegrates and recombines in startling ways. Varo and Borges add a
spatial-temporal plasticity to their narratives, which makes sense also in that spatialtemporal plasticity is inherent in irrealism.
A concept of journey-as-search, or journey-as-revelation sometimes arises in
relation to time. One theme surfacing in much of their work is an artistic reflection
and in some cases direct acknowledgement of an invisible eternal and infinite
absolute that is real beyond socially presumed conventions of physical appearances
and conventional presumptions about spatial mechanics. These sometimes playful
themes, in other words, seem more substantial in the context of fabulist storytelling
than either unquestioned rote belief or uninspected denial of ontological “reality.”
Questioning reality and presuppositional belief systems about the world and
self while simultaneously envisioning underlying, even invisible appearances are not
unique to fables. Genres like science fiction and magical realism, surrealism and
cubism, and especially some modernist non-objective abstract painting enter this
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philosophical terrain of invisible and redefined reality. However, those genres of
visual and literary art are not fabulist art in the sense that the storytelling narratives of
Varo and Borges are fables.
While an underlying reality—which is described as a numinous presence in
this study—can be explored by the artistic genres mentioned above, the main point is
that many works of literary and visual art explore what seems to be hidden behind
outer appearances. This numinous, invisible presence can be felt, experienced and
expressed through some styles of art making and some art, including the fabulist art
of Varo and Borges.
Another issue is to consider how the portrayal of human identification is an
orientation to art for life’s sake. This particular usage of the phrase “art for life’s
sake” is intended to reference neither the 1875-1920 American arts and crafts
movement nor a superficial notion or theory that every person is an accomplished
artist, however genuine and significant those types of topics may be in their own
contexts. More relevant renderings of art for life’s sake in the context of the present
study are the ideas and writings of Ellen Dissanayake and Mikhail Bakhtin.
Art for Life’s Sake: Dissanayake
Dissanayake’s view of art for life’s sake is distilled into to what she refers to
as a “palaeoanthropsychobiological” description of art that includes, Dissanayake
notes, several interrelated points:
First, that the idea of art encompasses all of human history (i.e., as far
back as the Paleolithic or even earlier): second, that it include all
human societies (i.e., is anthropological or cross-cultural); and third,
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that it accounts for the fact that art is a psychological or emotional
need and has psychological or emotional effects. Most people would
probably agree that their personal “idea of art” includes these things,
but I will show you that as presently practiced and taught in the West,
art is a conceptual ragbag or casserole full of the most incompatible
and confusing notions” (“Art for Life’s Sake” 169).165
While Dissanayake’s assertion about art in the West makes
palaeoanthropsychobiological sense, she also makes a point about the modern
distinction between art and decoration, thereby addressing how an elitist presumption
feeds the idea that art is a superfluous activity as compared with seemingly more
critical sociopolitical issues:
To be sure, among the settlers of our country, women—motivated
perhaps by notions of gentility—did put pictures on the walls, curtains
at the window, embroidered covers on the pillows. James Agee, in Let
Us Now Praise Famous Men, describes the lacelike paper cutouts
made by a sharecropper’s wife to decoratively edge her mantelpiece.
And young ladies of the 1920’s, going out to work or aspiring to
become proper housewives, learned from books like Harriet and Vetta
Goldstein’s Art in Every Day Life how to dress themselves and furnish
their homes with good taste (Art and Intimacy 175).166
Dissanayake emphasizes that since women have been, “disparaged and
disregarded, so have, perhaps by association, artists—for similarly reasons: they are
traditionally more concerned with appearance (‘making things nice’) and involvement
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with other people and their emotional needs” (Art and Intimacy 175-176). A search
for a universal evolutionary aesthetic standard, however, is sure to require an
unearthing of the idea of beauty, which in modern times has led a vast array of
opinions. Dissanyake emphasizes that a “naturalistic criteria for aesthetic quality”
(Art and Intimacy 209) does exist, a criteria rooted in the Greek aeshetikos, or sense
perception, which also incudes the sensation or feeling of beauty. While it is a given
that sensation enters into every human action or engagement, contemporary society—
and especially contemporary art and academic society—generally questions the
notion and feeling of beauty:
Over recent decades, and for what seem like good democratic reasons,
we have learned to shun terms such as “beauty,” “quality,” and
“transcendence” and deny the ideas they embody. While these words
were staples of Victorian conversations about the elevating effects of
art, they have become as unmentionable and taboo in contemporary
discourse as “breast” and “thigh” were to the Victorians. With their
residue of patriarchy, privilege, religiosity, and European dominion,
the very words now imply a kind of unexamined self-satisfaction, selfinterest, and ultra-conservatism that has become widely suspect (Art
and Intimacy 207).
While the discrediting of beauty and aesthetic value by postmodernist theory
makes sociopolitical sense in regards to critically addressing the presumptions of selfinterests and presumed elitist privileges of the powerful in society, something is also
lost via the inhibitive nature of that sociopolitical injunction. Dissanyake goes on to
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point out that evolutionist art theorists also presume that human beings make choices
that are ultimately beneficial for the person making a choice. The logic of that
argument and the cultural experience underlying such choices seems clear if art is
understood to be “an accidental by-product of big brains” (Art and Intimacy 207) and
the “enticements of our adaptive interests” (Art and Intimacy 208), but what if art is
understood to be a more universal human motivation and capacity? What if artmaking is as natural to Homo sapiens as sex and reproduction, or food gathering and
eating? This is certainly part of Dissanyake’s argument, and if one studies the
evidence of all artistic history sans any unconscious Eurocentric intellectual
theoretical bias or consciously constructed and arbitrary art history categorizations,
that possibility presents its own validation. From the Chauvet, Lascaux, and Altamira
cave art167 to the art of Joseph Cornell, Adolf Wölfli, Banksy and other graffiti artists,
and the countless examples between the prehistoric and the contemporary, art for
life’s sake is everywhere evident as a primary manifestation.
Art for Life’s Sake: Bakhtin
Of the numerous possible scholarly explications of art for life’s sake, several
are clearly relevant in the work of Mikhail Bakhtin. As noted by Deborah Haynes,
“Of particular focus are [Bakhtin’s] ideas regarding ‘art for life’s sake’ and
‘theoretism” (Bakhtin Reframed 11).168 Considering the former idea, and the
distinctions between art for art’s sake and art for life’s sake that, as Haynes notes, was
asserted earlier by Kant, Schiller, Goethe, Schelling, and others, “the intersection of
art and life that Bakhtin valued” (12) is key to understanding the orientations of Varo
and Borges.
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Bakhtinian Carnivalesque, Dialogical, Polyphonic Elements in Varo and Borges
In fact, a number of Bakhtinian theories are relevant when examining Varo’s
paintings and Borges’s stories. Bakhtin's theory of "carnivalesque" can help explicate
their artistic preferences for irrealism, as well as reflecting artistically "art for life's
sake." Carnivalesque is especially useful for explicating Varo's paintings, which
reflect various aspects of unconventional social turmoil and self-identification,
search, and mystery. Also Bakhtin's "dialogism" is useful in understanding the
storytelling or narrative drive of both artists, and how they deal with subjectivity in
their respective creative inventions, especially for Borges, whose literary characters
can be immersed in multiple perspectives that contrast monologism with polyphonic
and dialogic dynamics, even within a single protagonist:
Bakhtin conceives existence as the kind of book we call a novel, or
more accurately as many novels (the radically manifold world
proposed by Bakhtin looks much like Borges’s Library of Babel), for
all of us write our own such text, a text that is then called our life.
Bakhtin uses the literary genre of the novel as an allegory for
representing existence as the condition of authoring (Holquist 30).
Furthermore, some of these Bakhtinian issues can be related coherently to
Husserlian phenomenological explications of memory, fantasy, and image
consciousness in the specific work of Varo and Borges.
The Bakhtinian carnivalesque elucidates the use of irrealist fabulism in the
writings of Borges and paintings of Varo while also signaling a life-positive
orientation to the human being, one that affirms a sensibility of art for life’s sake. In
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his Rabelais and His World, Bakhtin considers the role of the carnivalesque in the
festive life of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, including its relationship to the
medieval festival known as the Feast of Fools. Bakhtin broadens that orientation into
a cultural and literary assessment of the carnival spirit that can be applied beyond his
study of Rabelais’s Gargantua and Pantagruel. Bakhtin presents the carnivalesque as
a merging of the sacred with the irreligious or profane, inspiring an anti-authoritarian,
contrarian celebration of life and art. A liberating attitude towards the humor and the
grotesque is inherent in the carnivalesque, and has been noted earlier, humor is one of
the cardinal elements in the creativity of Varo and Borges. Disorder and chaos
merged with a sense of openness to the world and the human spirit in the sense of
Bakhtinian “gay relativity” yields what can be described as an abasement of authority
that yields not only freedom but spiritual affirmation. As a celebration of the human
body and spirit, even in its grotesqueness, the carnival or carnivalesque lends power
to an undermining of hierarchical officialdom and authoritative presuppositions.
Borges and Varo each respectively finds an ability to combine carnivalesque humor
with a spiritual gravitas through their fabulist excursions into irreality.
Irrealism allows an artist to obliquely address reality, as is evident in many of
Varo’s paintings and Borges’s stories. While the landscape of their respective visual
and literary storytelling might be called a form of fantasy, the sense of feast in the
midst of journey—a celebratory anarchy or bedlam considerably more disarrayed and
complex than Hemmingway’s moveable feast—leaves in its wake a challenging
response to authoritative pieties missed by more widely acknowledged genres and
categories. Both artists immerse their work in popular cultural while simultaneously
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challenging, through the carnivalesque, categorical presumptions and cultural
limitations of a seemingly stabilized society.
Bakhtin’s concepts like dialogue and the dialogic are also relevant here.
Deborah Haynes writes about the significance of dialogue in Bakhtin’s work:
First, dialogue refers to the fact that every utterance is by nature
dialogic. Second, dialogue means utterances that are directed to
someone in a unique situation, and thus dialogue can be either
monologic or dialogic. Third, Bakhtin understood life itself as
dialogue. We participate in such dialogues our entire lives, with our
bodies and through the acts we undertake. Dialogue, therefore, is
epistemological. Only through dialogue do we know ourselves, other
persons and the world (Bakhtin Reframed 142).
Thus, even in the midst of employing dialogism as a literary aesthetic concept,
Bakhtin remains rooted in life itself. That Borges and Varo’s works pivot on the
theme of art for life’s sake signals how art cannot be divorced from or unrelated to
human existence
Nor is this without a strong connection to phenomenology, one scholar, using
Merleau-Ponty’s work169 to address dialogue and life in Bakhtin, writes: “Like
Bakhtin, Merleau-Ponty sees the human subject as living on borderlines, essentially
tuned to the other, within and without” (Erdinast-Vulcan 157).
Bataille as Artist-Philosopher
In regards to presenting an additional example of the writings of an artistphilosopher, the work of Georges Bataille is worth mentioning in that it might be
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described as presenting a highly emotive version of the Bakhtinian carnivalesque.
Similarly, like Borges, Bataille is an atypical seeker of spiritual truth, albeit one more
expressive and disclosed about sacred orientations in art than Borges. Bataille’s
approach is asymmetric in the sense that his search for the numinous is continually
being revised to express the multifarious aspects of seeking the seemingly
incommunicable mystery of the sacred. Although he shared with Schopenhauer and
Borges a reluctance to acknowledge a more conventional or religious approach to
spirituality in art, it is his passion for that search that is underscored: “Bataille was a
seeker after God, even though he didn’t admit it, ‘a new mystic,’ who would propose
a desertion of History in favor of ‘ecstatic swoon’ ” (Besnier 13).170 Bataille, perhaps
partly due to his emotional nature, proved incapable of suppressing his attraction to
the numinous in spite of his intellectual aspirations:
I too ‘want to see myself as an intellectual’ provided that I do not take
it lightly—that is, provided that I do not give the impression of being
‘upright’ and honest by renouncing my espousal of existence in its
totality, on the pretext of restricting myself to knowledge, or by letting
it be imagined that is possible scientifically to overcome ‘the
unpredictable course of things’ (15).171
Bataille’s words echo his orientation to knowledge and nonknowledge, his
resistance to the virtually universal acceptance of scientific materialism as a measure
of validity, and his observations about chance and the limitations of conventional or
fixed approaches to intellectuality.
It does not matter if a reader or viewer judges something to be real or not real
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because fabulist art exists via the representative function of imagination. To reiterate
what was emphasized above, the imagined object, which is to say the represented
object, does not have to exist in the same spatial or temporal setting as the so-called
real object being represented by the imagination.
Real existence means what? One definition: “What is real rather than
imagined or desired; the aggregate of real things or existences; that which underlies
and is the truth of appearances or phenomena” ("reality, n."). In other words,
imagination itself is not considered to be real but imaginary, and indeed, Husserl’s
use of “phantasy” as a synonym of the imagination signals that usage. However,
given that the irrealistic work of Varo and Borges (and other artists and writers) resist
conventional definitions of reality, as well as any literary or artistic genre, also points
to the paramount importance of art. Genre-making seems to be an irresistible impulse
for many literary and art theorists and critics, and while a philosopher like Nelson
Goodman172 can accurately define and describe irrealism in epistemological terms,
irrealism itself defies categorization.
At this point, it is useful to describe the irreal fabulism of Borges and Varo
separately in more detail.
Borges: Artist-Philosopher
Although Borges, one of the most erudite creative writers of modern times,
has been described as a literary philosopher,173 Borges never described himself as a
philosopher: “Borges was not a philosopher, and never considered himself to be one”
(Griffin 5). From a distance, then, philosophy and theory might be seen by a spectator
as two anxiously hungry dogs following Borges—in spite of his ignoring them—
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during one of his walks through the streets of Buenos Aires. Borges approached
philosophy via his own highly individual path, primarily an oblique literary approach
of a philosophical storyteller. “I am neither a philosopher nor a metaphysician; what I
have done is to exploit [explotar: also ‘explode’],174 or to explore—a more noble
word—the literary possibilities of philosophy” (Johnson 1).175
In other words, Borges uses philosophy for his art, something that is apparent
for any reader of his fabulist work. Borges is working, in a highly creative and
frequently playful way, with philosophy in the manner of an artist-philosopher despite
his claim to not being a philosopher. Although Borges claimed he could not read
Kant, his lifelong reading of Schopenhauer is well-known, as is his longtime interest
in the writings and ideas of the Swedish theologian and mystic Emanuel Swedenborg
(1688-1772), the writings of William James, and other thinkers who did not shy away
from topics about the numinous and related topics.
An influence on the young Borges in Buenos Aires was his father’s friend
Macedonio Fernández, an eccentric writer, humorist, philosopher, and attorney whose
thoughts, talks, and writings reflected an extreme idealism (Williamson, Borges, 96).
Macedonio’s influence on Borges is related to issues such as subjectivity and
irrealism:
In later years Borges came to regard Macedonio Fernandez as a far
better talker that he was a writer. Even so, the influence of
Macedonio’s ideas on Borges’s writing was crucial, especially as
regards two fundamental themes that would not come to maturity until
the 1940’s—the “unreality” of the material world and the nonexistence
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of the “I,” or individual subject. Borges would elaborate this latter idea
into one of his most striking themes—the arbitrariness of personal
identity, the notion that an individual could, in principle, be any other,
an idea he had already come across in Schopenhauer (Williamson,
Borges, 97).
In Borges’s case, his interest in mysticism is often acknowledged by literary
scholars as being only a peripheral phenomenon. Yet the opposite could be argued
and has been argued by some writers and scholars.176 Borges’s interest in numinous
was clearly more than a peripheral matter only distantly related to being a literary
artist. The titles of some of his creative writings alone indicate Borges’s interest in
this area, including pieces like “The Aleph,” “The Cult of the Phoenix,” and “The
Approach to Al-Mu’tasim.” Likewise, Borges’s philosophical bent is evident in his
titles: “A Problem,” “Everything and Nothing,” The Other,” and “His End and His
Beginning,” among many others.
Consider, for example, “A Problem.”177 As he did years earlier in “Pierre
Menard, Author of Quixote,” Borges pivots his story around one of the world’s
preeminent masterpieces of fictions, The Ingenius Gentleman Don Quixote of La
Mancha (El ingenioso hidalgo don Quijote de la Mancha). However, it is how he
accomplishes this creative appropriation that is significant in “a Problem.”
“Let us imagine…” opens this fable (Collected Fictions 308). As mentioned
earlier, Husserl uses the word phantasy as a synonym for imagination. What is
immediately “given” in Husserlian terms is the appearance of an object of fantasy.
The reader, then, receives or intuits that presentation, which because this is a work of
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imagination is actually a re-presentation. Yet as always with Borges, the line between
imagination or fantasy and so-called reality is nebulous in that the narrative is a
woven strand of what is “real” (historical) and imaginary, a strand described in this
study as irrealism. The entire opening sentence of “A Problem” reads, “Let us
imagine that a piece of paper with a text in Arabic on it is discovered in Toledo, and
that paleographers declare the text to have been written by that same Cide Hamete
Benengeli from whom Cervantes derived Don Quixote” (308).
After openly declaring the imaginary state, or re-presentation of this “piece of
paper,” the author immediately begins to construct a communication based on an
amalgamation of fantasy and fact. One might say Borges is “bracketing in” facts into
his fables or stories. The character Cide Hamete Benengeli is not a historical person,
yet neither is he invented by Borges. Benengeli is a character invented by Cervantes
who is then appropriated by Borges. References like the Arabic text and Toledo are
obviously “factual.” This kind of creative invention in fiction is not unique to Borges,
of course, but, as noted earlier, how he accomplishes that creative process in a
scholarly style reflects a distinctive Borgesian style. In a single fabulist sentence
Borges presents elements of irrealism, literary intertextuality, and an undermining of
historical authenticity. The question then arises as to whether or not Borges’s work
can be more clearly understood via critical theory explications.
Borges and Critical Theory
In terms of structuralist and poststructuralist critical theory, while there was
some positive acknowledgement of Borges’s literary creations, there was scant indepth critical regard for his work until critics and literary scholars began to write
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studies of Borges. Foucault’s positive response to Borges has been discussed earlier.
Michael Wood, in an essay titled “Borges and Theory,” describes how Borges draws
near to some of the common issues in French theory without actually merging with
them:
The world of Borges’s fiction, in its most amply philosophically
mischievous measures, maps very convincingly on to a number of
preoccupations we find in (French) critical theory, associated in
particular with the names of, respectively, Michael Foucault, Louis
Althusser, Roland Barthes, and Jacques Lacan. I am thinking of
discourse (rather than material event) as the source of meaning in
history; ideology as ubiquitous and unavoidable (rather than
representing any given set of chosen political assumptions); mythology
as an aspect of every day contemporary life; and the realm of the
symbolic as that of shared social existence. These notions differ from
each other in important ways, of course, but each has a touch of
Borges about it, and each involves a system of meaning which allows
for the investigation of realities felt to be (often distressingly) out of
reach or caught up in complicated mediations (33).
The final sentence is a lucid summation of the relationship between Borges
and critical theory. Wood adds:
“If his writing forms an attractive provocation for Foucault, and a
half-denied parallel project for Lacan,178 for other Europeans it is
something like an indispensable reference, the mark of a stylish and
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informed modernity, and an acknowledgment that playfulness too
must be part of any sophisticated skepticism” (33).
Other theorists such as Jacques Derrida, who references two quotations from
Borges in his essay “Plato’s Pharmacy” but does not substantially comment on
Borges beyond Borges’s words—words Derrida uses primarily to support his own
argument (Wood 34)—knew about Borges but did not write extensively or directly
about his work. Julia Kristeva responded similarly, noted Wood: “Julia Kristeva’s
chief allusion to Borges is similar in style to Derrida’s: a swift evocation and a trail of
associations” (35).179 Wood goes on to say that Kristeva does quote from Borges’s
story “The Cruel Redeemer Lazarus Morrell” in his A Universal History of Iniquity
because in “Morrell’s sinister ingenuity Kristeva finds an allegory of modern writing,
cut off from the sacred” (36), but he accurately points out that she goes on to
emphasize her own, not Borges’s, accents of horror, which are like a void beneath
beautiful artifices:
Borges certainly looks into this void, and his elegant, worldly irony
recognizes, or glances at, all kinds of horrors. But he doesn’t sink into
them. His writing is a way of navigating the space between the dark
and the light (36).
This elucidates a key point for both Borges and Varo’s work—they both
navigated a route between dark and light, and yet neither artist sank into darkness or
negativity, partly because of their playfulness and humor, but primarily because of
their respective searches for the numinous.
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Wood discusses Borges and Roland Barthes as well. Although in his writings
and lectures Barthes never mentioned Borges, they were on the same page, so to
speak, in that, as Wood says, “…what really connects Borges and Barthes, makes
them ‘precursors’ of each other, so to speak, is the sense not that the author is hidden
or ghostly or inaccessible or not needed but that the reader creates the author” (37).
Wood points out that Borges’s story “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote” from the
1944 The Garden of Forking Paths (El jardín de senderous que se bifurcan)180
perfectly reflects this notion of the reader creating the author.
In fact, there is much about “Pierre Menard” that echoes Borges’s role in this
study: questions of subjectivity, reality, fantasy, memory, and invisible presence,
among others. As in much of Borges’s fabulist literature, the opening paragraph of
this story conveys a seemingly authentic scholarly tone, with compelling and
seemingly factual details from life and history. Most importantly, at least to this
reader, is that a resonant, attractive quality arises as the words flow by. This resonant
and arresting feeling remains distant yet unmistakably present in the reader’s
awareness, forming initially a confluence of narration and reader consciousness, but
quickly establishing a sense of assimilation between the narrative and the reader, and
between the characters and the reader, an amalgamating quality that instills a sense of
intersubjective singularity in the reader. Existing on the cusp between conscious and
unconscious awareness, the reader begins to identify with the anonymous author
presenting the narrative:
The visible oeuvre left by this novelist can be easily and briefly
enumerated; unpardonable, therefore, are the omissions and additions
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perpetrated by Mme. Henri Bachelier in a deceitful catalog that a
certain newspaper, whose Protestant leaning are surely no secret, has
been so inconsiderate as to inflict upon that newspaper’s deplorable
readers—few and Calvinist (if not Masonic and circumcised) though
they be. Menard’s true friends have greeted that catalog with alarm,
and even with a degree of sadness. One might note that only yesterday
were we gathered before his marmoreal place of rest, among the dreary
cypresses, and already Error is attempting to tarnish his bright
Memory….Most decidedly, a brief rectification is imperative
(Collected Fictions 88).
Also evident in the opening to “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote” are
some of the qualities mentioned earlier by Michael Wood that are present in the
majority of Borges’s creative work: discourse, ideology, mythology, the symbolic.
The narrator goes on to reveal that Menard has authored many obscure and
philosophical works, and has written two chapters of Don Quixote. Yet Menard’s
writings are not exactly the same two chapters of Don Quixote written by Miguel de
Cervantes, or more accurately, they are and they are not. How can this be? It is
actually Borges’s narrator who addresses this issue:
It is a revelation to compare the Don Quixote of Pierre Menard with
that of Miguel de Cervantes. Cervantes, for example, wrote the
following (Part I, Chapter IX):
…truth, whose mother is history, rival of time, depository of deeds,
witness of the past, exemplar and adviser to the present, and the
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future’s counselor. This catalog of attributes, written in the
seventeenth century, and written by the “ingenious layman” Miguel de
Cervantes, is mere rhetorical praise of history. Menard, on the other
hand, writes:
…truth, whose mother is history, rival of time, depository of
deeds, witness of the past, exemplar and advisor to the present,
and the future’s counselor.
History, the mother of truth!—the idea is staggering. Menard, a
contemporary of William James, defines history not as delving into
reality but as the very fount of reality. Historical truth, for Menard, is
not “what happened”; it is what we believe happened. The final
phrases—exemplar and adviser to the present, and the future’s
counselor—are brazenly pragmatic (94).
That both versions of the commentary above—that of Cervantes and
Menard—are identical, says everything about Borges and his ability to
simultaneously disclose and deceive, to graciously bestow and mischievously beguile,
while entertaining and transporting the reader. Borges transports the reader into his
irreal storytelling, and once the reader is within the story, he or she becomes almost
unknowingly activated as a participant—the fabricator, commentator, and narrator of
a fabulist tale. A number of issues germane to the present study surface in this kind of
milieu—two being the self-forgetting and not-knowing experiences of the readernarrator. Also apparent is the plasticity of thought—inherent temporal-spatial
alignments and instability of what is only apparently stable philosophical truth.
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Borges does not hesitate to dismantle ontological and epistemological
presuppositions; he continuously challenges intellectual belief systems. In “Pierre
Menard” the narrator says:
There is no intellectual exercise that is not ultimately pointless. A
philosophical doctrine is, at first, a plausible description of the
universe; the years go by, and it is a mere chapter—if not a paragraph
or proper noun—in the history of philosophy (94).
Being himself a master of philosophical obscurity allows Borges to create a
forest of non-sequiturs for thinkers. Entering one of Borges’s famous mazes is a
philosophical, even an aesthetic risk. In fact, the reluctance of Lacan, Derrida,
Barthes, and other modern French theorists to adequately address Borges’s work may
be partly due to its idiosyncratic, irrealistic style, confounding any preconceived
expectations—literal, narratological, philosophical or theoretical. In some respects,
Borges can be more obscure and oblique than some of the French theorists who have
occasionally been accused of being obscure and oblique. What makes Borges’s
fabulism in some sense as rich if not richer than the work of those illustrious theorists
is that theorists, despite being at times brilliantly original and witty, often take
themselves very seriously. Does Borges take himself seriously? At some level, how
could he not? Yet Borges remains a genius of elegant and playful humor, even of a
kind of quiet hilarity and self-effacement. His work reflects a quality—not his
primary quality, perhaps, but nonetheless on that is always present—of not quite
trusting philosophy either in his beloved library or in himself.
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On the other hand, it could also be argued that Borges’s work was simply a
literary precursor of what later came to be developed by the French theorists:
In “Pierre Menard,” Borges presents a conception of writing which is
radically new, indeed revolutionary, and which seems to anticipate by
some twenty years certain ideas developed by French theorists. Like
Michael Foucault, Menard questions the existence of an objective
historical reality and suggests that the reader constructs the so-called
truths of history; like Julia Kristeva, Menard wants to show that a text
is not an original piece of writing but a web of “intertextual” relations;
and like Jacques Derrida, Menard denies the possibility of discovering
the “presence” of an author in a literary text. Above all, the story
heralds what Roland Barthes would famously call the “Death of the
Author”—Menard’s project undermines that idea that a text
communicates a message from what Barthes called the “Author-God.”
Every reader, therefore, is a kind of Pierre Menard who repeats the
worlds of the text as he reads and changes their meaning as he adjusts
them to his own subjectivity (Williamson, “Borges in Context,” 211).
Nonetheless, Jacques Derrida is well aware of Borges’s work. In what is one
of Derrida’s most beautiful books, Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-Portrait and Other
Ruins, he considers with his usual insight and accomplished intertextual finesse some
great writers who were blind or who became blind—Homer, Joyce, Milton, Borges
(33). Derrida writes, “Borges begins with Homer; he then ends with Joyce—and, still
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just as modestly, with the self-portrait of the author as a blind man, as a man of
memory, and this, just after an allusion to castration” (35).
Borges discussed his making of fables at times. In one conversation with
fellow Argentinian Osvaldo Ferrari in the 1980s about Borges’s upcoming second trip
to Japan, Italy and Greece, Ferrari asks Borges why he still retained (at his advanced
age and in spite of his blindness) an excellent facility for travel. Borges replied:
One reason would be my blindness, my feeling countries without
being able to see them. If I stay in Buenos Aires, my life will
be…insignificant. I will always be inventing fables, dictating. On the
other hand, if I travel, I will be acquiring new impressions.
Impressions which will, in the end, turn into literature (Borges and
Ferrari, Conversations Volume 1, 7).
This statement is interesting because it indicates that Borges was not simply
“inventing” fables to dictate as short stories, but merging his fables with so-called real
life. While referencing the non-fictional world and one’s personal life may be
common, if not universal, with literary writers, merging fact with fiction was a
paramount aspect of Borges’s work.
Besides Derrida’s book being a excellent example of erudition and his ability
to apply heterogeneous approaches to a topic, it is a wonderful instance of the levels
of complexity that sometimes arise with intertexuality—wherein an intertextual
comment can be pivoted from another intertexual comment. Given the scholarly
erudition of both Borges and Derrida, one can only wonder at what an active
friendship between the two might have given the world.
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To return to the point being discussed—there actually are connections
between Borges and critical theorists. In a sense, one could argue that theorists and
philosophers—at least in some cases and at least in certain moments—are so
committed to their concepts that they unconsciously become trapped in an
unintentional sophism. One challenge for scholars is determine how to navigate the
exclusivities and limitations of scholarly language, as well as how to dismantle
whatever academic conservatism might underlie scholarly professionalism. Borges
almost invariably remains humble and even self-deprecating. Theorists, although
some are modest individuals, are not, generally speaking, self-deprecating.181 One of
the chief advantages the artist-philosopher has over other thinkers is
straightforward—the artist-philosopher can present concepts, ideas, and even theories
through making art. A preeminent contemporary thinker, Alain Badiou, has
commented at length on the artist-philosopher dynamic:
A bond that is forever affected by a symptom, one of oscillation, of
throbbing. From the very beginning there is Plato's judgement
ostracizing poetry, theatre and music. By and large the founding father
of philosophy—a refined connoisseur of the arts no doubt—preserves,
in The Republic, only military music and patriotic chants. On the other
hand, you find a pious devotion to art, a contrite bending of the
concept, reasoned as technical nihilism, against the poetic word that
alone proffers the world at the latent Openness of its own angst. Yet,
after all, Protagoras the sophist, singled out the apprenticeship of arts
as the key to education. There was an alliance of Protagoras and
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Simonides the poet, which Plato's Socrates attempts to thwart the
casuistry and enslave the rational¹s intensity to his own benefit. An
image comes to mind, an analogous matrix of meaning: philosophy
and art are historically coupled the way the Master and the Hysteric
coalesce in Lacan. You know how the hysteric confronts the master
and says: "The truth speaks through my tongue, I am 'there,' and you,
who knows, do tell me who I am." And you surmise that whatever
wisdom and subtleties lie in the master's reply, the hysteric will let him
know it is not as yet that, that her "there" evades the catch, that all
should be resumed, and a lot of effort is required to please her. She
thereby takes command over the master and becomes maîtresse du
maître. As it is, art is always already there, addressing the thinker with
the silent and scintillating question of its own identity. However,
through constant invention—its metamorphosis—art dismisses
whatever the philosopher has to say concerning its own self (Badiou
“Art and Philosophy”).
The artist in a thinker, or the thinker in an artist, creates an unusual situation.
In Borges’s case, despite his rich and extensive literary output of fiction, nonfiction,
and poetry, and his immense erudition, Borges is attracted to anonymity, obscurity,
and self-imitation. The art of both Varo and Borges contains mirrors and labyrinths,
conundrums and paradoxes. In a metaphorical sense, Borges is a richly attired clown
who is attracted to and can deftly and eloquently transmit the carnivalesque and the
grotesque via his irrealistic, fabulist narrative. In fact, as pointed out by Manuel
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Duráin and Fay R. Rogg, there are parallel universes in Borges’s Pierre Menard, and
Cervantes’ Don Quixote, not to mention the work of another irreal storyteller, Franz
Kafka:
Borges (1899-1986) and Kafka [1883-1924] have much in common.
Both like parables. Kafka’s parables tend to be mysterious, dark, and
tragic. Borges’s parables are more whimsical, sometimes contradictory
and ambiguous, often disconcerting, and occasionally irritating.
Borges plays games, invents nonexistent literary works, even
encyclopedias. He creates fake footnotes; in other words, he has fun
and at the same time sends messages for the reader to decipher. This
technique is reminiscent of that found in murder mysteries where the
reader may eventually guess the identity of the murderer after
uncovering clues along the way (228).
And of course there are parallels between the narratives of Borges and
Cervantes, which is another reason “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote” has long
fascinated literary scholars. “Borges’s approach to criticism is ironic and devastating”
(229). Duráin and Rogg go on to address the Borgesian maze, which is significant
enough to quote at length because the authors elucidate much about Borges’s work:
The words used to define history are the same, but [between Cervantes
and Menard], but their meaning is not, simply because the cultural
horizon has shifted toward relativity. Starting wit the Enlightenment
and Kant’s philosophy, this fact erodes the belief in an absolute,
immutable truth in the field of history, accessible to true, devoted,
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scientific historians. Whatever Cervantes may have thought about
history, we are today less confident of reaching a perfect
understanding of the past, and Borges’s essay (or is it an obituary?)
states this in an ironic and oblique fashion; there will always be room
for another interpretation of the past. This applies to Cervantes’s
novel, which will be the subject of new interpretation as new
generations appear on the historic horizon. Borges himself stated again
and again that his readers have interpreted whatever he wrote and that
basically it is up to them to decide on the meaning of his work (230).
This point signals how what was asserted earlier in the present study—that a
work of art or literature is not complete until it is completed by the viewer or the
reader—is always relevant. That Duchamp emphasized this issue as well as Borges is
interesting; neither of them liked their work being categorized by scholars or fit into
definitive aesthetic categories.
Borges and Subjectivity
Borges’s fictional prose in pieces like “Borges and I” reflect an ongoing
struggle with subjectivity and the idea of self. Describing this “other” man—
“Borges,” the author “allows” both his and Borges’s existence, about which the
author of “Borges and I” feels, at best, ambivalence:
I t would be an exaggeration to say that our relationship is hostile—I
live, I allow myself to live, so that Borges can spin out his literature,
and that literature is my justification. I willingly admit that he has
written a number of sound pages, but those pages will not save me,
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perhaps because the good in them no longer belongs to any individual,
not even that other man, but rather to language itself, or to tradition.
Beyond that, I am doomed—utterly and inevitably—to oblivion, and
fleeting moments will be all of me that survives in that other man.
Little by little, I have been turning everything over to him, though I
know the perverse way he has of distorting and magnifying
everything. Spinoza believed that all things wish to go on being what
they are—stone wishes eternally to be stone, and tiger, to be tiger. I
shall endure in Borges, not in myself (if, indeed, I am anybody at all),
but I recognize myself less in his books than in many others’, or in the
tedious strumming of a guitar (Collected Fictions 324).
Borges’s poetry expresses the emotional tone of this attraction to selfforgetting more directly. As emphasized by Jason Wilson (194), Borges, in his sonnet
“On Waking” (El despertar” also translated as “Waking Up” in the 1964 collection
The Self and the Other, or El otro el mismo) does express his desire to be released
from self:
The trappings of my day also come back:
My voice, my face, my nervousness, my luck.
If only Death, that other waking-up,
Would grant me a time free of all memory
Of my own name and all that I have been!
If only morning meant oblivion! (Selected Poems 201)
[Vuelve también la cotidiana historia:
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Mi voz, mi rostro, mi temor, mi suerte.
¡Ah, si aquel otro despertar, la muerte,
Me deparara un tiempo sin memoria
De mi nombre y de todo lo que he sido!
¡Ah, si en esa mañana huybiera olvido! (Selected Poems 200-201)]
Another poetic rendering of the existential desire to acknowledge the
paradoxical and bifurcated nature of self-identification is in a 1975 anthology182 in
Borges’s poem “The Dream” or “El sueño” (Selected Poems 348-349).
“The Dream”
While the clocks of the midnight hours are squandering
an abundance of time,
I shall go, farther than the shipmates of Ulysses,
to the territory of dream, beyond the reach
of human memory.
From that underwater world I save some fragments,
inexhaustible to my understanding:
grasses from some primitive botany,
animals of all kinds,
conversations with the dead,
faces which all the time are masks,
words out of very ancient languages,
and at times, horror, unlike anything
the day can offer us.
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I shall be all or no one. I shall be the other
I am without knowing it, he who has looked on
that other dream, my waking state. He weighs it up,
resigned and smiling.
[“El sueño”
Cuando los relojes de la media noche prodiguen
Un tiempo generoso,
Iré más lejos que los bogavantes de Ulises
A la región del sueño, inaccessible
A la memoria humana.
De esa region inmersa rescato restos
Que no acabo de comprender:
Hierbas de sencilla botánica,
Animales algo diversos,
Diálogos con los muertos,
Rostros que realmente son mascaras,
Palabras de lenguajes muy antiguos
Y a veces un horror incomparable
Al que nos puede dar el día.
Seré todos o nadie. Seré el otro
Que sin saberlo soy, el que ha mirado
Ese otro sueño, mi vigilia. La juzga,
Resignado y sonriente.]
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It should be noted that O’Rawe and others have proposed that Borges’s early
poetry is more directly expressive of spiritual themes.
Borges also questioned throughout his adult life what was conventionally
presumed to be “real.” In fact, Borges considered literature, which is to say art, to be
more real than the material world that humankind presumes is real, the world within
which art seems to be physically created. He questioned everything, which is clearly a
philosophical orientation to the phenomena of life, and his questions arise in both his
fabulist storytelling and in his non-fiction essays, a distinction that is itself sometimes
a nebulous and shifting separation.
As noted, a primary characteristic of fables is an inclusion of animals and
other creatures, some humanoid, others not, and some mythical or imaginary, others
not. This characteristic is inherent in some of both artists’ work. In fact, for both of
these fabulists, the interaction of humans and other species, and sometimes the
blending of species, is an essential feature in their work.
Borges fascination with the tiger surfaces repeatedly in his fabulism. The
narrator’s opening to “Blue Tigers” in his 1983 book, Shakespeare’s Memory,
addresses this fascination.
A famous poem by Blake paints the tiger as a fire burning right and an
eternal archetype of Evil; I prefer the Chesterton maxim that casts the
tiger as a symbol of terrible elegance. Apart from these, there are no
words that can rune [sic] the tiger, that shape which for centuries has
lived in the imagination of mankind. I have always been drawn to the
tiger. I know that as a boy I would linger before one particular cage at
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the zoo; the others held no interest for me. I would judge
encyclopedias and natural histories by their engravings of the tiger.
When the Jungle Books were revealed to me I was upset that the tiger,
Shere Khan, was the hero’s enemy. As the years passed, this strange
fascination never left me; it survived my paradoxical desire to become
a hunter as it did all common human vicissitudes (Collected Fictions
494).
The narrator in Borges “Blue Tigers” is a Scotsman working in India as a
professor of Eastern and Western logic, who also hosts a weekly seminar on Spinoza,
and who notes that “it may have been my love of tigers that brought me from
Aberdeen to Punjab” (494). Tigers, he goes on to say, are always in his dreams.
Included in Borges’s 1964 Dreamtigers, a collection of stories and poems, is a
poem that offers some words that point to the importance of the tiger to Borges, and
to other themes that attracted him: other animals, the library, the river, the quest,
dreams.
“The Other Tiger”
And the craft that createth a semblance
—Morris: Sigurd the Volsung (1876)
I think of a tiger. The gloom here makes
The vast and busy Library seem lofty
And pushes the shelves back;
Strong, innocent, covered with blood and new,
It will move through its forest and its morning
And will print its tracks on the muddy
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Margins of a river whose name it does not know
(In its world there are no names nor past
Nor time to come, only the fixed moment)
And will overleap barbarous distances
And will scent out of the plaited maze
Of all the scents the scent of dawn
And the delighting scent of deer.
Between the stripes of the bamboo I decipher
Its stripes and have the feel of the bony structure
That quivers under the glowing skin.
In vain do the curving seas intervene
And the deserts of the planet;
From this house in a far-off port
In South America, I pursue and dream you,
O tiger on the Ganges’ banks.
In my soul the afternoon grows wider and I reflect
That the tiger invoked in my verse
is a ghost of a tiger, a symbol,
A series of literary tropes
And memories from the encyclopaedia
And not the deadly tiger, the fateful jewel
That, under the sun or the varying moon,
In Sumatra or Bengal goes on fulfilling
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Its rounds of love, of idleness and death.
To the symbolic tiger I have opposed
The real thing, with its warm blood,
That decimates the tribe of buffaloes
And today, the third of August, ’59,
Stretches on the grass a deliberate
Shadow, but already the fact of naming it
And conjecturing its circumstances
Makes it a figment of art and no creature
Living among those that walk the earth.
We shall seek a third tiger. This
Will be like those others a shape
Of my dreaming, a system of words
A man makes and not the vertebrate tiger
That, beyond the mythologies,
Is treading the earth. I know well enough
That something lays on me this quest
Undefined, senseless and ancient, and I go on
Seeking through the afternoon time
The other tiger, that which is not in verse
(Dreamtigers 70-71).
[“El Otro Tigre”
Pienso en un tigre. La penumbra exalta
290

La vasta Biblioteca laboriosa
Y parece alejar los anaqueles;
Fuerte, inocente, ensangrentado y nuevo,
Él irá por su selva y su mañana
Y marcará su rastro en la limosa
Margen de un río cuyo nombre ignora
(En su mundo no hay nombres ni pasado
Ni porvenir, sólo un instante cierto.)
Y salvará las bárbaras distancias
Y husmeará en el trenzado laberinto
De los olores el olor del alba
Y el olor deleitable del venado;
Entre las rayas del bambú descifro
Sus rayas y presiento la osatura
Bajo la piel espléndida que vibra.
En vano se interponen los convexos
Mares y los desiertos del planeta;
Desde esta casa de un remoto puerto
De América del Sur, te sigo y sueño,
Oh tigre de las márgenes del Ganges.
Cunde la tarde en mi alma y reflexiono
Que el tigre vocativo de mi verso
Es un tigre de símbolos y sombras,
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Una serie de tropos literarios
Y de memorias de la enciclopedia
Y no el tigre fatal, la aciaga joya
Que, bajo el sol o la diversa luna,
Va cumpliendo en Sumatra o en Bengala
Su rutina de amor, de ocio y de muerte.
Al tigre de los símbolos he opuesto
El verdadero, el de caliente sangre,
El que diezma la tribu de los búfalos
Y hoy, 3 de agosto del 59,
Alarga en la pradera una pausada
Sombra, pero ya el hecho de nombrarlo
Y de conjeturar su circunstancia
Lo hace ficción del arte y no criatura
Viviente de las andan por la tierra.
Un tercer tigre buscaremos.
Éste Será como los otros una forma
De mi sueño, un sistema de palabras
Humanas y no el tigre vertebrado
Que, más allá de las mitologías,
Posa la tierra. Bien lo sé, pero algo
Me impone esa aventura indefinida,
Insensata y antigua, y persevero
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En buscar por el tiempo de la tarde
El otro tigre, el que no está en el verso.]
In the final stanza, the third tiger appears as “a system of words / A man
makes” (71) that serves an impulse of seeking, a seeking that drives Borges’s life and
art.
In his essay “A New Refutation of Time,” Borges writes, “Had this refutation
(or its title been published in the middle of the eighteenth century, it would be
included in a bibliography by Hume, or at least mentioned by Huxley or Kemp Smith.
But published in 1947 (after Bergson) it is the anachronistic reductio ad absurdum of
an obsolete system, or even worse, the feeble artifice of an Argentine adrift on a sea
of metaphysics” (Selected Non-fictions 317).
One obvious characteristic of Borges’s work is intertextuality, which
in itself represents a philosophical facet of the temporal theme. Borges is a
preeminent example of someone whose work is pervaded by an aesthetic of
intertextuality.
Borges, Time and Intertextuality
Ancient authors become contemporary in some sense, and obscure voices
grow famous in his storytelling. In “A New Refutation of Time,” an essay of 16 pages
(Selected Non-fictions 317-332), Borges references David Hume, George Berkeley,
and Arthur Schopenhauer repeatedly, but he also refers to the work of biologist
Thomas Henry Huxley, philosophers Norman Kemp Smith and Henri Bergson,
philosopher and mathematician Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Buddhism and Tibetan
mythology, sociological writer Gustav Spiller, Cartesian ideas, scientist and satirist
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Georg Christoph Lichenberg, Mark Twain’s Huck Finn, Peruvian Captain Isidoro
Suárex, essayist Thomas De Quincy, Shakespeare, philosophers Heraclitus and
Plutarch, Cain of the Old Testament, dramatist George Bernard Shaw, author C.S.
Lewis, Zeno and Lucretius and Plato, philosopher Josiah Royce, St. Augustine,
philosopher and essayist Thomas Carlyle, Platonist John Norris, Judah Abrabanel,
Gemistus, Plotinus, theologians Malebranche, Johannes Eckhart, F. H. Bradley,
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Parmenides and Anaxagoras, philosophers
Alexander Campbell Fraser and Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, philosophers Hermann
Lotze and Boethius, physician and philosopher Sextus Empiricus, priest and poet
Angelus Silesius, Chuang Tzu, scientist, and philosopher, theologian and mystic
Emmanuel Swedenborg. Borges’s erudition as a working librarian and scholar, poet
and fabulist, is impressive. Borges referenced in his decades of writing fiction and
nonfiction a vast number of thinkers and literary artists.
As might be expected from an accomplished poet, Borges language could also
be very lyrical, as when, summarizing his concluding assessment at the end of “A
New Refutation of Time,” he writes, “Time is the substance of which I am made.
Time is a river that sweeps me along, but I am the river; it is a tiger that mangles me,
but I am the tiger; it is a fire that consumes me, but I am the fire. The world,
unfortunately, is real; I, unfortunately, am Borges” (Selected Non-fictions 332).
Borges noted that he placed a refutation of time in every book he wrote
(Selected Non-fictions 318), and he brings forth Berkeley’s argument that nothing, no
object, exists outside of the human mind perceiving it, except that when no human
individual perceives an object, God still does. Borges considers both Berkeley and
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Schopenhauer to be idealistic thinkers, and he notes that both Berkeley and Hume,
each in his own way, affirmed the existence of time. Exactly what about time Borges
refutes emerges in his essay; essentially he denies “in a large number of cases”
temporal succession and simultaneity (322). Finally in “A New Refutation of Time,”
Borges quotes Schopenhauer that the present, not the future or the past, is “the form
of all life” (331). As is often the case when it comes to philosophy, and in spite of
some minor differences in a given context, Borges agrees in general with
Schopenhauer’s orientation to time, and quotes him at length in his essay:
We can compare time to an endlessly turning circle: the constantly
falling half would be the past, the one constantly arising the future, but
on top, the indivisible point touched by the tangent would be
unextended present. Just as the tangent does not roll on with the circle,
neither does the present, the point of contact between the object,
whose form is time, and the subject, which has no form because it does
not belong among objects of possible cognition, but is a condition of
all objects of possible cognition. Or: time is like a ceaseless stream and
the present like a rock on which it breaks, but does not sweep along
with it (Schopenhauer, WWP I, 331).
It is worth considering if Schopenhauer’s “endlessly turning circle” raises
another point. Does Borges subscribe to a cyclical version of time? He definitely
investigates this idea, rejecting the Nietszchian notion of cyclical time and eventually
seeming to prefer another version: “Finally, we arrive at the third and least
threatening version of this doctrine: the view that there is a repetition of similar but
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not identical cycles. It is Borges’s favorite version and he cites several formulations”
(Bossart 105).
Santiago Colás, after noting in “The Difference that Time Makes:
Hopelessness and Potency in Borges’s ‘El Alep’ ” that Borges, famous for his
economy, wrote a single sentence two pages long. Colás, pointing out that the
narrator (called “Borges” in “The Aleph”) is obsessed with his unrequited beloved
Beatriz Viterbo to the point that he repeats the name “Beatriz” seven times in seven
sentences, writes, “We have then, right from the beginning of ‘Borges’s description,
the experience of time as a problem along with a proposed solution: resistance to time
through repetition” (88). Colás goes on to describe “Borges” meetings with Beatriz’s
cousin, Carlos Argentino Daneiri, who also has found time a problem, and whose
home holds the Aleph. A paragraph in Colás’s essay is worth repeating here, because
it says much about Borges the writer who has invented a fable told by the narrator
“Borges”:
The Aleph is a sphere, two or three centimeters in diameter. It contains
everything in the universe seen from every point of view,
simultaneously, “without transparency and without superposition.”
And it is under a staircase in Carolos Argentino Daneri’s basement.
Daneri apparently discovered the Aleph as a child and returned
frequently to savor its dizzying perspectives. As an adult, however, he
has taken to composing a poem, which he calls “The Earth,” recoding
his visions. Already in this fact we can see something of our narrator’s
own aversion to time in this enterprise. To capture the Aleph via the
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word, via the poetic representation, is an extended version of the
narrator’s own project of repeating the name Beatriz not only as a way
of remembering, but as a way equally of preserving abstract identity in
the face of the difference time makes (89).
Colás also brings up memory, a topic intimately related to time.
Borges and the Numinous
Given Borges’s self-description of being an agnostic, his interest in mysticism
and spirituality, or what is described here as the numinous, seems contradictory.
However, Borges’s interest in the numinous is reflected in his first visit to Japan in
1979, during which Borges met with and questioned both Buddhist and Shinto monks
and nuns, and visited various sacred and monastic sites in Kyoto and elsewhere in
Japan. Although deeply affected by his encounter with Japanese spirituality, Borges
did not automatically become a religious believer. It has been noted that “the visit to
Japan, therefore, did not resolve Borges’s spiritual yearnings, but what it did was to
awaken him to a new consciousness of a numinous reality beyond the self, and
Shintoism, specifically, acted as a catalyst for the elaboration of what we might call
an ‘agnostic mysticism’ of his own, for its accommodating mysteries allowed for a
reconciliation of metaphysical perplexity with a kind of religious awe” (Williamson
446). That Williamson directly acknowledges Borges connection to “a new
consciousness of a numinous reality beyond the self” (446) is relevant here, and it is
not surprising that Borges might be seen as an agnostic mystic, given some of his
preferences, such as his lifelong appreciation for Arthur Schopenhauer, whose
philosophy is described here as a type of spiritual atheism.
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Noting Borges’s interest in mysticism points to a subtopic throughout this
study, namely the challenge of explicating and discussing in a philosophical context
the association writers, artists, and thinkers have with what seems to be ineffable and
thus beyond explication. While topics such as intuitive understanding, spiritual
consciousness, subjective mystical experiences, self-transcendence are approached
herein via the concept of numinous presence, this remains a thematic territory
infrequently seen in objective scholarship. Thus this thematic territory often is either
excluded or marginalized in philosophy. Nonetheless, Borges was keenly interested in
this marginalized territory, despite his cautionary and somewhat ambivalent
orientation. For instance, Borges’s interest in Emanuel Swedenborg, the Swedish
Christian theological, philosopher, scientist, and mystic has been well-documented.183
This spirited interest in the numinous was not unique to Borges or an isolated
phenomenon. Besides Borges, Swedenborg’s writings attracted the attention of
Immanuel Kant, William Blake, Henry James, William James, James Joyce, W.B.
Yeats, and many other well-known literary and philosophical figures (Lang 196). In
spite of this widespread and documented interest in mysticism among many
prominent thinkers and writers, however, Borges himself remained ambivalent about
mysticism, aligning himself more with Arthur Schopenhauer’s spiritual atheistic
orientation than that of a religious believer.
It should be noted that ambivalence towards the numinous and so-called
mysticism has been a widespread phenomenon throughout intellectual history, but
especially in modern philosophy. Most philosophers have avoided serious studies of
mysticism, as well as—except for theological studies—esoteric spirituality. Creative
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writers and artists, however, have had the advantage of their own literary and visual
artmaking aesthetics to explore what seemingly cannot be seen or heard, except
through a dynamic of wonder. Borges, for example, emphasized that his agnosticism
openly allowed wonder, thus opening consciousness to all possibilities: “Being an
agnostic means all things are possible, even God, even the Holy Trinity. This world is
so strange that anything may happen, or may not happen. Being an agnostic makes
me live in a larger, a more fantastic kind of world, almost uncanny. It makes me more
tolerant" (Shenker 3).
At least some of Borges’s philosophy is rooted in Schopenhauer: “It is the
Schopenhauerian principle in Borges which makes him wonder what is real and what
is illusory in our common experience. And it is this which makes him deliberately
blur the borderline be-tween his fiction and his essays: as if in order to imitate nature
he blurs the boundary between reality and dream” (Agassi 288).
Borges joins with Schopenhauer in rejecting the possibility of philosophically
validating the mystical experience because of its resistance to conceptual renderings,
which is to say its ineffable, invisible and thus unverifiable nature. This ambivalent
approach in Borges and Schopenhauer to mystical experience and the numinous has
been recognized by others:
Schopenhauer, whom Borges acclaimed as the most lucid and sound of
all philosophers, argued that mysticism is the origin and also the
culmination of all religion, but that, unlike James’s suggest of noetic
value, no knowledge is to be derived from the ecstatic mystical state.
Indeed, argued Schopenhauer in The World as Will and Representation
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(a book of which Borges was particularly fond), mysticism opposes
philosophy and cannot constitute a pathway to knowledge owing its
inherently subjective rather than objective relationship with the
individual (Lang 99).
Whether one agrees or disagrees with this assessment of Schopenhauer and
Borges, it should be noted that ambivalence towards the numinous and so-called
mysticism and even the common experience of wonder has been a widespread
phenomenon throughout intellectual history, but especially in modern western
philosophy. Most philosophers have avoided serious studies of mystical experience,
as well as—except for theological studies—esoteric spirituality.
Varo as Artist-Philosopher
Some of what can be said about Borges can be said, with some revisions, for
Varo. Varo also never described herself as a philosopher per se. In fact, she felt
unqualified to enter into the intellectual and philosophical conversations of other
surrealist artists when she lived in Paris before moving to Mexico (Kaplan 55-57).
Part of Varo’s reluctance was undoubtedly related to the exclusion of women, or at
least the uninspected or openly acknowledged male dismissal of art made by women,
that was characteristic of that era (Kaplan 57), but another aspect of this issue is that
Varo was simply not a conventional thinker. While the influence of associating with
the surrealists in Paris and Marseilles during that time was a powerful factor in her
life, Varo would eventually after moving to Mexico feel free to cultivate her own
subjective and highly individualistic artistic and philosophical orientation, including
her specific thematic preferences and aesthetic motifs.
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Another aspect of her unconventional orientation is that Varo, like many
painters, is a visual thinker. Nonetheless, Varo is also a storyteller, a feature her
paintings accentuate. Almost every painting announces and presents a story, and
again, as is with Borges and his readers, it is the viewer who appropriates and
completes her visual fable. An unusual thinker and dreamer, her sense of journey,
quest, narrative incident, and other references and revelations are inherent in her
visual work, just as they are in Borges’s written work.
Varo’s 1956 painting Discovery (Hallazgo) reveals themes repeatedly
expressed in many of her paintings: journey, search and encounter, fabulist mystery,
and revelation. Ultimately Varo is attempting to present the phenomenon of selftranscendence, or the revelation of what is greater than the object. Her comments on
this painting echo those themes:
After lengthy comings and goings, these travelers have finally found a
sort of thick pearl in the little woods in the background; the small
luminous sphere, or pearl, represents inner harmony, and the travellers
stand for persons attempting to gain access to a higher spiritual level
(Ovalle and Gruen 112).
[Esos viajeros después de mucho ir y venir encuentran por fin esa
especie de perla gruesa en el bosquecillo al fondo; esa esferita
luminiosa or perla representa la unidad interior, los viajeros
representan gentes que buscan llegar a un nivel más alto espiritual. ]
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Fig. 37. Remedios Varo. Discovery (Hallazgo). 1956.
Oil on Masonite. 78 x 69 cm. Private Collection.
It is worth considering, in Husserlian terms, how these themes appear. A river
boat with human crew is re-presented from the imagination of the artist or given in
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consciousness. It is not, as in a documentary, that a “real” boat is represented in the
painting. The boat is imaginary, which is why it is re-presented rather than presented
directly as a boat. Intentionality surfaces in both the artist who made the painting and
the viewer receiving the painting—both must receive or “intuit” the object of the
painting and necessarily the content of the painting. Again, a performance-assisted
subjective process remains central to understanding Varo’s paintings.
Here one might note, given some of the travels in Varo’s life, that imagination
is never far from memory of actual events. For instance, during Varo’s 1947-1949
stay in Venezuela, she did explore with her boyfriend of that time, Jean Nicolle, the
region between the Orinoco River184 and the Andes mountain range that contained an
intricate network of slow-moving rivers (Kaplan 114-115).
The boat in Discovery is re-presented against the mystery of woods, so that
the viewer necessarily must intuit (a Husserlian term for receiving the presentation or
re-presentation of an appearance of an object “given” in consciousness). One might
argue that by receiving or intuiting everything in this painting, the viewer necessarily
receives or intuits the object, the woods with all its qualities.
Varo’s interests in mystery and mystical revelations of mystery are made
abundantly clear through her paintings and correspondence. She translated those
interests at times into philosophical ideas and themes—spatial and temporal issues,
ontological and phenomenological topics, and questions about reality and the validity
of subject-object dichotomies. Thus while Varo was only somewhat interested in the
ideas of mainstream western philosophy, she was very interested in an expansive
array of Western and Eastern ideas most frequently, and sometimes erroneously,
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described as mystical or occult. Such ideas are only infrequently explicated by either
analytic or continental philosophy. Her interests included the writings of C.G. Jung,
G. I. Gurdjieff, P.D. Ouspensky, Helena Blavatsky, and Meister Eckhart, as well as
themes such as Sufism, the I-Ching, alchemy, sacred geometry, and the legendary
Holy Grail.
As already addressed in Chapter Four, the fact that these themes attracted
many modernist artists—from Wassily Kandinsky to Hilma af Klint to Jackson
Pollock to Agnes Martin to Brice Marsden and even some contemporary artists—is
well known, even if sometimes discounted, ignored or avoided by some
contemporary art historians and art scholars. Varo was far from the first modern artist
to demonstrate interest in the numinous even when perceived via its various mystical
and magical appearances.
As discussed earlier in regards to Husserl himself, it makes sense when
applying a Husserlian methodology to the work of these two artists to first consider
their engagement of subjectivity.
Varo and Subjectivity

304

Fig. 38. Remedios Varo. Vagabond
(Vagabundo) 1957.
Oil on Masonite, 22 x 10 5/8 in. private collection.
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Remedios Varo also deals with the self in her work, albeit in ways distinct
from Borges’s poems and writings. Her paintings often reflect fragmented versions of
herself, and especially express her seeking to understand herself and her life as an
artist as a journey. Varo painted many versions of herself, but what those versions
have in common are a sensibility of seeking the numinous. Her “selves” are all
seekers. Her self-portraits reflect a highly imaginary variety of selves.
Janet Kaplan’s excellent Remedios Varo: Unexpected Journeys introduced the
work of this remarkable artist to the English-speaking world in 2000. As Kaplan
points out, Varo’s explorations of self and knowing are also often expressed in what
seems to be self-portraits:
Varo did not paint self-portraits in the traditional sense. She did not
seek to render a naturalistic likeness after careful scrutiny of the
mirror. Her work is filled with self-portrait characters, but they are
abstracted, metaphoric, ironic. Placed in a variety of situations—some
related to her life experience, others purely invented—they become
symbolic equivalents of the artist herself. Even if one does not know
the details of Varo’s physiognomy, there is a quality of self-absorption
that soon communicates the sense that the work is autobiographical.
Like an actress taking on roles, Varo consistently used these selfportrait characters as a way to explore alternative identities, both
personal and universal, in a style that quickly became her signature
(Kaplan, Unexpected, 147).
In comments addressed to her brother, Dr. Rodrigo Varo, Remedios Varo did
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comment on some her paintings, including Vagabond (fig. 35):
I think this painting is one of my best. Here is a design for a
vagabond’s clothing, but in this case the vagabond is not liberated. It’s
a very practical and comfortable suit. As a means of locomotion it has
front-wheel drive; by lifting his walking stick he can come to a halt.
The garment can be sealed hermetically at night, and has a little door
that can be locked. Some parts of the garment are made of wood but,
as I said, the man is not liberated. On one side of the suit is a niche
which serves as a living room. There you will find a portrait hanging
and three books. On his breast he is wearing a flowerpot with a rose
growing in it, a more select and exquisite plant than the ones he
encounters in these woods. But he needs the portrait, the rose
(symbolizing nostalgia for a little garden in a real house) and his cat;
he isn’t really free (Ovalle 115). 185
Here it is useful to note Varo’s physical orientation to mystical themes. She
invariably describes the physical or visible elements of a given painting even though
she is attempting to depict or reveal themes that accentuate the ineffable and invisible.
Kaplan suggests that there is an autobiographical element to this painting:
“Perhaps the vagabond is emblematic of Varo herself. Although she
left France for Mexico with only what she could carry, she, too, found
it difficult to free herself from the past” (Kaplan, Unexpected, 151).
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Fig. 39. Remedios Varo. The Juggler (El malabarista o El juglar), 1956.
Oil and inlaid mother-of-pearl on Masonite, 35 7/8 x 48 in. private collection.
Swinford then compares Bosch’s painting to Varo’s The Juggler (fig.36) as
an example of what he describes as a modern allegorical system (181):
In The Juggler, Varo creates a personal allegorical system which relies
on the predetermined symbols of Christian and classical iconography.
But these are quickly refigured into a personal system informed by the
scientific and organized like a machine. The work features a host of
symbols familiar from Christian iconography and demonology: the
lion, the owl, the goat, the pentacle-shaped juxtaposition of the
juggler’s magician hat and eerily forked facial hair. But this system is
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disrupted by personal symbols which recur throughout Varo’s work.
Who is the girl in the juggler’s cart? Why the horde of identical
observers wrapped in a single cloak? In the irreal work, allegory
operates according to an altered, but constant and orderly iconographic
system (181-182).
Swinford also references a comment from Octavio Paz, who noted that Varo
is painting a mirror-image—“Not the world in reverse, but the reverse of the world”
(182).186 Paz’s assessment affirms Varo’s work and allows her to be the agency she
is, an artist working in the margins of conventional aesthetics. Varo is not affirming
the world as it appears; she is confirming a kind of reversal of how the world appears
in that she is signaling the existence (and radical significance) of a seemingly
invisible, ineffable numinous gate.
Applying a Husserlian orientation to The Juggler, if the so-called juggler or
magician is understood to be re-presenting an action as object (the juggling), this representation echoes a larger contextual representation within which the juggler acts.
A phenomenological layered appearance necessarily arises in consciousness; the
audience is receiving the givenness of the juggler’s activated object, itself an irreal representation occurring within a broader irreal re-presentation. The layers of
imagination in a Varo painting echo’s the multifarious possibilities of a irreal
fabulism inherent in Varo’s work altogether. Since a viewer must enter Varo’s world
as depicted in her paintings, the viewer too must account for layers or stages of representation. To some extent, this accounts for uniqueness of Varo’s style of
surrealistic imagery wherein a Varo painting is not simply a depiction of symbols and
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unconsciousness, but a world that includes both the “real” world and the “phantasy”
or imagined world, but also includes an imaginary world within imaginary settings
rooted in a previously imagined world. One world leads into another world,
depending on to what extent or depth of layering the intentionality of the artist (and
viewer) expresses aesthetically. The point is that a Varo painting, while meticulously
composed, is not static or “completed” in a fixed sense; it is a challenge for a viewer
not to imagine what happens next in a Varo composition. That action leads to action,
and that layer uncovers layer, is alive in Varo’s artist-philosopher dynamic. It is
literally a dynamic via her art itself. Varo is inquiring into a given appearance, that
inquiry or artistic intentionality eventually opens the numinous gate the artist senses
and is seeking. Varo’s art is a search to locate the numinous.
The artist’s description of The Juggler is much simpler, yet her description is
more of a pointing towards a territory the magician himself is pointing towards:
The painting is about a magician full of tricks, color, and life. In his
covered wagon he has all sorts of marvelous things and animals;
before him is a uniform “mass” of beings. So that is even more evident
that they are a mass, they wear a collective cloak, an enormous piece
of gray fabric with holes for their heads. They all look alike, have the
same hair, et cetera (Ovalle 113).
[Se trata de un prestidigitador, está lleno de trucos, de color, de vida,
en el carricoche lleva toda clase de cosas milagrosas y animales, ante
él está la “masa”; para que sea más “masa” hasta llevan un traje
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común, un enorme pedazo de tela gris con agujeros para sacar la
cabeza, todos se parecen, tienen igual pelo, etcetera (Ovalle 113).]
Varo and the Temporal-Spatial Theme
Varo also often depicts human confrontations with the fluid nature of time.

Fig. 40. Remedios Varo. Creation of the Birds (Creación de las aves), 1957.
Oil on Masonite, 20 15/8 x 24 5/8 in., Private Collection
Almost every Varo painting can be understood as a fable. Admittedly this is
only one of several approaches to her art, but there are numerous aspects of a Varo
painting that are fabulist in tone and content. Relative to nonhuman species, one the
most famous of her paintings is Creation of the Birds (fig. 40). In that painting a
human with an owlish humanoid-bird appearance herself sits at table or desk
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“painting” birds that fly away once created. Her brush is musically inspired in that it
is attached by a line to a violin that hangs from her neck; simultaneously the artist
holds up a triangular magnifying glass that intensifies the light shining through a
window of a bright star in the deep space of the night. A contraption stands next to
her desk. It appears to be scientific device of some sort with three extended tubefingers that deposit different colored paint on the artist’s palette.
Is this a depiction of divine creation? That description seems inaccurate. A
more accurate summary would be that the painting depicts an inspired work of art,
one inspired both externally by the phenomenal universe and internally by the artist’s
imagination. It is a work that acknowledges or counters the illusion of subject-object
dichotomy that separates humans from other species. The magnified starlight, musical
paint brush, and the mysterious dispenser of paints, laboratorial like in appearance, do
not necessarily mean God or a supreme being creates art or even life, but that the
creative process and art itself can be inspired and to some extent accomplished within
the mystery of infinity. The laboratory or a room of active investigation does appear
regularly in Varo paintings. Varo was attracted to science but also frustrated with
what she perceived to be the limitations of how scientific evidence is perceived and
validated. If quantum mechanics had surfaced during her lifetime, she might have
utilized those theories in art.
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Fig. 41. Remedios Varo. Weaving of Space and Time (Tejido espacio-tiempo),
1954. Oil on Masonite, 26 x 21¼ in. (66 x 54 cm.)
In this painting, Weaving of Space and Time, Varo, as she often does, includes
machinery. The woman’s legs are a wheel, and her torso includes meshed gears, but
much more is depicted. A clock appears between the man with a lily and the woman
with a candle. Inner and outer space are inside a woven cloth or perhaps a basket.
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Tere Arcq writes at length about this painting, referencing Varo’s intense interest in
P.D. Ouspensky and the fourth dimension:
Everything seems to be stretched and prolonged along a timeline: past,
present and future are one and the same. Kant established the fact that
everything that the senses perceive is perceived in terms of time and
space. In other words, extension in space and existence in time are not
inherent properties of things, but rather properties of our sensorial
perception: they are categories of our reasoning. [...] Weaving of Space
and Time is an interesting attempt to encapsulate Ouspensky’s vision,
to represent how a mind that escapes the limitations of the senses’
perception can be elevated to another plane and see the past, present
and future coexist simultaneously, “beyond the limits of the circle
enlightened by our usual consciousness” (Arcq 76-77).187
It should be noted here that the explication of meaning in Varo’s
metaphorically rich paintings can almost always go down any of several interpretative
paths, depending on the elements or features being accentuated by a given writer. An
example would be the next two paintings.

314

Fig. 42. Remedios Varo. Unsubmissive Plant (Planta insumisa) 1961.
Oil on Masonite, 33 x 24 5/8 in. Private Collection.
It is interesting to first hear Varo’s comments before other
interpretations:
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This scientist is experimenting with different plants and
vegetables. He is somewhat bewildered because there is an
unruly plant. All the plants are growing shoots in the form of
mathematical figures and formulas, except for one that insists
on producing a flower. And the only mathematical branch it
sprouted at the beginning, which drops onto the table, is very
withered and weak and besides, is mistaken, for it says “two
plus two is almost four.” Each hair on the scientist’s head is a
mathematical equation
(Ovalle 120).
Janet Kaplan, whose excellent Remedios Varo: Unexpected Journeys
introduced the work of this remarkable artist to the English-speaking world in 2000,
discusses the flower in Discovery of a Mutant Geologist (fig. 43) in another context
by first considering Unsubmissive Plant (fig. 42):
Unsubmissive Plant presents Varo’s mixed feelings about scientific
study in a succinctly ironic image. Science, in this case botany, seeks
to understand nature through abstraction but grows greedy for control
and, in the process of controlling, is alienated from the very nature that
was its starting point. Varo offered the ultimate results of such
abstraction in Discovery of a Mutant Geologist (fig.43). Another
scientist, with even more elaborate equipment, carefully studies an
unnaturally large flower, the only sign of life in a barren landscape
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denuded by the radiation of an atomic bomb. Studying intently, he is
unaware that he, too, has mutated, sprouting the winds of an insect and

Fig. 43. Remedios Varo. Discovery of a Mutant Geologist
(Descubrimiento de un geólogo mutante) 1955.
Oil on Masonite, 30 x 20 in. Richard J. Woods.
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the tail of a raccoon. It is noteworthy that in areas closest to the bomb
sites, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where all forms of life had been
immediately destroyed, it was documented that within days of the blast
there were violent eruptions of abnormal plant growth, causing fields
of lush flowers to spring up overnight. It is not known if Varo’s image
of the gigantic flower referred to that fact or if she simply intuited the
possibility (173-174).
Varo’s description of this painting is more succinct: “In a landscape devastated
by an atomic bomb, a geologist—who has mutated because of the radiation—is
examining a gigantic flower. The geologist is carrying a very interesting piece of
laboratory equipment” (Ovalle 120).
Varo and the Numinous
The paintings of Remedios Varo reveal a visual orientation to the numinous via
compositional representation, creating a reality that allows visual contextual
representations of mysterious and magical figures and occurrences. Whereas Borges’s
short stories often reflect a philosophical playfulness that challenges conventional
presuppositions about reality and self-identification, as well as spatial-temporal
presuppositions, Varo’s paintings express a transformative process through themes of
journey, doorways, and the disintegration of conventional self-identification. This last
theme is not uncommon in surrealist art, but with Varo’s work there is often a sense
of action and search. In the 1950’s in Mexico Varo began to extend her work beyond
her earlier experiments influenced by her association with Surrealism and the Paris
group of artists led by Andre Breton. Her paintings more and more assumed a unique
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aesthetic, as described here by Alberto Ruy Sánchez:
Remedios Varo’s fascinating body of work appears to us as a
revelation and a mystery at one and the same time. A revelation so
compelling that its aesthetic power has caused her name to be
inscribed in the annals of the greatest and most disconcerting
accomplishments of modern art. It is impossible to remain indifferent
before the meticulous brushwork and incessant imagination seen in her
paintings (Sánchez 14).
Sánchez goes on to describe four paradoxes that intensify Varo’s painting
skills and magnify the imaginative imagery alive in her paintings: (1) a strong formal
language that “espouses a profoundly delirious discourse” and “scrupulous logic of
nonsense”; (2) a “technically pure academic background” combined with a “primitive
palpitation” of details that “approaching innocence or naïvetá”; (3) the “precise
geometry” of her compositions, albeit with “lines and motifs of equal delicacy and
clear fragility”; and (4) the “finished thought” concluding a quest combined with a
simultaneous “yearning for an open and constant search” (Sánchez 14).
However, as noted earlier, the approach herein is not to examine the occult per
se, although the varieties of occultism, magic, mysticism, and related topics surface
from time to time within the philosophical and aesthetic themes of the study.
Summary Review of Varo’s Paintings
Attempting to categorize the work of Remedios Varo undermines that work.
Calling her art irreal fabulism, while not inaccurate, is ultimately an inadequate
description.

One can assign descriptive labels to both Varo and Borges, but in both
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cases arbitrary, historically rooted classifications quickly reach inherent limitations;
using established means of describing Varo’s paintings becomes the metaphor of
looking at a closely passing elephant through a tiny viewing hole. What can be seen
of the whole work? This is one reason whey art writers and scholars has proposed
multifarious interpretations of her work. The visual details of a Varo painting much
extend the narrative or storytelling aspects of most surrealistic art. Her paintings are
more than depictions of the unconscious and more than the state dream
consciousness, though both factors represent relevant elements. The key to work is
found more in the fabulist destination being presented. The revelation of ontological
and spiritual purpose beyond characteristics of journey and search are first sensed and
then revealed in the details of a Varo painting. In other words, the entertaining and
playful attractiveness of a Varo painting only signals another purpose.
If the purpose of art is, as Varo asserted, to communicate the incommunicable,
is that accomplished in her art? Visually, Varo’s irreal fabulism transports the viewer
to what is called here the numinous gate. Varo repeatedly leaves the viewer standing
in front of that gate, looking over the gate, so to speak, and left in the most
advantageous location for pushing open that gate.
Can that so-called numinous gate even be pushed open. It’s not clear that one
can open push open a gate merely through volitional energy; it is almost as if the gate
must open itself. The proposal here is that no work of art is completed until the
performance-assisted subjective process is completed, so that the artist and viewer, or
writer and reader, are merged in a sensibility to this numinous gate and its inherent
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spiritual revelation. Essentially that revelation is rooted in a sensibility to prior unity
that in itself allows revelation of prior unity and what is seemingly incommunicable.
This is not a seamlessly perfect approach to discovering ultimate reality. Varo
had her doubts; in fact, doubt is a rich means that must be allowed and utilized in any
process of revelation of truth or reality. Varo both uses and dismisses scientific
“fact.” She both accepts and glorifies, while also refusing and reshaping, for example,
the physical appearance of the human being. Varo combines mechanical and fleshy
elements in her fabulism. Sometimes a human subject is multiplied as a plurality of
intersubjective awareness, at other times a kind of subjective solitude permeates a
compositional scene.
A primary point is that Varo’s irreal fabulism is almost invariably a story
about a search for what is hear described as the numinous gate. One of many
paintings that illustrate this is Varo’s 1962 Spiral Transit (Tránsito en espiral) (fig.
44).
Kaplan notes about this painting that the travelers “are embarked on a journey
beyond the realm of mere navigations” (169), and that “theirs is a spiritual voyage…”
(169). Luis-Martin Lozano also offers—quoted at length because its summary
insight—commentary that unravels Varo’s broader purpose in this and other
paintings:
In addition, the iconographic exploration would help to understand the
permanent metaphysical quest within the dimensionality of her
painting. Either the characters she paints acquire a platonic attitude of
meditation and explore within themselves, or they advance in a
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continuous and frantic exploration that leads them to climb analogous
mountains, to submerge themselves in murky, back world waters,
tireless travelers reaching the miasmas of the Orinoco River in search
of the primal origin of all oracles; where it will be commonplace to
encounter sailors who cross over into hidden dimensions, making use
of fantastic means of locomotion to travel winding roads and
labyrinthine canals; always furtive, they will discover the secret
passages in the walls and cathedrals, seeking answers to the mysteries
of the universe. This is well illustrated in one of the key paintings by
Remedios Varo: Spiral Transit, of 1962, a work conceived as a
microcosm surrounded by its own sea and celestial vault, in the
manner of the Flemish panels of Hieronymus Bosch (Ovalle 71).
Lozano’s comments acknowledge the journey theme in Varo, the secret
passages in her paintings, the combination of inner self and outer search. I would add
that an aesthetic quality pervades Varo’s work, a quality of mystery that directly
points to spiritual search and revelation, as it does, for example, in Alejandro
Jodorowksy’s film El Topo, among other modern works of art. This film, as Ben
Cobb emphasizes, reflects elements from The Bhagavad Gita, Sufi mysticism, and
(like Varo’s work) the work of G.I. Gurdjieff (Cobb 71).
Varo uses storytelling in the form of irreal fabulism to show search and
journey, as well as qualities common to travel: points of anonymity, playful attraction
to what does not seem to be knowable, nonrecognition combined with recognition of
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stereotypes, plasticity of appearance in the midst of mystery—all of this continually
arising within a world of wonder.

Fig. 44. Remedios Varo. Spiral Transit (Tránsito en espiral), 1962.
Oil on Masonite, 39 3/8 x 45 ¼ in. Private collection.
Wonder in Varo and Borges
Wonder is one of the keys to understanding the philosophical implications of
both Borges and Varo’s artistic creations. There are very few Remedios Varo
paintings that do not reflect a sensibility of and orientation to wonder, as well as a
visual orientation to the numinous via compositional representation rooted in irreal
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fabulism. As emphasized in her commentary about the clockmaker in her painting
Revelation or The Clockmaker (figs. 32-34), wonder is a key element for Varo: “I
have tried to make him look both astonished and enlightened” (Ovalle 111).
Her paintings create a reality that allows visual contextual representations of
mysterious and magical figures and occurrences. Whereas Borges’s short stories often
reflect, as noted previously, a philosophical playfulness that challenges conventional
presuppositions about reality and self-identification, as well as spatial-temporal
presuppositions, Varo’s paintings express a transformative process through themes of
journey, doorways, and the disintegration of conventional self-identification. This last
theme is not uncommon in surrealist art, but with Varo’s work there is often a sense
of action and search. In the 1950’s in Mexico Varo began to extend her work beyond
her earlier experiments influenced by her association with Surrealism and the Paris
group of artists led by Andre Breton. Her paintings more and more assumed a unique
aesthetic. As with many creative thinkers, there is a continual interest in the role of
the ineffable in both Varo and Borges.
Shiomy Mualem, contrasting Wittgenstein’s emphasis that philosophy is
essentially about elucidations that clarify cloudy and indistinct thoughts, notes that
“Borges assumes the opposite: the act of making reality somewhat cloudy turns our
attention toward philosophical quests, since it evokes in us the initial amazement;
philosophy begins in wonder” (76). Wonder is, in fact, one of the keys to
understanding the philosophical implications of both Borges and Varo’s artistic
visions. In some ways, what is very beautiful about art in comparison to philosophy,
which by the way can also be beautiful, is that art can show and not just tell.
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Although with Varo and Borges this gap is considerably reduced in light of
their storytelling fabulist artistic orientations, there nonetheless remains a contrast
between art and philosophy—the making of things and the thinking about everything,
although one could also argue that thinking is likewise a form of making. That Borges
so resonated with Schopenhauerian thought undermines Borges’s claims to not being
a philosopher. Art and philosophy are like two great streams flowing into each other
and creating an even greater river that flows to a seemingly endless sea. And indeed,
art and philosophy each have many tributaries that feed both their respective streams
as well as that single combined river.
Borges and Varo in the Margins
If Borges allows wonder to summon up an eternal universe only sensed at the
margins of logical thought, wonder also allows Varo to open a doorway in her art that
reveals what cannot be seen but imagined. Both of these artists render the invisibility
of infinity visible through their fabulist art, however strange or illogical their art may
seem in a world that naively claims to make the world linear and fixed. In some
sense, they do more than straddle a line between real and irreal—they change and
cross that line, working in the margins of reality, in that area that is presupposed to be
invisible and inaccessible.
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Conclusion—The Numinous Gate
As acknowledged in the introduction, this study makes no claim to explicating
nicely packaged explications or definitions of philosophical truth and reality. The
central proposal of this study has been that Remedios Varo and Jorge Luis Borges
attempt to communicate the numinous in their art, as have many other modern artists,
including modernist, postmodernist, and contemporary artists. That the numinous is
immersed in consciousness and appears or is felt as consciousness, and yet remains
apparently incommunicable via rational thought and linear concepts, has been the
central issue being addressed here. The major challenge has been to undertake this
investigation in philosophical and phenomenological, or as expressed earlier, in
philosophico-phenomenological fashion rather than proposing a theological or other
belief system exclusivity.
Since the “numinous gate” in the title is a metaphorical entranceway into
experiencing the numinous in consciousness, a gateway opened via a state of wonder
and awe, the complex thematic conundrum of the study has continually surfaced.
What is a conundrum and what is that conundrum in the present context? Again, the
definition of a conundrum applicable here is: “Any puzzling question or problem; an
enigmatical statement” (“conundrum, n., 4.b.”). More specifically the conundrum
here pivots around communicating what seems to be incommunicable yet does exist.
The existence of the numinous, for the most part, remains a mystery that can only be
sensed or “felt,” yet does in some circumstances become becomes temporarily visible
and capable of being directly experienced.
326

Thus the issue has been to explicate in philosophico-phenomenological terms
how these two artists, among many other modern artists, acknowledge a sensibility to
the numinous and to attempt, through their respective creative processes, to express
the numinous through their art. Obviously, this is not a simple issue. Sometimes what
the artist actually communicates is his or her search for the numinous, or that artist’s
sensibility to the numinous, or even that artist’s own doubt about and challenges to
expressing or revealing the numinous in his or her art.
For example, and as explored already, even though Varo’s paintings do
express mystical and magical elements, she is not literally a mystic or magician
(although her art has been described as “magical”), but an artist very much aware of
and capable of confronting the conventional limitations of rational thought:
Personally, I do not think I am endowed with special powers,
but rather an ability to quickly see the relationship between
cause and effect beyond the current limits of ordinary logic”
(Personalmente, yo no me creo dotada de poderes especiales,
sino más bien de una capacidad para ver rápidamente las
relaciones de causa a efecto, y ello fuera de los límites
ordinaries de la lógica corriente) (Cartas 81-82).188
On the other hand, and as stated throughout this investigation, the fabulist
literary art of Borges communicates through his art a sensibility to the numinous
more through an intertextual layering and philosophically accented narratology.
In a sense, it is the nature of the numinous, and the search for it, that creates
the artist-philosopher dynamic in Borges and Varo. Both the fabulist, irreal paintings
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of Varo and the fabulist, irreal stories of Borges are more than visual and literary
storytelling. As proposed earlier, a primary focus is on the sensibility to the numinous
that these two artists—and many other modern artists, as well—express, a sensibility
that fuels and shapes their artistic attempts to excavate and make visible the numinous
via image consciousness.
How can this occur? Often it is wonder that initiates a dynamic rupture in
consciousness that acts as the hinge allowing the numinous gate proposed herein to
become visible and to swing open. In other words, wonder expressed through the art
itself—as visible and communicable expressions of the artists’ sensibility to the
numinous—becomes that numinous gateway in consciousness.
Nor is this simply a description of someone making and presenting art to “the
other.” The conjunction of the artist with the viewer or reader is a completion of the
work of art, allowing that metaphorical gateway or entranceway into the numinous to
become the reality that was previously only sensed, felt, or intuited.189 This naturally
brings up subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and the concept of self, topics that have been
considered throughout, leading especially to the assertion that art is an intersubjective
phenomenon, and that the idea of a separative self-identified self is itself at best only
a partially valid notion in the sense of being an incomplete idea. This is reflected in
part in Husserl’s work to extend and revise Cartesian theory.
This study has considered many relevant concepts and factors to assist in
clarifying and authenticating its central theme, including Husserlian transcendental
phenomenology, the Schopenhauerian aesthetic, wonder and self-forgetting, notknowing or unknowing, and other ideas and writings. The writings of both
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Schopenhauer and Husserl provided some functional and conceptual means for
serving the excavation of the numinous within a larger context of perception that
includes the seeing of all “things.” In the present context, if there is an answer or
solution to the question inherent in the thematic conundrum of communicating the
incommunicable, that solution is art. In other words, what is proposed and argued is
that art can be a means to make visible the invisibility of the numinous.
Husserl’s epochē is an essential means for magnifying a focus that can
penetrate the ephemeral and ineffable nature of the numinous. Because the epochē
brackets out presuppositions, preconceptions, and prejudices that could obstruct the
investigation and appearance of the numinous gate, a more direct and vivid vision
becomes possible, one that can allows a shift in consciousness that ushers in a
visibility of the numinous beyond a felt sensibility to it. Specifically with Varo and
Borges, when the artist allows an intentionality of reception of appearance, or
receives that givenness (the appearance of an art object) in consciousness, notknowing and self-forgetting may spontaneously accompany the reception of that
appearance of a reshaped irreal object. The work of Borges and Varo, appearing as it
does in the irreal fabulist context of their specific aesthetics, allows the artist to both
give and receive the art object, and also allows the viewer or reader to receive that art
object and its appearance as the numinous gate. Understanding Husserlian
intentionality as an antecedent event, one that occurs before (and sometimes
simultaneously with) conceptually encountering the object, also leads to
understanding how the intersubjective encounter takes hold as an interactive
encounter between artist and viewer. In some ways, the two—artist and viewer, writer
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and reader—are inseparable. It may be that nothing is as powerfully disruptive to
linear temporal-spatial presuppositions as the artist-viewer synergetic conjunction.
Undertaking this topic of how art, art-making and art-viewing are related to
the numinous leads to other conclusions. This is not simply a “transcendent” issue or
the intervention of what creative writers have sometimes called (usually in critical
terms) the God Box, where an aspect of the art suddenly just happens in miraculous
terms. While there may be some legitimacy to this imaginary or visualized
phenomenon, that has not been the orientation of this study. In fact, one result of the
study has been to understand more clearly how non-rational aspects of the numinous
arise in contextual territories, whether by alternative states of consciousness or within
so-called sacred cultures, but in this context, via art. The disruptive experience of
wonder that is here proposed as the hinge that allows the numinous gate to visibly
swing open, is a subjective experience, even though Borges and Varo continually
challenge fixed ideas of the self. Here it is useful to note again that making and
viewing art is a performance-assisted subjective process (Adi Da 94) that represents
an aspect of seeking the numinous. The artist-philosopher dynamic in Borges and
Varo fuels their respective creative processes of their fabulist art, which involves an
irrealistic interplay with subjectivity, wonder, knowledge, not-knowing, selfforgetting and so on. The proposal herein has been that while truth and reality are
inherent in the numinous, they are ultimately indefinable yet not inaccessible aspects
of the performance-assisted “subjective” process in art-making and art.
Proposing that the making and viewing (or reading) of art pivots around image
consciousness or Bildbewußtein (also translated as “depicting consciousness”), the
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imagination (Husserlian “phantasy”), and memory, and blending that with a
multifarious array that includes the artist-philosopher dynamic, intertexualities, and
various forms of intersubjectivity, have as a whole served the elucidation of the art
and creative processes of Remedios Varo and Jorge Luis Borges.
In regards to mystery and the invisible, which is to say the numinous, part of
the purpose here has been to challenge the widespread notion that such topics are
impenetrable to scholarly investigation. To undermine philosophical investigation
with presuppositional, linear understanding is to place philosophy inside the
restrictions of a belief system rooted in scientific materialism. This study has been a
protest against that attitude, as well as a remonstration against the often unspoken and
uninspected contemporary prohibition or taboo against acknowledging that a
sensitivity to the numinous in art is a theme worthy of scholarly investigation.
Ultimately the numinous is apodictic. That is said with the caveat that simply
claiming the numinous is apodictic is insufficient. Evidence of how the numinous is
apodictic is a conclusion, but it is a partial conclusion that is challenged herein by
examining the irreal, fabulist work of the two artist-philosophers featured in the
study.
Finally, this investigation has argued that art for life’s sake is central to
Borges and Varo. The Bakhtinian carnivalesque is a strand in the writings of Borges
and paintings of Varo, one that engenders a life-positive orientation to humankind
and the art of humankind. A liberating attitude towards the humor, the grotesque, and
the carnivalesque pervades the work of Varo and Borges. Simultaneously, their work
authenticates Plato’s emphasis on wonder as “the beginning of philosophizing as a
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divine phenomenon, a sort of epiphany, related to the sight of divine beauty”
(Chrysakopoulou 95). That wonder is an instance of not-knowing is not as unusual as
one might think; the argument herein has been that wonder is also a version of
quotidian experience functioning as disruption (Gosetti-Ferencei 1).
The intention here, then, has been to navigate through what is actually one
aesthetic and philosophico-phenomenological territory, albeit one that displays a great
variety of features across its landscape. While it is clearly evident and has been noted
before that Borges and Varo explore consciousness via their fabulist art-making, it
has been less evident in the philosophy of art that their work is fueled by a sensibility
to the numinous. Thus it is hoped that this study will initiate other studies similar to
this theme, whether for the artist-philosophers examined here or for art and the artmaking of the artist-philosopher in general.
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Endnotes

1

The distinctions among magic realism, fantasy, fabulism and other terms are
examined farther ahead, as well as the reasons for choosing irreal fabulist storytelling
as the narratological term of choice.
2
While the word “mystery” is an essential term here, it should be noted that there are
theological and religious uses of the word as well as non-theological uses, and while
both uses are significant in this study, several relevant uses of the word “mystery”
will be explored in more detail in the chapters ahead. One non-theological definition
immediately relevant is defined in the The Oxford English Dictionary as: “A hidden
or secret thing; something inexplicable or beyond human comprehension; a person or
thing evoking awe or wonder but not well known or understood; an enigma”
(“mystery, n.1,” II. 5a).
3
The term “philosophico-phenomenological” is borrowed from Anthony Steinbock’s
Phenomenology and Mysticism: The Verticality of Religious Experience, and will be
examined more closely ahead.
4
In saying that art is rooted in this impulse, no claim is being made that every piece
of art made throughout the history of humankind has been made via that impulse to
make visible the invisibility of the numinous. Obviously art is made for all kinds of
reasons. But any attempt to determine precisely what art is rooted in that impulse
would be foolhardy and inaccurate. Thus the statement is not that “some art” is made
via that impulse, because that adjective would be misleading and false to some degree
as well. A major aspect of the thesis herein is that far more art has been and continues
to be made with that impulse than has been openly acknowledged in scholarship. In
some cases the artist himself or herself may be motivated unconsciously by that
impulse, but to find and use those unconscious cases of seeking the numinous is not
the orientation here. Through artist commentaries and art scholarship, it is clear that
much modern art—modernist, postmodernist, and contemporary—has been openly
rooted in a seeking for and sensibility to the numinous. This is abundantly evident in
modernist art, but whatever the art history era or category, examples are used
throughout this study of art-making in which a seeking for and a sensibility to the
numinous are clearly and consciously evident in one way or another.
5
Borges writes this in his essay “Narrative Art and Magic.” The quote is also used in
The Cambridge Companion to Jorge Luis Borges, 209.
6
Epochē is a seminal Husserlian concept, one that is critical to this study. As will be
discussed in more detail, epochē’s central value here is that it serves to set aside
uninspected presuppositions about art, reality, perception, and various additional
concepts and issues that pervade (at times unconsciously) Eurocentric thought.
7
While the term leitmotif is generally related to music, there are other uses that signal
a principle theme in other fields. See "leitmotiv, n." OED Online. Oxford University
Press, March 2015. Web. 5 June 2015.
8
Blindness is also an important theme in Borges’s work, given that he became
gradually more and more blind as he aged.
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9

Plato attributes to Socrates numerous times in the Socratic dialogues this “notknowing” orientation to knowledge.
10
The complete reference to this passage is summed up by writer and widow of
Borges, Maria Kodama: “This experience is narrated in one of his [Borges] first
works, ‘El idioma de los argentines’ (‘The Language of the Argentines’), from 1928,
and later he included it in two more publications including “A New refutation of
Time.” He referred to the experience as ‘sentirse en muerte,’ or ‘feeling in death’.”
11
As noted above, Borges includes this experience in “A New Refutation of Time”
in Jorge Luis Borges, Selected Non-Fictions. Eliot Weinberger, ed. New York:
Penguin Books, 1999, 324-325.
12
The Magic of Remedios Varo opened in February 2000 at the National Museum of
Women in the Arts in Washington D.C. before traveling in June 2000 to the Mexican
Fine Arts Museum in Chicago. The four thematic sections of the exhibition included
(1) “The Transferable Being: Metaphors of the Inner World, (2) “In Search of other
Dimensions: The Conjunction of Magic Forces,” (3) “Time, Cosmos & Energy:
Paradigms of a New Science,” and (4) “Enlightenment of the Forbidden: Revealing
Knowledge of an Occult World.”
13
Thirteen years before the Kandinsky’s Munich incident, a minor yet seminal “notknowing” experience initiated a root awakening to the significance of perceptual and
emotional engagement of the art object: “About a year before leaving Russia he saw
an exhibition of French Impressionists in Moscow, and for the first time became
aware of the characteristics of modern painting. Before [i.e. before viewing] one of
Claude Monet’s Haystacks, he did not recognize the object [i.e. did not “see” a
haystack], missed it, but at the same time he noticed that the picture moved him
deeply, becoming engraved in his memory with all its special charter.” This anecdote
is in Will Grohmann’s Wassily Kandinsky: Life and Work, 32.
14
See especially Kandinsky’s seminal book on this topic, his 1912 Über das Geistige
in der Kunst (Concerning the Spiritual in Art).
15
While the role of abstraction in modernist art history is not a primary theme in this
study, it is a significant factor underlying any understanding wonder and the
numinous in art, as will be discussed in Chapter Four.
16
One of the more directly relevant scholarly studies of this topic is Jennifer Anna
Gosetti-Ferencei’s The Ecstatic Quotidian: Phenomenological Sightings in Modern
Art and Literature.
17
For example, sociopolitical, conceptual, technical, and so on.
18
This chapter, in the pages ahead, will expand and bring more detail to the initial
definition of irreal presented in the introduction, but in Chapter Six the irreal in the art
of Borges and Varo will be considered in more direct detail and depth.
19
See, for example, Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary
Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, edited by Jean Petitot and others; Mind in
Life: biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind, by Evan Thompson; or The
Phenomena of Awareness: Husserl, Cantor, Jung, by Cecile T. Tougas.
20
1900: Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Teil: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik
(Logical Investigations, Vol 1). 1901: Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Teil:
Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis (Logical
Investigations, Vol 2). English translation: 1973.
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21

1913: Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen
Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie
(Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology). English translation in three
volumes: 1980-1989.
22
A collection of Husserl’s writings on time consciousness was published in 1928 in
Husserl’s Jarbuch. It included a short foreward by Heidegger, who was listed as
editor, but it was Edith Stein who actually gathered and organized the writings while
she worked as Husserl’s assistant in 1917. This book was published in 1966 as Zur
Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893-1917), with an English
translation published in 1991 titled On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of
Internal Time (1893-1917).
23
Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory (1898-1925) is a gathering of
posthumous texts (lectures, notes, sketches) by Husserl on representational
consciousness. This book more than any of Husserl’s other works, discusses art and
aesthetics in regards to Husserlian transcendental phenomenology and consciousness.
Also relevant to this study, as will be seen, is Husserl’s Cartesian Mediations: An
Introduction to Phenomenology.
24
The ways in which Husserl agrees and disagrees with Descartes will become
clearer as this chapter unfolds.
25
As pointed out in a translator’s note (1) to Cartesian Mediations: An Introduction
to Phenomenology, that book is an elaboration of two 1929 lectures Husserl delivered
at the Sorbonne in Paris entitled “Einleitung in die transzendentale Phänomenologie”
(Introduction to transcendental phenomenology).
26
Interrelated terms surface everywhere in Husserl’s methodology. Husserlian
intuition (Anschauung) and givenness (Gegenbenheit), for example, together form a
unitary, reciprocally cooperative activity, as do object (Objekt) and intentionality
(Intentionalität).
27
Here, the emphasis is on Husserl’s later thought, after his so-called “transcendental
turn.” Clearly, any thinker influenced by the work of Plato and Kant must necessarily
clarify his or her own useage and meaning of the word “transcendental.”
28
Carr is referencing a section title (#53) in Husserl’s The Crisis of European
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological
Philosophy (178).
29
Brough is referencing in quotations George Dickie, The Art Circle: A Theory of Art
(New York: Haven Publications, 1984). Thomas Prufer: a contemporary professor of
philosophy and author.
30
I refer to Husserl’s method as a methodology in the present context because
“methodology” better describes how the main thrust of this study is to investigate
topics related to the art of Varo and Borges, and how that is accomplished by using a
methodology grounded in scientifically rigorous Husserlian transcendental
phenomenology. This allows for a consistency of language and investigative concepts
to be applied to Varo and Borges’s work. In other words, that specific methodology is
used as the primary means to investigate their visual and literary art.
31
In all fairness, since the authors of this art history textbook are discussing Sartre’s
aesthetic, and not attempting to explicate the range of Husserl’s thinking, they are
emphasizing Husserl’s “intentional consciousness,” which was a starting point for
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Sartre’s aesthetic, although some Husserlian scholars have noted that Husserl’s
students and assistants such as Heidegger, Sartre, and Derrida did not really study
Husserl’s writings and lectures closely enough or with enough depth, and did have
some misunderstandings about his work. This is understandable, of course, given the
vast nature and enormous range of Husserl’s work. And, as stated already, neither
does this study claim to address all of Husserl’s work. It seems as if everyone picks
and chooses from Husserl what is useful for their own arguments and studies.
32
This quote initially came to my attention via Dan Zahavi’s “Husserl and the
“absolute.”
33
A.D. Smith, in Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Husserl and the Cartesian
Meditations. London, Routledge. 2003. Print.
34
This point is also referenced by A.D. Smith in The Routledge Philosophy Guide
Book to Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations (20). It is also worth noting the title of
the specific part of Husserl’s The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental
Phenomenology where this issue is addressed. See Section 8 in “Part II: Clarification
of the Origin of the Modern Opposition between Physicalistic Objectivism and
Transcendental Subjectivism.”
35
Other scholars have argued that other principles are central or primary in Husserl’s
phenomenology. Epochē, for example (see Bourne-Taylor and Mildenberg 25).
36
Some of the points in this chapter about Husserl’s rendering of imagination will be
returned to in Chapter Six about the artist-philosopher dynamic.
37
Forms of consciousness are discussed numerous times in Husserl’s writings, but
especially relevant here are his discussions in Logical Investigations and in Phantasy,
Image Consciousness, and Memory (1898-1925).
38
Steinbeck here references Edmund Husserl’s Analyses Concerning Passive and
Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic, Anthony J. Steinbock, trns.
Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001, introduction to Part 2.
39
See Gregory Minissale’s brilliant book on this subject: Framing Consciousness in
Art: Transcultural Perspectives (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2009).
40
Irrealism in the specific art of Borges and Varo is examined in detail in Chapter
Six.
41
Although Husserl uses the spelling of fantasy as “phantasy,” the spelling employed
in this study is, for the most part, “fantasy.”
42
John B. Brough translated into English the 2005 Springer edition of Husserl’s
Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory (1898-1925). Professor Brough also
wrote the essay “Art and Artworld: Some Ideas for a Husserlian Aesthetic,” included
in the 1988 anthology Edmund Husserl and the Phenomenological Tradition: Essays
in Phenomenology, edited by Robert Sokolowski. Serbian poet, essayist, and
philosophy professor Milan Uzelac wrote one of the most detailed, penetrating, and
frequently referenced essays on Husserl and art, “Art and Phenomenology in Edmund
Husserl,” published in 1998. These works are listed in the bibliography and are used
extensively in this paper. Also it should be noted that many if not most extended
discussions of aesthetics and phenomenology (regardless of which phenomenological
theorist or thinker is being discussed) will at various points refer to Husserlian
phenomenological principles.
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43

That there are at least two sides and several stages to Husserl’s work is well known.
Even the titles of some of the books by Husserl or books about him and his work
reflect that multiplicity or what some interpret as a dichotomy. Consider these:
Husserl’s The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An
Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy; Donn Welton’s The Other Husserl:
The Horizons of Transcendental Phenomenology and The New Husserl: A Critical
Reader; Quentin Lauer’s The Triumph of Subjectivity: An Introduction to
Transcendental Phenomenology; Maurice Natanson’s Edmund Husserl: Philosopher
of Infinite Tasks; Roman Ingarden’s On the Motives Which Led Husserl to
Transcendental Idealism; Marvin Farber’s The Foundations of Phenomenology:
Edmund Husserl and the Quest for a Rigorous Science of Philosophy; Harrison Hall’s
essay “Was Husserl a Realist or an Idealist?” in Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive
Science; and so on. Husserlian phenomenology, generally considered to be one of the
foundational forces of Continental Philosophy, has been taken up not only by
Continental philosophers, but neurobiological scientists, analytic philosophers,
materialists, theologians and scholars of religion. The bibliography both for Husserl’s
work and the literature about him and his work is vast. And that wide wake of his
work broadens to include the works of Husserl’s students such as Heidegger, Levinas,
Roman Ingarden, Max Scheler, Adolf Reinach, Eugene Fink, Edith Stein, Ludwig
Landgrebe, or other phenomenological scholars and artists deeply influenced by his
work such as Sartre, Derrida, Merleau-Ponty, Paul Ricouer, Michel Henry, AnnaTeresa Tymieniecka, Ortega y Gassett, and many other thinkers.
44
Here Bourne-Taylor and Mildenberg are referencing Husserl’s words in his Logical
Investigations, as well as referencing Merleau-Ponty in his The Primacy of
Perception.
45
Moran and Cohen reference a page from Edmund Husserl, Psychological and
Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927-1931).
This section of the book, page 98, is one of the drafts of the infamous Encyclopaedia
Britannica article on phenomenology, written jointly by Husserl and Heidegger,
which, despite each thinker’s efforts, they could not agree on. A section of that page
follows:
Accordingly, transcendental phenomenology is not one particular science among
others; rather, when systematically elaborated, it is the realization of the idea of an
absolutely universal science, specifically as eidetic science. As such it must
encompass all possible a priori sciences in systematic unity, specifically by
thoroughly considering the a priori connections in absolute grounding. We could
even bring up the traditional expression and broaden it by saying: Transcendental
phenomenology is the true and genuinely [p. 520] universal ontology that the
eighteenth century already strove for but was unable to achieve. It is an ontology that
is not stuck either in the naïve one-sidedness of natural positivity or, like the
ontologies of Baumgarten and Wolff, in formal generalities and analytic explanations
of concepts far removed from issues. Our ontology draws upon the original sources of
a universal intuition that studies all essential connections, and it discloses the
complete system of forms that pertains to every co-possible universum of possible
being in general and, included therein, that belongs to every possible world of
present <p. 32> realities.
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46

David Michael Levin is referencing Jacques Derrida, “Force and Signification,” in
Writing and Difference. Chicago: U Chicago P, 1978, 28.
47
It must be noted that David Michael Levin is a preeminent scholar of
phenomenology and no novice to Husserl’s work. See Levin’s Reason and Evidence
in Husserl’s Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1970.
48
In addition to Professor Christian Lotz’s “Depiction and Plastic Perception. A
Critique of Husserl’s Theory of Picture Consciousness,” and David Michael Levin’s
chapter “Husserl’s Transcendental Gaze” in his The Philosopher’s Gaze: Modernity
in the Shadows of Enlightenment, and of course the many criticisms of Husserl’s
work by both Heidegger and Derrida (which must be addressed where relevant to a
Husserlian aesthetic), there are the somewhat more positive critical essays of
Professor Christian Ferencz-Flatz, including “The Neutrality of Images and
Husserlian Aesthetics.”
49
See, for example, Husserl’s writings in Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and
Memory (1898-1925), 38-41, 132: discussing Raphael and Dürer, 182-184: discussing
Titian, 192-193: discussing a painting by Franz and Ida Brentano. Throughout this
volume are many general considerations of art and aesthetics, including both visual
and literary art, as well as music. See also Husserl’s discussion of Dürer’s “The
Knight, Death, and the Devil” in his Ideas: General Introduction to Pure
Phenomenology, 228-229. This last example will be explored in more detail in
Chapter One of the present study.
50
Not meaning to be presumptuous, I wish to note that one of the goals of the present
study, echoed in Wallenstein’s statement below, is in fact to tell at least some aspects
of this story.
51
These were early students of Husserl’s work. As John J. Drummond points out
(64), Husserl was very interested in this group, the so-called Munich School, who
included Adolf Reinach, Moritz Geiger, Alexander Pfänder, and Max Scheler. he
notes, “The Munich School was committed to a form of metaphysical realism and a
Platonism regarding idea objects ….” Eventually, Husserl disagreed with some details
of the group’s concepts. The Göttingen Philosophical Society, although attracted
originally to Husserl’s Logical Investigations, did not agree with or follow him in his
turn to “transcendental idealism,” in which objects are dependent on consciousness
(205).
52
See Henry’s Material Phenomenology. New York: Fordham University Press,
2008.
53
In a footnote (72) Malpas notes: “‘Objectivity’ is being used here in a deliberately
idiosyncratic fashion that is not intended to imply any notion of factual correctness,
and it ‘ontological’ rather than ‘epistemological’ in its orientation. ‘Objectivity’ refers
to the way in which an object is an object—to its being (or becoming) as object—in a
way that is intended to direct attention away from a concern with identity or
individuation conditions and on to the question of the object in its active or processcharacter.”
54
The phrase sub specie aeternitatis means, roughly, in its essential or universal form
or nature. It is also defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “Viewed in relation
to the eternal; from a universal perspective” ("sub specie aeternitatis, adv." OED
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Online. Oxford University Press, December 2014. Web. 24 February 2015). Also,
Rubenstein is quoting Wittgenstein from Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 6.44-6.45.
55
Rubenstein is quoting Wittgenstein from Notebooks, 86/86e.
56
Rubenstein is quoting Wittgenstein from Culture and Value, 5/5e.
57
Cahill quotes from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, 6.522. The German reads: “Es gibt
allerdings Unaussprechliches. Dies zeight sich, es ist das Mystische.” Schopenhauer’s
work is discussed in detail in Chapter Five—Philosophico: An Intertexual Orientation
to Aesthetic Thinkers.
58
The Gateless Gate is a famous collection of Chan (Zen) Buddhist koans that
appeared first in China in the early 13th century and subsequently in Japan. A koan is
a question, statement, story, or dialogue used in Zen Buddhist practice to provoke
great doubt and test a Buddhist practitioner’s spiritual understanding, especially in the
Rinzai Zen Buddhist tradition. The title to this collection has been more accurately
translated in modern times by Zen teacher Robert Aitken as The Gateless Barrier. See
Aitken’s book, The Gateless Barrier: The Wu-Men Kuan (Mumonkan), San
Francisco: North Point Press, 1990.
59
See The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta, by Raniero Gnoli.
60
See Schopenhauer’s Encounter with Indian Thought: Representation and Will and
Their Indian Parallels, by Stephen Cross; and Understanding Schopenhauer Through
the Prism of Indian Culture: Philosophy, Religion and Sanskrit Literature, Arati
Barua, Michael Gerhard, Matthia Koßler, eds.
61
See, for example, Transformative Philosophy: A Study of Sankara, Fichte, and
Heidegger, by John A. Taber. Also, Agents of Uncertainty: Mysticism, Scepticim,
Buddhism, Art and Poetry, by John Danvers.
62
See especially John Golding’s Paths to the Absolute: Mondrian, Malevich,
Kandinsky, Pollock, Newman, Rothko, and Still.
63
The footnoted quote on page 252 from Kant is: “Two things fill the mind with ever
new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more frequently and persistently
one's meditation deals with them: the starry sky above me and the moral law within
me.” Emphasis is Kant’s.
64
See especially Patrick Sherry, “The Varieties of Wonder.” Philosophical
Investigations, 36.4 (2013): 340-354.
65
The essays in Phenomenology, Modernism and Beyond contain some of the most
significant writings available about Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology in
relation to the arts. Critical questions regarding phenomenology and modernist art in
this unique collection also reference the work of thinkers Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
Martin Heidegger, Michel Henry and Paul Ricoeur.
66
Mildenberg quotes from Virginia Woolf, “The Mark on the Wall” in Selected Short
Stories (London: Penguin Books, 1993), 69.
67
Here Mildenberg adds in a footnote: “For different interpretations of ‘doubt’ in
Woolf see Marc D. Cyr, ‘A Conflict of Closure in Virginia Woolf’s ‘The Mark on the
Wall’’, Studies in Short Fiction 33:2 (1996), pp. 197-205, and Stephen J. Miko’s
stimulating article ‘Reflections on The Waves’, Criticism 30, pt. I (1988), pp. 63-90.”
68
Mildenberg is quoting from Husserl’s Ideas, 107-108.
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69

Natanson’s book Mildenberg refers to is Maurice Natanson, Edmund Husserl:
Philosopher of Infinite Tasks. Evanston, Indiana: Northwestern University Press,
1973.
70
See also Kevin M. Cahill’s The Fate of Wonder: Wittgenstein’s Critique of
Metaphysics and Modernity, and Gordon C.F. Bearn’s Waking to Wonder:
Wittgenstein’s Existential Investigations.)
71
This quote in The Phenomenology Reader came originally from a section of
Merleau-Ponty’s The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays. Evanston, Illinois:
Northwestern UP, 1964, 12-27. Print.
72
Bearn is quoting Wittgenstein via a conversation G.E.M. Anscombe had with
Wittgenstein, reported by Anscombe in her “Opening Address [of the 6th International
Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg am Wechsel, August 1981]” in
Language and Ontology, W. Leinfellner, et al., eds. Vienna: Hoelder-PichlerTempsky, 1982, 28. Print. Anscombe (1919-2001) was an analytical philosopher and
one of Wittgenstein’s students, as well as the translater of some of his writings,
including Philosophical Investigations. Note from Bearn: “A second edition with an
index (of the first edition) and a new version Wittgenstein’s “Notes on Longic: 1913”
was published by the University of Chicago Press in 1979. The pagination up to p. 91
is the same.”
73
Bearn quotes Wittgenstein from (6.44) Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, 5.552.
74
Focault is referring to a passage in Borges’ 1942 essay “The Analytical Language
of John Wilkins” (El idioma analítico de John Wilkins). Focault goes on to note,
“This passage quotes a ‘certain Chinese encyclopedia’ in which is written that
‘animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (be) embalmed, (c) tame, (d)
sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) include in the present
classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair
brush, (l) et cetera, (me) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long
way off look like flies’.”
75
This blend of heavy subject matter and humor is reflected in the titles of some of
Borges’ books: A Universal History of Iniquity, The Garden of Forking Paths, The
Book of Sand, Artifices, and some of his stories: “The Widow Ching—Pirate,” “Man
on Pink Corner,” “Et cetera,” “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote,” “The Library
of Babel,” “A Dialog Between Dead Men,” “A Weary Man’s Utopia,” and so on.
76
This is one of a series of comments by Remedios Varo on some of her paintings as
addressed to her brother, Dr. RodrigoVaro.
77
At times in this study, the quotations used may not follow the best uses of English,
especially in the many translations from Spanish, German, and French, the last, for
example, as it is translated from Bataille’s writings. This may well not be the
translators fault, but only reflecting the usage in the original language.
78
It is critically important to establish evidence that many modernist artists, and also
some contemporary artists, and not simply Varo and Borges, attempt to express
various versions of their individual sensibilities to the numionous. Chapter Four—
Seeking the Numinous in Modern Art focuses on this topic.
79
Regarding “theological-philosophical” see Philip C. Almond’s Rudolf Otto: An
Introduction to His Philosophical Theology.
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80

A number of resources used in this study utilize these terms. These include Roger
Lipsey’s An Art of Our Own: The Spiritual in Twentieth-Century Art; Wassily
Kandinsky’s Concerning the Spiritual in Art; David F. Martin’s Art and the Religious
Experience: The “Language” of the Sacred; Jungo Yoon’s Spirituality in
Contemporary Art: The Idea of the Numinous; Tuchman and Blotkamp’s The
Spiritual in Art: Abstract Painting 1890-1985; Anthony J. Steinbock’s
Phenomenology and Mysticism: The Verticality of Religious Experience; Pacquement
De Loisy’s Traces du Sacré; Clément and Kristeva’s The Feminine and the Sacred;
as well as Otto’s The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor in the
Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational.
81
It should be noted that some important scholarly works have approached this topic
from a variety of perspectives, including studies about Husserl, Heidegger, Levinas,
Marion and others being done by Espen Dahl. See Dahl’s books in Works Cited.
82
Since “immanent” and “immanence” have, like transcendental, been used in both
religion and philosophy, it worth noting the OED emphasis on the philosophical
interpretation: 1. Indwelling, inherent; actually present or abiding in; remaining
within. In recent philosophy applied to the Deity regarded as permanently pervading
and sustaining the universe, as distinguished from the notion of an external
transcendent creator or ruler; immanent principle (with Kant), a principle limited to
the realm of experience: opposed to transcendental principle. ("immanent, adj.".
OED Online. December 2013. Oxford University Press. 11 December 2013.
83
One famous longtime practitioner of Transcendental Meditation is filmmaker
David Lynch. See Lynch’s Catching the Big Fish: Meditation, Consciousness, and
Creativity.
84
One challenge to researching and writing a study like the present one that is related
to spirituality is how to compositionally bracket out presumptions and preconceptions
about what spirituality is in a fresh or immediate sense beyond historical and cultural
labels. An important aspect of that challenge is simply diction. Although “numinous”
is the word I have selected to more precisely express—in a philosophicophenomenological thematic context—the spiritual impulse underlying much modern
and contemporary artmaking and art viewing, there are other words that support or
enhance at times the usage of numinous. Though not exact synonyms, these terms can
serve to clarify given instances of the more broadly applied expression “sensibility to
the numinous.” Besides specific words that are more Asian in character (words like
“samadhi” and “satori”), there are various western nouns and adjectives that can be
associated with numinous. One such term is “epiphany” or “epiphanic”. A more
generalized term would be “revelation” or “revelatory”. Ecstasy and intuition,
likewise are associated with numinous, and others words and phrases will surface
during the process of writing this study.
85
Of course the word “feeling” is also a culturally overloaded term, and a generalized
amorphous concept, given its relationship to psychology and subjectively specialized
meanings. Ultimately, I think it is important to retain the whole phrase of “feeling
sensibility” rather than try to make feeling itself into a valid conceptual principle. If
one has a “feeling sensibility,” it is a sensibility to “something,” which in this study is
going to be a feeling sensibility to the numinous in relation to the functioning of
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image consciousness in art. It is important to remain consistently specific in this
regard.
86
There are numerous anthologies of these experiences. Besides the highly regarded
1902 The Varieties of Religious Experience by William James, two of the more
respected longtime popular anthologies are Aldous Huxley’s 1944 The Perennial
Philosophy and Richard Maurice Bucke’s 1901 Cosmic Consciousness: A Study in
the evolution of the Human Mind.
87
For that fact, Cox referenced E.J. Sharpe’s same statement in Comparative
Religion: A History. London, Duckworth, 2nd Edition, 1986, 162.
88
Espen Dahl attributes this comment to E. Husserl, Briefwechel VII. Husserliana
Doumente III, ed. E. Schumann and K. Schumann. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994, 207.
89
Here Husserl has misspelled the name of his student, Heinrich Ochsner (18911970), who became a professor.
90
The letter is dated March 5, 1919. Two Notes: (1) from Thomas Sheehan, trns.: The
original copy of this letter is found in the Rudolf-Otto-Nachlass at the
Universitätsbibliotek in Marburg, West Germany, catalogues as Hs 797-794. It has
been published in Hans-Walter Schütte, Religion und Christentum in der Theologie
Rudolf Ottos, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1969, pp. 139-142. I have followed the more
accurate transcription that is found in the Husserl Archives in Leuven, catalogued as
R. I. Otto 5.III.19. I am grateful to Professor Samuel I Jsseling, Director of the
Leuven Archives, for permission to translate this text. Although the letter is chiefly
concerned with Oxner and with Otto’s book Das Heilige, it is one of the earliest
documents in which Husserl mentions Heidegger, and specifically Heidegger’s
religious orientation to Protestantism. Moreover, while this would be the first time
that Otto heard the name Heidegger, it would not be the last. During 1925 Otto
worked vigorously to oppose Heidegger’s promotion at Marburg to the chair vacated
by Nicolai Hartmann. (Tr. note.) 2. Note via Religious Studies Stanford Education:
Letters Husserl and Heidegger: March 5. 1919: Edmund Husserl to Rudolf Otto
[Briefwechsel 7:205-8] Husserl writes to Professor Rudolf Otto, author of The Idea of
the Holy, to offer his impressions of his student Heinrich Ochsner (1891-1970),
whose name Husserl misspells here as “Oxner.” Ochsner, who had studied with
Husserl and who was planning to convert from Catholicism to Protestantism, had the
prospect of an assistantship with Otto at Marburg University. In the course of the
letter Husserl reveals at least as much about the young Heidegger, who had become
his assistant less than two months before, as he does about Ochsner, including
Heidegger’s shift (if not “conversion”) to Protestantism.
91
It is important to emphasize that Otto’s numinous is non-rational rather than
irrational.
92
Harten’s essay excerpt “Creating Heaven” in Simon Morely’s anthology, The
Sublime, was extracted from Heaven: An Exhibition That Will Break Your Heart
(Düsseldorf: Kunsthalle Düsseldorf /Ostfildern-Ruit: Hate Cantz Verlag, 1999) 9-11.
93
This of course does not even take into account the influence of Kant’s general
thought on thinkers like Nietzsche, Heidegger, and others up to the present day.
94
Simon Morley describes this: “Broadly speaking, four approaches to the sublime
can be identified within contemporary art and theory. These derive from Longinus,
Burke, Kant and Schiller. From Longinus comes an emphasis on the transcendence of
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reality through the heroic act; from Burke, the idea of the sublime as an experience of
shock and awe and as a destabilizing force; from Kant the notion of the sublime as
revealing a reality that is fundamentally indeterminate, undecidable and
unpresentable; and from Schiller a reading of the sublime as ecstatic experience.”
Morley goes on in that anthology (see Morley, The Sublime, which emphasizes
modern and contemporary commentaries on the sublime) to divide the texts of that
anthology into seven sections or categories. He names these sections The
Unpresentable, Transcendence, Nature, Technology, Terror, The Uncanny, and
Altered States. In the present study, contemporary writings that address the sublime in
the sections Transcendence and Altered States are most useful, but any of the texts in
The Sublime may reappear as resource materials for various topics or subtopics.
95
In the 1790s Goethe developed numerous friendships, including becoming friends
and collaborator with Schiller. Goethe’s 1810 Theory of Color will be accessed later
in this study during some considerations of color in modern art. As to Goethe and the
sublime, as might be expected, his is a highly original orientation. The following is an
abstract of a current dissertation titled Goethe and the Sublime, or Das Erhabene bei
Goethe, by John M. Koster at the University of Toronto: The dissertation situates the
Goethean sublime in an obscured countermovement of resistance to the
aestheticization the concept underwent in the 18th century. Before the encounter with
the English aesthetic concept of the sublime, the German notion of das Erhabene (the
sublime) named not a category of aesthetic experience, but a social affect. In contrast
to the Sublime of Edmund Burke's theory, which explicitly excludes melancholy from
the sources of the Sublime, das Erhabene is an affect related to the self-overcoming of
melancholic subjectivity. As the aestheticized notion of the sublime displaced das
Erhabene, Goethe became one of the most radical innovators of the aesthetics of the
sublime. But as is demonstrated in chapters on The Sorrows of Young Werther,
Elective Affinities, Faust and Wilhelm Meister, he did so with the aim of recovering
the displaced meaning of das Erhabene as social affect. Goethe's sublime aims to
show at every turn that the so-called "aesthetic experience" of the sublime is really
displaced social affect. His treatment of the sublime therefore constitutes a radical
critique of the establishment of aesthetics as an independent sphere of inquiry. There
is for Goethe no way to understand aesthetic experience independently of its social
context. By reconnecting the sublime to the original social meaning of das Erhabene,
Goethe recovers the aesthetics of the sublime as a means of mediating and facilitating
the movement of subjectivity from frustrated stasis to divine creativity; i.e., from
exclusion to participation in the material creation of reality.
>http://hdl.handle.net/1807/35868<
96
In The Sublime, author Philip Shaw references Kristeva once, in a section subtitled
“Towards the Fragile Absolute” (144-146), which discusses “the Lacanian thesis of
woman as the foreclosed or sublime object of patriarchal discourse” (144). Shaw does
frequently reference Slavoj Zizek, and at times uses the films of David Lynch to
accentuate points to emphasize a more contemporary and at times postmodernist
version of the sublime.
97
Morely, in his editor’s introduction to The Sublime, names two of Lyotard’s essays,
the 1984 “The Sublime and the Avant-garde” and the 1982 “Presenting the
Unpresentable: The Sublime” (first appearing in Art Forum).
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On this point Shaw references P. Hamilton’s “From Sublimity to Indeterminancy:
New World Order or Aftermath of Romantic Ideology,” in Romanticism and
Postmodernism, ed. Edward Larrisey, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999.
99
Todd A. Gooch references Scheler’s Vom Ewigen im Menschen, Gesammelte
Werek, Vol. V, ed. by Maria Scherler, Bern: Francke, 1954, p. 166.
100
It is worth quoting Otto’s assessment of Goethe’s “pagan” orientation to the
numinous to give a more detailed sense of the difference between the two: There can
be no clearer expression than this of the prodigiously strong impression which
divination of the numinous may make upon the mind, and that obviously not on a
single occasion but repeatedly, till it has become almost a matter of habit. But at the
same time this 'divination' of Goethe is not one that apprehends the numinous as the
prophet does. It does not rise to the elevation of the experience of Job, where the nonrational mystery is at the same time experienced and extolled as supra-rational, as of
profoundest value, and as holiness in its own right. It is rather the fruit of a mind
which, for all its depth, was not equal to such profundities as these, and to which,
therefore, the non-rational counterpoint to the melody of life could only sound in
confused consonance, not in its authentic harmony, indefinable but palpable.
Therefore, though it is genuine divination, it is the divination of Goethe 'the pagan',
as he sometimes used to call himself. Indeed, it is a divination that functions only at
the level of the 'daemonic' which, as we saw, precedes religion proper, not at the level
of the divine and the holy in the truest sense; and it shows very clearly how that sort
of merely 'daemonic' experience of the numinous may in a highly cultivated mind only
stir emotional reactions of bewilderment and bedazzlement, without giving real light
or warmth to the soul (Otto 153).
101
For this quote from Faust, Bishop’s attribution is: J.W. von Goethe, Faust II,
II.6272-74 (J.W. von Goethe, Faust: Part Two, trans. D. Luke, Oxford and New
York: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 52-3).
102
According to Roderick Main (158), Jung began to reference the concept of the
numinous in his writings in the 1930’s, especially using it as “one of the defining
characteristics of archetypes,” but also as the “core of religious experience.”
103
Murray Stein attributes part of the Otto’s preference for feeling over thinking to
Otto’s experiences of what he came to term “the numinous” in India and what is now
Morocco during his extensive travels (41). However, it should be noted here that
despite his travels and liberal observations of other religious cultures, and his
suffering the abusive criticism and ridicule of his theological colleagues because of
his liberal attitude towards other religions, Otto continued to consider Christianity to
be a religion superior to all others (43), and this attitude of Christian exclusivity and
superiority is undeniably reflected in his Das Heilige.
104
See, for example, Stein’s references to Jung’s writings as evidence of Jung’s own
“receptivity to numinous experience” (45), including the descriptions in Jung’s 1963
Memories, Dreams, Reflections.
105
See Jungu Yoon, Spirituality in Contemporary Art: The Idea of the Numinous.
106
See Alondra Yvette Oubre´, Instinct and Revelation: reflections on the Origins of
Numinous Perception.
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Goethe wrote “The Trilogy of Passion” at the age of 75. It was appended to an
edition of The Sorrows of Young Werther published at that time. See The Poems of
Goethe, 200.
108
The chapter that explicates Schopenhauer’s aesthetic is, like the present
explication of the numinous and Husserlian methodology, central to this study. Much
of Schopenhauer’s thought, and especially his argument about the pivotal
transcendent importance of the artistic experience, is thematically essential to
elucidating the thesis here. One of the challenges in explicating and including the
Schopenhauerian aesthetic, besides weaving that aesthetic with a Husserlian
transcendental phenomenological methodology, is showing how Schopenhauer’s
passionate expression of the sublime in art is simultaneously a sensibility to the
numinous, the root of which is being excavated in the present chapter.
109
Roy references for this assertion include: Reginald W. Bibby, The Poverty and
Potential of Religon in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Press, 1987), 69-70; Andrew M.
Greeley, The Sociology of the Paranomral: A Reconnaissance (Beverly Hills: Sage
Publications, 1975), 57-8; David Hay, Exploring Inner Space: Scientists and
Religious Experience (Harmondwworth: Penguin Books, 1982), 112-29, and
Religious Experience Today (London: Mowbray, 1990), 79-85 for “international
statistics.”
110
In his Transcendent Experiences: Phenomenology and Critique, Roy considers
how the writings of Kant, Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hegel, William James, Rudolf
Otto, and other philosophers or philosopher-theologians are significant in his study of
the transcendent experience. Some aspects of Roy’s explication of his thesis are
relevant to this study, others are not.
111
See Louis Roy’s discussion of Husserl as well as how Husserl’s concept of
intentionality and “inner perception” both echoes and differs from the concepts of his
mentor Franz Brentano in Roy’s Mystical Consciousness: Western Perspectives and
Dialogue with Japanese thinkers. 7-10, 40.
112
Roy quotes Husserl’s words in Mystical Consciousness, 8.
113
Roy notes that Otto’s discussion of Gefühl occurs in Otto’s 1909 book The
Philosophy of Religion Based on Kant and Fries, in the “Author’s Notes on the
Translation” written at the time of the English translation.
114
Roy references a section (146-147) of Otto’s Das Heilige in which Otto is
considering Schleiermacher's writings: What Schleiermacher is feeling after is really
the faculty or capacity of deeply absorbed contemplation, when confronted by the
vast, living totality and reality of things as it is in nature and history. Wherever a
mind is exposed in a spirit of absorbed submission to impressions of 'the universe', it
becomes capable--so he lays it down--of experiencing 'intuitions' and 'feelings'
(Anschauungen and Gefühle) of something that is, as it were, a sheer overplus, in
addition to empirical reality. This overplus, while it cannot be apprehended by mere
theoretic cognition of the world and the cosmic system in the form it assumes for
science, can nevertheless be really and truly grasped and experienced in intuition,
and is given form in single 'intuitions'. And these, in turn, assume shape in definite
statements and propositions, capable of a certain groping formulation, which are not
without analogy with theoretic propositions, but are to be clearly distinguished from
them by their free and merely felt, not reasoned, character. In themselves they are
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groping intimations of meanings figuratively apprehended. They cannot be employed
as 'statements of doctrine' in the strict sense, and can neither be built into a system
nor used as premises [sic] for theoretical conclusions. But, though these intuitions are
limited and inadequate, they are none the less indisputably true, i.e. true as far as
they go; and for all Schleiermacher's aversion to the word in this connexion they must
certainly be termed cognitions, modes of knowing, though, of course, not the product
of reflection, but the intuitive outcome of feeling. Their import is the glimpse of an
Eternal, in and beyond the temporal and penetrating it, the apprehension of a ground
and meaning of things in and beyond the empirical and transcending it. They are
surmises or inklings of a Reality fraught with mystery and momentousness.
115
Virtually all the organized religions include sacred art. Tibetan Buddhism and
Christian Byzantine art are two (of many) salient examples. While such art can be
beautiful, it is also sometimes clearly intended to be a means of worship or devotion
for the particular religion associated with it. On the other hand, the contemplation of
any art, including modern art, is not necessarily an expression of religious
motivations. Such contemplation may in fact even be rooted in a more general
spiritual impulse, one not associated with a specific religion.
116
Bass is quoting Robert A. F. Thurman from “The Buddha’s Smile: Enlightenment
and the Pursuit of happiness,” in In Pursuit of happiness, Leroy S. Rouner, ed. Notre
Dame, Ind.: U Notre Dame P, 1995, Print. 89-90.
117
See also Lawrence Weschler. Seeing is Forgetting the Name of the Thing One
Sees: Over Thirty Years of Conversations with Robert Irwin (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2008).
118
Obviously, it was not only Hilma af Klint and Emma Kunz’s interest in the occult
and spiritually accented themes that marginalized them; the fact that they were
women working in a gender-biased society was equally significant. One could easily
argue that these are two biases have continued to this moment, although gender
prejudice has been addressed far more frequently in recent years.
119
As noted in the previous chapter, much evidence points to the early abstractionists
interest in spirituality and art. Besides many books on this topic, see also exhibition
catalogs that focus on the works of these artists. See especially the essays,
commentaries, and art images in exhibition catalogs:The Spiritual in Art: Abstract
Painting 1890-1985, Traces du Sacre (Traces of the Sacred), The Third Mind:
American Artists Contemplate Asia, 1860–1989, and Inventing Abstraction 19101925: How a Radical Idea Changed Modern Art.
120
It should be noted here that intentionality is not meant to be comprehended as or
restricted a completely separate means to navigate the labyrinth of the transcendent
experience in art, at least not in this study. The quote from Husserl about three
concepts of consciousness, for example, is given in a chapter of his Logical
Investigations, and the title of that chapter illustrates the point being made in this
endnote. The title of Husserl’s chapter is “Consciousness as the phenomenological
Subsistence of the Ego and Consciousness as Inner Perception” (LI, v. 2, 81).
121
This transcultural aspect of Percy’s work expresses not so much a self-conscious
“borrowing” of Asian aesthetic as a demonstration of “Asia as Method,” a reference
made by scholar and curator Alexandra Munroe to a 1960 lecture of that title by the
Japanese scholar of Chinese literature Takeuchji Yoshimi. Munroe, the Samsung
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Senior Curator of Asian Art at the Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum in New York,
and the curator of the 2009 exhibition at that museum, The Third Mind: American
Artists Contemplate Asia, 1860-1989, referenced Yoshimi’s lecture in her brilliant
introductory essay of the catalog for The Third Mind. It should be emphasized that
this exhibition and the excellent large catalog that accompanied it, provide some of
the most extensive and detailed materials and resources ever created to address the
influence of Asian aesthetics on American art.
122
For a full consideration of Percy’s aesthetic and his abstract art, see my essay:
Carroll, “Transcultural Intuition and Beauty in the Paintings of Robert Percy.”
123
Cage’s interest in Zen Buddhism, on the other hand, has been acknowledged in art
scholarship.
124
Originally in Graham’s Marcel Duchamp: Conversations with the Grand Master,
1968, 3.
125
Interesting here is that the word “stoppages” is associated with invisibility.
126
See John F Moffitt’s 2003 Alchemist of the avant-garde: The Case of Marcel
Duchamp, published in the SUNY series in Eastern Esoteric Traditions.
127
The orientation here is neither a denial nor validation of Joselit’s study.
128
“For the rest of his life he spoke and wrote English almost like a native—could
indeed sometimes pass as one for his first few minutes with an English stranger. The
English prose he was to write in adult life, though containing minor blemishes of
grammar and syntax, had the same highly distinctive character of his German, though
this is perhaps less surprising when one remembers that his adult German prose had
an English model. Despising as he did the pretentiousness so characteristic of German
writing—and the long, convoluted sentences that went with it—and seeing nothing in
the language itself that called for these things, he consciously set out to write German
in the way Hume wrote English” (Magee 5).
129
Almost every book about Schopenhauer’s philosophy, both his metaphysical
philosophy and his aesthetic philosophy, comments at some point about how
emphatically Schopenhauer’s writings influenced various artists, writers, poets,
musicians, and other individuals in the arts. These books include, among others,
Sophia Vasalou’s Schopenhauer and the Aesthetic Standpoint: Philosophy as a
Practice of the Sublime; Julian Young’s Schopenhauer; W. Wallace’s Life of Arthur
Schopenhauer; Rüdiger Safranski’s Schopenhauer and the Wild Years of Philosophy;
Stephen Cross’s Schopenhauer’s Encounter with Indian Thought: Representation and
Will and Their Indian Parallels; David E. Cartwright’s Historical Dictionary of
Schopenhauer’s Philosophy; Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's
Educator, Christopher Janaway, editor; Schopenhauer, Philosophy and the Arts, Dale
Jacquette, editor; Better Consciousness: Schopenhauer’s Philosophy of Value, Alex
Neill and Christopher Janaway, editors.
130
As Cartwright points out (125), Schopenhauer did write that “my doctrine is
pessimism” in 1828 while comparing his philosophy with pantheism, the latter of
which he described as being optimism. Cartwright cites this remark as being found in
Manuscript Remains, vol. III. “Adversaria,” para.66.
131
Discussing objects and the experience of objects in the world immediately invites
a comparison with Husserl’s phenomenology and the concepts about objects and
perception, and intentionality and givenness, for example.
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The second volume, WWP II, consisting of “supplements” or essays expanding the
Books of the first volume, was published in 1844.
133
The complexity of Schopenhauer’s thought is a challenge to effectively
summarize. In fact, to label Schopenhauer as simply being a “pessimist,” as he so
often has been categorized, is an obvious example. Besides the challenges of
summarizing his work, such labels undermine the significance of his original and also
optimistic thought and aesthetic.
134
As Aquila notes (xii, footnote iv): “ ‘Representation’ and its cognates are fairly
standard in translations of Kant, e.g., in the translations of the Critique of Pure
Reason most frequently cited in the literature: Norman Kemp Smith (London:
Macmillan, 1929); Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998).
On the other hand, Werner Pluhar ops for ‘presentation’ (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Co., 1996). References to the Kritik der Vernunft appear in standard A/B
format, referring to the pagination of the first (1781) and second (1787) editions,
typically so indicated in the margins of modern editions.”
135
For versions of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung using the word “idea” as a
translation of Vorstellung, see The World as Will and Idea, tr. in 3 vols., R.B.
Haldane and J. Kemp (London: Trubner & Co., 1883-1886); The World as Will and
Idea, abridged, ed. David Berman, tr. Jill Berman (London: J.M. Dent, 1995
[Everyman Library]).
136
Another scholarly advantage to Aquila’s translation of The World as Will and
Presentation is that far more footnotes are included than with other translations. For
example, at this junction while discussing Schopenhauer’s use of presentation in a
theatrical and spectator context, Aquila includes a useful footnote that also notes
Schopenhauer’s use of Puppenspiel (puppet show) and a “tragi-comedy” of which
one is the spectator. Aquila then states, “Just as with the corresponding English term,
Vorstellung can refer either to what is presented or to the process or action in
presenting it” (xiii).
137
It worth noting as an aside, however, the somewhat paradoxical and humorous
nature of Schopenhauer’s advice to put aside emotion and passion, given that Arthur
Schopenhauer was one of the most emotionally fueled, passionate, and strongly
opinionated voices in the history of philosophy!
138
Schopenhauer also later considered On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of
Sufficient Ground: A Philosophical to serve as an introduction to WWP I (Cartwright
53).
139
As he did with so many of Schopenhauer’s ideas, Nietzsche took and used for his
own purposes the term principium inviduationis directly from Schopenhauer. See
Tom Rockmore's Art and Truth after Plato, 246.
140
The passage from the Upanishad quoted by Schopenhauer: Oupnekhat, Vol. 1, p.
202. CF Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, III, 7, 23.
141
This is not the first time scholars have assigned a mystical connection to
Schopenhauer’s work. An earlier quote by Dale Jacquette on page 2 began with this
sentence (emphasis on “mystical” is mine): “With its roots firmly embedded in a
particular interpretation of Plato, Kant, and Asian philosophy, Schopenhauer’s theory
sheds light on these important intellectual and mystical religious traditions.”
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The same might be said of Nietzsche, who is often described as Schopenhauer’s
student. See Magee’s The Philosophy of Schopenhauer, Safranski’s Schopenhauer
and the Wild Years of Philosophy, and especially Janaway’s Willing and Nothingness:
Schopenhauer as Nietzsche’s Educator.
143
See Magee’s The Philosophy of Schopenhauer, especially “A Note on
Schopenhauer and Buddhism,” 340-345.
144
Here Charles Muses notes that such critiques are typified especially by “a quantity
of popularizing writings.” A larger question that might be addressed beyond Muses
comments and beyond the scope of the present study is why western philosophy has
been willing to remain self-enclosed by a Eurocentric sheath of presumed exclusivity.
While the term “global art” indicates that contemporary philosophical and aesthetic
orientations are challenging that exclusivity, this is a relatively recent shift. In that
sense, Schopenhauer was a pioneer in that his thought refused such exclusivities, and
Nietzsche, somewhat less than Schopenhauer, acknowledged the importance of
Eastern thought as well. Heidegger, on the other hand, while incorporating some
Asian concepts into his philosophy, generally failed to acknowledge those sources.
(See, among other resources, Heidegger’s On the Way to Language, Harper, 1982;
Reinhard May’s Heidegger's Hidden Sources: East-Asian Influences on his Work,
Routledge, 1996; Peter Wilberg’s Heidegger, Phenomenology and Indian Thought,
New Gnosis Publications, 2008; Wei Zhang’s Heidegger, Rorty, And the Eastern
Thinkers: A Hermeneutics of Cross-cultural Understanding, State University of New
York Press, 2006; J.J. Clarke’s Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter Between
Asian and Western Thought, Routledge, 1997; and Graham Parkes’ Nietzsche and
Asian Thought, University of Chicago Press, 1996.
145
Wittgenstein, Derrida, Roland Barthes, many other thinkers come to mind. In the
context of Varo and Borges’s irrealistic fabulist art-making, language remains as one
primary and very significant element, one that I intend to address primarily through
Bakhtinian aesthetics, as discussed at the conclusion of this chapter and in even more
detail in the final chapter on the artist-philosopher.
146
The “passage already quoted” by Schopenhauer signals the same quote he used
following his earlier reference (WWI 224) to Byron’s words: “Are not the mountains,
waves and skies, a part / Of me and of my soul, as I of them?” (Childe Harold’s
Pilgrimage, III, 72, Canto III).
147
Much of Kandinsky’s writing brings up the subject of music. See especially his
1926 Point and Line to Plane (Punkt und Linie zu Fläche), which was the ninth in a
series of fourteen Bauhaus books edited by Walter Gropius and L. Moholy-Nagy, and
many other Kandinsky writings. See also Kandinsky’s exchanges with his friend the
composer Arnold Schoenberg (who was also influenced by Schopenhauer’s work),
especially in Schoenberg, Kandinsky, and the Blue Rider. Also see The Sounding
Cosmos: A Study in the Spiritualism of Kandinsky and the Genesis of Abstract
Painting, by Sixten Ringbom.
148
Another orientation of Gefühl would be that conceptual thought and a sensibility
to the numinous can occur simultaneously, a point that will be returned to later in the
study.
149
Deborah J. Haynes is a pioneer in applying Bakhtin’s theories to visual art. See her
books Bakhtin and the Visual Arts and her Bakhtin Reframed.
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In noting that many the terms in Bakhtin’s early essays are related to theology,
Haynes is referencing Graham Pechey’s Mikhail Bakhtin: The Word in the World
(153).
151
According to Husserl, “The life of humans is nothing but a way to God. I try to
reach this goal without theological proofs, methods, supports; namely, to arrive at
God without God. I, as it were, must eliminate God from my scientific existence in
order to pave the way to God for humans who do not have, as you do, the certainty of
faith through the Church. I know my procedure could be dangerous for me were I not
a human deeply bound to God and a faithful Christian” (See Laycock, 1-2, and 22).
152
See especially the work of phenomenological scholar Angela Ales Bello: The
Divine in Husserl and Other Explorations, and “Archeology of Religious
Knowledge” in Phenomenology and the Numinous.
153
See http://philosopherartists.blogspot.com for some of the strongest writing about
the artist-philosopher. There are some strong connections at that blog with professors
and graduate students the European Graduate School in in Saas-Fee, Wallis,
Switzerland.
154
Although some of this material was covered in Chapter Four about the numinous
and modern art, what comes to mind immediately are all the artists who wrote
influential books, some only about aesthetic details, but many about the philosophy of
art and general philosophy as well. Some, such as Kandinsky, Mondrian, Malevich,
Rothko, and others were and are excellent writers.
155
Although it can be confusing, when referring directly to Husserl’s words or
concepts, the spelling “phantasy” is used, Husserl’s spelling, but when considering
the general topic of fantasy it seems more appropriate to use the contemporary
spelling “fantasy.”
156
See Hilma af Klint: Pioneer of Abstraction, edited by Iris Müller-Westermann,
with Jo Widoff; and 3X Abstraction: New Methods of Drawing: Hilma af Klint,
Emma Kunz, Agnes Martin, edited by Catherine de Zegher and Hendel Teicher.
157
Husserl put a footnote at the end of this excerpt: “We intend to try to pursue as far
as possible the point of view of imagination and the notion that phantasy presentation
can be interpreted as image presentation—although there is no dearth of objections to
this attempt, objections that subsequently turn out to be justified.”
158
In some respects irrealism and fabulism or interchangeable. In this study whatever
is the dominant topical issue in a given sentence is made the noun, be it “irreal
fabulism” or “fabulist irrealism.”
159
Since these are discussed as “objects” rather than stories, they are not enclosed in
quotes like most story titles, but are given formal capitalization because they are
places or people. The Library of Babel is not just a story, but a place within the story
that is given its reality by the author.
160
In her book Magic(al) Realism, Maggie Ann Bowers delineates three terms:
“magic realism,” “magical realism” and “marvelous realism,” but uses the term
“magic(al) realism” where all three have common features.
161
This is a reference to British surrealist painter Lenora Carrington, a close friend of
Remedios Varo who also lived and worked in Mexico for years.
162
See Gracia, Jorge J.E, Carolyn Korsmeyer and Rodolphe Gasché, eds. Literary
Philosophers: Borges, Calvino, Eco. Also see Williams, Merel, Henry James and the
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Philosophical Novel: Being and Seeing, and Singer, Irving. George Santayana:
Literary Philosopher.
163
These different meanings are defined at "fantasy | phantasy, n." OED Online.
Oxford University Press, June 2014. Web. 8 September 2014.
164
Although Husserl uses the spelling of fantasy as “phantasy,” the spelling
employed in this study is, for the most part, “fantasy.”
165
Although this article is referenced in the bibliography as “Art for Life’s Sake,” Art
Therapy: Journal of the American Art Therapy Association, 9 (4), 169-175, 1992, the
journal editor notes: “Art Therapy would like to thank the author and the National Art
Education Association for permission to reprint this article. The article originally
appeared in What is Art For? Keynote Addresses of the 1991 NAEA Convention,
Karen Lee Carroll, ed., 15-26.”
166
Besides referencing the books by Agee and the Goldsteins in this passage,
Dissanayate is referencing a 1997 paper presented at the College Art Association by
Carma R. Gorman titled “Period Eye.”
167
A recent important resource for prehistoric art is Werner Herzog’s remarkable
documentary film, Cave of Forgotten Dreams, which takes the viewer along on a
exclusive expedition into the Chauvet Cave in France, home to the most ancient
pictorial art discovered—dating back over 30,000 years. The sense that art-making is
an innate human capacity and need is directly communicated in that film.
168
Also very relevant to a study of Varo and Borges is, as will be seen ahead in this
chapter, Bakhtin’s carnival or the carnivalesque.
169
On the page quoted, Daphna Erdinast-Vulcan references Merleau-Ponty’s
Phenomenology of Perception, The Prose of the World, and The Visible and the
Invisible.
170
In his essay, “Bataille, the Emotive Intellectual,” Besnier attempts to address three
charges widely leveled at Bataille—that he was hostile to democracy and was
seduced by Fascism, that he became a Stalinist, and that he was a spiritual seeker.
Besnier notes that while there are some factual elements in these accusations by the
intelligentsia of his day, none of the charges reflected a definitive or complete
orientation to Bataille’s work, even though his writings were to some degree
marginalized because of the reactions to these charges. Part of the reaction may have
been the unconventional approach to eroticism in some of Bataille’s writings,
especially in his controversial 1928 novel, Histoire de l’oeil, (Story of the Eye) (under
pseudonym of Lord Auch). In the current study, the fundamental elucidation of
Bataille’s work focuses on his spiritual search and writings about mysticism, which
was at least as taboo as his erotic writings. Even though his work was valued
posthumously by Foucault, Derrida, Lacan, Baudrillard, Kristeva, and others, his
interest in the numinous and fascination with mysticism was criticized and scorned by
intellectual contemporaries such as Sartre.
171
Besnier references Bataille’s “Letter to Roger Caillois, 20 July 1939” for this
quote.
172
See especially Goodman’s Languages of Art.
173
Among the many studies of Borges and his work, see especially Literary
Philosophers: Borges, Calvino, Eco, edited by Jorge J.E. Gracia, Carolyn Korsmeyer,
and Rodolphe Gasché; Signs of Borges, by Sylvia Molloy; Out of Context: Historical
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Reference and the Representation of Reality in Borges, by Daniel Balderston; The
Narrow Act: Borges’s Art of Allusion, by Ronald Christ; Borges and Memory:
Encounters with the Human Brain, by Rodrigo Quian Quiroga; and Borges and His
Fiction: A Guide to His Mind and Art, by Gene H. Bell-Villada.
174
Johnson’s comment.
175
David E. Johnson found (and translated) this quote in María Esther Vázquez’s
Borges: Imágenes, memorias, diálogos, Caracas: Monte Ávila Editores, 1977, 105.
Johnson also references in a footnote a quote from Ivan Almeida’s essay, “De Borges
a Schopenhauer” in Variaciones Borges 17: 103-41: “appreciation of a philosophical
doctirine is, for Borges, a function of the virtualities of fiction that this doctrine offers
him” (113).
176
See especially William Rowlandson’s 2013 Borges, Swedenborg and Mysticism,
and Maria Kodama’s 2010 introduction to Jorge Luis Borges: On Mysticism.
177
“A Problem” was included in Borges’s 1960 collection, The Maker.
178
Lacan, in a seminar, mentioned Borges. That reference is described as, “Lacan’s
tribute is grandiose and ambiguous” (Wood 32).
179
Actually Derrida does write more about Borges in another context, which is
discussed farther ahead.
180
The Garden of Forking Paths (El jardín de senderous que se bifurcan) was
actually published as one of the volumes of the two-volume collection titled
Ficciones (1935-1944), with Artifices (Artificious) as the second volume.
181
This is not at all intended to mean that all critical theorists and philosophers are
hopelessly arrogant and egocentric characters. Quite the contrary, many thinkers are
modest men and women. One thinks of Husserl, Wittgenstein and Bakhtin, three
relatively humble philosophical giants, and of numerous other figures. And even for
those philosophers or theorists who have moments of seeming quite “full of
themselves,” those may be an instance when the writer is unconscious about how he
or she is communicating in a passionate moment of arguing for an idea. Nonetheless,
this issue does need to be openly acknowledged.
182
Originally from La rosa profunda (The Unending Rose), 1975.
183
See especially Peter Lang’s Borges, Swedenborg and Mysticism, as well that
book’s extensively documentation and bibliography on this subject.
184
See also Fig. 1: Exploration of the Sources of the Orinoco River (Exploración de
las Fuentes del rio Orinoco), 1959.
185
Her original words are: Este cuadro es a mi juicio uno de los mejores que he
pintado. Es un modelo de traje de vagabundo, pero se trata de un vagabundo no
liberado, es un traje muy práctico y cómodo, como locomoción tiene tracción
delantera, si levanta el bastón, se detiene; el traje se puede cerrar herméticamente por
la noche, tiene una puertecilla que se puede cerrar con llave, algunas partes del traje
son de madera, pero como digo, el hombre no está liberado: en un lado del traje hay
un recoveco que equivale a la sala, allí hay un retrato colgado y tres libros. En el
pecho lleva una maceta donde cultiva una rosa, planta más fina y delicada que las que
encuentra por esos bosques, pero necesita el retrato, la rosa (añoranza de un jardincito
de una casa) y su gato; no es verdaderamente libre (Ovalle 115).
186
Swinford is quoting from Octavio Paz’s Visiones y desapariciones de Remedios
Varo.
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187

Arcq is referencing and quoting from P.D. Ouspensky’s Tertium Organum: The
Third Canon of Thought, A key to the Enigmas of the World. Rochester, New York:
Manas Press, 1920.
188
This quote from Varo’s letter to a Senor Gardner can also be found elsewhere, one
being in the catalog for the 2012 exhibition Indelible Fables: Remedios Varo, in the
catalog’s essay, “Remedios Varo: In Search of the Invisible Thread” by Terri Geis.
189
In this sentence, intuition is meant in the more common usage of sensing
something rather than the usage of phenomenological intuition introduced earlier in
the study.
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